Chullin

[or a sheep, or a goat, is brought forth, then it shall be seven days under the dam].1 ‘Or a sheep’ — this excludes2 a cross-breed. ‘Or a goat’ — this excludes a goat looking like a lamb. ‘Is brought forth’ — this excludes that which was extracted from the side.3 ‘It shall be seven days’ — this excludes an animal which is too young. ‘Under the dam’ — this excludes an orphan. Now what is meant by ‘an orphan’? Does it mean that the mother-beast brought forth its young and died immediately after? Must it then continue to live on for ever! Or, again, does it mean that the mother-beast died and immediately after the young was brought forth?4 But this would be excluded from the words, ‘Is brought forth’. It can only mean that the one expired at the same moment that the other came into life. Now if you say that the mother-beast must show signs of life after bringing forth,5 it is therefore necessary to employ a verse in order to exclude this case [of an orphan]; but if you say that it need not show signs of life after bringing forth,6 why then is a verse employed to exclude this case? It surely is excluded from the words, ‘Is brought forth’! Raba said: The law is as stated in the following Baraitha: ‘If a small animal stretched out its foreleg and did not withdraw it, the slaughtering is invalid; [but if it did withdraw it, it is valid.]7 These rules apply only to the foreleg, but with regard to the hind leg the rule is that whether it stretched it out but did not bend it, or bent it but did not stretch it out, it is valid. Moreover all this applies to a small animal, but with regard to a large animal the rule is that whether it was the foreleg or the hind leg, whether it stretched it out but did not bend it or bent it but did not stretch it out, it is valid. With regard to a bird, even if it merely twitched its wing8 or flapped its tail, it is a sufficient sign of vitality’. What does he [Raba] teach us? Surely these rules are all implied in our Mishnah: IF A SMALL ANIMAL STRETCHED OUT ITS FORELEG BUT DID NOT WITHDRAW IT, IT IS INVALID, FOR THIS WAS BUT AN INDICATION OF THE EXPIRATION OF ITS LIFE. Now it is clear that this applies to the foreleg and not to the hind leg to a small animal and not to a large animal!9 — It was necessary for him to teach it with regard to a bird, which is not stated in our Mishnah. MISHNAH. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED A BEAST FOR A HEATHEN,10 THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID; R. ELIEZER DECLARES IT INVALID.11 R. ELIEZER SAID, EVEN IF ONE SLAUGHTERED A BEAST WITH THE INTENTION THAT A HEATHEN SHOULD EAT OF THE MIDRIFF12 THEREOF, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID, FOR THE THOUGHTS OF A HEATHEN ARE USUALLY DIRECTED TOWARDS IDOLATRY. R. JOSE EXCLAIMED, IS THERE NOT HERE AN A FORTIORI ARGUMENT? FOR IF IN THE CASE OF CONSECRATED ANIMALS, WHERE A WRONGFUL INTENTION CAN RENDER INVALID, IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT EVERYTHING DEPENDS SOLELY UPON THE INTENTION OF HIM WHO PERFORMS THE SERVICE,13 HOW MUCH MORE IN THE CASE OF UNCONSECRATED ANIMALS, WHERE A WRONGFUL INTENTION CANNOT RENDER INVALID, DOES EVERYTHING DEPEND SOLELY UPON THE INTENTION OF HIM WHO SLAUGHTERS! GEMARA. These Tannaim14 accept the view of R. Eliezer son of R. Jose. For it has been taught: R. Eliezer son of R. Jose says: I am informed that the owners can render the sacrifice piggul.15 The first Tanna, however, is of the opinion that only if we heard him [the heathen] express an [idolatrous] intention [with regard to the animal] does it become invalid but not otherwise, for we do not say that the thoughts of a heathen are usually directed towards idolatry; whereas R. Eliezer is of the opinion that even if we did not hear him express an [idolatrous] intention [it is invalid], for we say that the thoughts of a heathen are usually directed towards idolatry. And R. Jose comes to say that even if we heard him express an [idolatrous] intention [it does not become invalid], for we do not hold that one man's wrongful intention should affect another's acts.16 According to another version they17 differ even in the case where we heard him [the heathen] express an [idolatrous] intention [with regard to the animal]. The first Tanna is of the opinion that the view that one man's wrongful intention may affect another's acts, applies only as regards acts performed inside [the Temple],18 but not outside,19 and we cannot draw any inference as to acts performed outside from acts performed inside; one moment after the slaughtering. was brought forth after the mother-beast had died, i.e., extracted out of the womb. be consumed by a Jew. person who performed the sacrificial acts had the proper intention with regard thereto. V. Pes. 46a. sacrifice invalid, i.e., render it kudp. V. Glos.