Chullin

whereas R. Eliezer holds that we may draw this inference — outside services from inside services.1 And R. Jose comes to say that even as regards acts performed inside we do not hold that one man's wrongful intention should affect another's acts. It was reported: If one slaughtered a beast with the intention [expressed during the slaughtering] of sprinkling the blood or burning the fat unto idols, R.Johanan says. The beast is forbidden for all purposes; Resh Lakish says. It is permitted.2 ‘R. Johanan says it is forbidden’, because he accepts the principle: ‘a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence [even in connection with idolatry]’, for one must draw an analogy between acts performed inside3 and acts performed outside. ‘Resh Lakish says: it is permitted’, because he does not accept the principle, ‘a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence [in the case of idolatry]’, for one must not draw any analogy between acts performed inside and acts performed outside. Now they are consistent in their views, for it was also reported: If one slaughtered [a sin-offering] under its own name with the intention [expressed at the time of slaughtering] of sprinkling the blood under the name of another sacrifice, R. Johanan says, it is invalid; Resh Lakish says. It is valid. ‘R. Johanan says it is invalid’, because he accepts the principle, ‘a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence’, [even in this case], for we derive it from the case of piggul.4 ‘Resh Lakish says it is valid’, because he does not accept [in this case] the principle, ‘a wrongful Intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence’ for we may not derive it from the case of piggul. And it was necessary [for both disputes to be reported]. For if this dispute5 only was reported. I should have said that only here does Resh Lakish maintain his view, because we must not draw an inference as to acts performed outside from acts performed inside, but where each is a service performed inside he would no doubt concur with R. Johanan [that we derive one from the other]. And if the other dispute6 only was reported, I should have said that only there does R. Johanan maintain his view, but in this case he would no doubt concur with Resh Lakish. It was therefore necessary [that both disputes be reported]. R. Shesheth raised an objection. We have learnt: R. JOSE EXCLAIMED, IS THERE NOT HERE AN A FORTIORI ARGUMENT? FOR IF IN THE CASE OF CONSECRATED ANIMALS, WHERE A WRONGFUL INTENTION CAN RENDER INVALID, IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT EVERYTHING DEPENDS SOLELY UPON THE INTENTION OF HIM WHO PERFORMS THE SERVICE. HOW MUCH MORE IN THE CASE OF UNCONSECRATED ANIMALS, WHERE A WRONGFUL INTENTION CANNOT RENDER INVALID. DOES EVERYTHING DEPEND SOLELY UPON THE INTENTION OF HIM WHO SLAUGHTERS! Now what is meant by the assertion that in the case of unconsecrated animals a wrongful intention will not render invalid? Shall I say it means that in no wise will it render invalid? Then how is it possible for the prohibition of that which has been slaughtered to idols ever to take effect?7 Obviously it means a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service, and the Mishnah is to be interpreted thus: ‘If in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service renders them invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service does not render them invalid, does everything depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters’! Now the assertion with regard to services performed inside [namely, consecrated animals] contradicts Resh Lakish,8 and the assertion with regard to services performed outside [namely, unconsecrated animals] contradicts R. Johanan.9 I grant however, that as far as Resh Lakish is concerned, the assertion with regard to services performed inside presents no real difficulty, for one view10 he expressed before he learnt [the interpretation of the Mishnah] from [his master]. R. Johanan, and the other after he learnt it from R. Johanan. But [the assertion with regard to] services performed outside clearly contradicts R. Johanan! — After raising this objection he [R. Shesheth] answered it thus: [The Mishnah] refers to the four principal services,11 and the passage must be read as follows: If in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention12 expressed in the course of any one of the four principal services renders them invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, affect by his wrongful intention the act of another. wrongful intention in relation to another act thereof, the sacrifice would be invalid. E.g., if a person, whilst slaughtering the sacrifice, expressed the intention, of sprinkling the blood after the time prescribed for it, the sacrifice is piggul. the four principal services (v. infra) of performing another principal service, or of eating the sacrificial meat, at the improper time. V. Lev. VII, 18, and Zeb. II, 2. According to R. Johanan any wrongful intention expressed in this manner will have the effect of invalidating the sacrifice. offering. established, v. A.Z. 32b. renders it invalid; contra Resh Lakish. with regard to another service does not render it invalid; contra R. Johanan. course of one of these services the priest intended to eat the sacrificial meat at the improper time the sacrifice is piggul (Rashi). According to R. Gershom, Rashba and others, the meaning is: If in the course of the slaughtering he intended to perform one of the following services at the improper time, namely, to receive the blood, or to carry it forward, or to sprinkle it, or to burn the fat, the sacrifice is piggul. V. ;xuh atr ad loc.