Chullin

[This case is quite different for] there the reasoning is expressly stated, viz., They said to R. Meir: Do you not agree that if the cask were to break the result would be that this person has from the outset been drinking untithed wine?1 To this [R. Meir] replied: When it breaks . . . !2 Rather we can derive it,3 from the teaching of Ayyo. For Ayyo taught: R. Judah says that a person cannot conditionally reserve for himself two contingencies simultaneously.4 [He may declare that] if a Sage comes to the east his ‘erub5 at the east should serve him,6 and if to the west his ‘erub at the west should serve him; but on no account [may he make such conditions] in the event of two Sages coming one to this side and the other to that side. Now it was argued. Why is it that in the event of two Sages coming one to this side and the other to that side that he may not make conditions? It is, is it not, because bererah is not held?7 Then even in the event of the Sage coming [to one side only], either to the east or to — the west, he should not be allowed to make conditions. [for the very same reason] that bererah is not held? And R. Johanan had explained that [in the latter case] the Sage had already arrived.8 Rather said R. Joseph:9 It is the view of R. Judah expressed in the matter of ‘Vessels’. For we have learnt: Whatsoever vessels, which may be moved on the Sabbath, fragments thereof10 may likewise be moved on the Sabbath, provided they can perform aught in the nature of work,11 e.g., fragments of a kneading trough that can be used for stopping the bung-hole of a cask, or fragments of a glass for covering the mouth of a flask. R. Judah says: Provided they can perform aught in the nature of their former work, e.g., fragments of a kneading trough that can have porridge poured into them, or fragments of a glass that can have oil poured into them. Now according to R. Judah [they are permitted to be moved] only if they can perform aught in the nature of their former work, but not if they can perform aught in the nature of some other work. This, therefore, shows that since they were not set in readiness on the eve of the Sabbath for that particular work, it is forbidden [to use them for such purpose on the Sabbath]; so, too. In the case of our Mishnah, since the animal was not set in readiness on the eve of the Sabbath for food, it is forbidden [to be so used on the Sabbath]. Thereupon Abaye said to him: What a comparison! There we are dealing with something that was originally a vessel and is now a fragment of a vessel, which is a case of nolad12 and consequently forbidden; whereas here [in our Mishnah] we are dealing with something that was originally [intended for] food13 and now, too, is [intended for] food, it is therefore the same foodstuff merely more defined.14 And we have already ascertained that according to R. Judah, where the foodstuff is the same but more defined it is permitted.15 For we have learnt:16 One must not press fruit [on the Sabbath] in order to extract the juice, and even if the juice oozed out by itself it is forbidden.17 R. Judah says. If [the fruits were intended] to be eaten, the juice which oozed out is permitted,18 but if [they were kept only] for their juice, that which oozed out by itself is forbidden. [R. Joseph replied:19 But] has it not been stated in connection therewith: Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel that R. Judah accepts the opinion of the Rabbis in the case of baskets of olives and grapes?20 Now the reason for this is clear, namely, since these fruits are usually kept for pressing one would always be inclined to do so at all times. Similarly it must be said [here in the case of our Mishnah], since an animal is usually kept for slaughtering one would always be inclined to do so.21 — [Abaye replied]. Indeed, the whole argument is based upon Rab's original statement, is it not? And Rab has stated that R. Judah was in conflict with the Rabbis even in the case of baskets of olives and grapes! 22 Rather said R. Shesheth b. Idi, It is the view of R. Judah expressed in the matter of ‘Lamps’. For it has been taught: A new lamp may be moved [on the Sabbath] from place to place but not an old one;23 so according to R. Judah. But perhaps we are to understand R. Judah's view only in case of mukzeh on account of nauseousness,24 but are we to understand that it applies also to cases of mukzeh in consequence of a ritual prohibition? — Yes, indeed, for it has been taught: R. Judah says, procedure and not because they do not hold bererah. boundaries of his town. If, however, he desires to go further, he must make an ‘erub, i.e., he deposits on the eve of Sabbath some food, enough for two meals, at a spot at the limit of the prescribed two thousand cubits’ distance. This spot is regarded in law as his temporary abode and he may then go two thousand cubits beyond it. Having, however, gained two thousand cubits in one direction he forfeits his right of movement in any other direction outside the town boundaries. It is obvious that a person can make only one ‘erub and place it in that direction in which he intends to go. It is, however, provided for, in the event of a person being undecided as to which direction he will take on the Sabbath, that he may place a conditional ‘erub in each direction, and on the Sabbath when he makes his decision the ‘erub in the particular direction chosen will be effective. than two thousand cubits beyond the boundaries of his town. not known which is to be effective; it is only when the decision is made on the Sabbath that a particular ‘erub is determined retrospectively to be the one intended to be effective from the outset. before the Sabbath which ‘erub is effective by the arrival of the Sage. All that remains is for this person to ascertain this fact. This Baraitha, however, clearly proves from the first clause that R. Judah does not hold bererah; hence the suggestion of R. Abba that the view in the Mishnah corresponds with that of R. Judah in the matter of ‘Readiness’ can no longer be maintained. festival or on the Sabbath, may not be so used on that day. food, for otherwise it would be forbidden to slaughter an animal on the Festival. slaughtered on the Sabbath. would constitute a breach of one of the main classes of work prohibited. but as the fruit itself in a more particular and defined form. R. Judah in the Mishnah quoted corresponds with the view of our Mishnah. that R. Judah adopts a lenient view. the Sabbath. Mishnah; so that the original question remains open: Why, according to R. Judah, is the animal forbidden to be eaten on the Sabbath? having already had oil poured into it for lighting would rarely be used for another purpose — it would be nauseating to do so — and so would be regarded in law as mukzeh (set apart, not counted on for use), and consequently forbidden to be moved. This same reasoning applies to our Mishnah: since the animal was not slaughtered before the Sabbath it certainly was not counted on as food for the Sabbath; it is therefore mukzeh and forbidden to be eaten. mukzeh in consequence of a ritual prohibition.