Soncino English Talmud
Bava Metzia
Daf 3a
and where it could be maintained that the whole amount is due solely to that party Symmachus abides by the principle that 'Disputed money of doubtful ownership should be divided without an oath', how much more readily would he abide by that principle in a case where [as in our Mishnah] it can be said that the disputed object belongs to both [and that therefore it should be divided between them without an oath]? It can still be maintained that our Mishnah is in agreement with Symmachus. For the oath imposed upon disputants in our Mishnah is only rabbinical [not Biblical]. This is expressly maintained by R. Johanan. For R. Johanan says: This oath is an institution of the Sages, intended to prevent anyone from going out and seizing a neighbour's garment, declaring it to be his own. Shall it be assumed that our Mishnah is not in agreement with R. Jose? For does not R. Jose say: If so, what loss does the fraudulent claimant incur? Therefore let the whole amount be retained [by the Court] until 'the coming of Elijah'? But [as a counter-question] would not the same difficulty arise in regard to the Rabbis [who are opposed to R. Jose]? For seeing that these Rabbis maintain that the balance should be retained [by the Court] until 'the coming of Elijah'. would they not accordingly give the same decision concerning the disputed garment [in our case], which is like the disputed balance [in the other case]? — What a comparison! In the other case, where it is certain that the disputed balance belongs to one of the claimants only, those Rabbis rightly decided that the amount in question should be retained till 'the coming of Elijah'; whereas here [in our Mishnah], where it can be assumed that the garment belongs to both, the [same] Rabbis would agree that it should be divided among the two claimants when they have taken the oath. But in regard to R. Jose the argument is the other way. If R. Jose decided in his case, where each claimant is undoubtedly entitled to one hundred [zuz], that the money should be retained till 'the coming of Elijah', how much more readily would he decide so in our case [where it can be assumed that only one of the disputants is entitled to have the garment]? — The Mishnah can still be in agreement with R. Jose. For in his case one of the disputants is bound to be a fraud, whilst in our case no one can say for sure that one of the disputants is a fraud, as it is possible that both picked up the garment simultaneously. If you wish it, I could argue thus: In his case, R. Jose penalised the fraudulent claimant [in making him forfeit his hundred] so that he may confess the truth, but in our case [where the dispute is about a found article] what real loss would the fraudulent incur [on the garment being forfeited] that could induce him to confess the truth? [But the question arises:] Assuming this argument is right with regard to a found article, how can it apply to a bought article? The first answer is hence the best. [Now the question arises:] According to the views of either the Sages or R. Jose [who agree that the fraudulent person should not be allowed to benefit by his fraud] how is it that in the case of the shopkeeper and his credit-book the decision is that both take the oath and receive payment [from the householder] and we do not say that the money should be taken from the householder and retained [by the Court] until 'the coming of Elijah', since it is certain that one of the parties is guilty of fraud? — In this case there is a special reason for the decision given. The shopkeeper can say to the householder: 'I carried out your instructions — what have I to do with your employee? Even if the employee swears — I do not believe his oath. You trusted him, in that you did not tell me to give him the goods in the presence of witnesses.' The employee, on the other hand, can say [to the householder]: 'I have done the work for you — what have I to do with the shopkeeper? Even if he swears — I do not believe him.' Therefore they both swear and receive payment from the householder. R. Hiyya taught: [If one says to another,] 'You have in your possession a hundred zuz belonging to me', and the other replies, 'I have nothing belonging to you', while witnesses testify that the defendant has fifty zuz belonging to the plaintiff; the defendant pays the plaintiff fifty zuz, and takes an oath regarding the remainder, for the admission of a defendant ought not to be more effective than the evidence of witnesses, a rule which could be proved by a Kal wa-homer. And our Tanna teaches this: WHEN TWO HOLD A GARMENT AND ONE OF THEM SAYS 'I FOUND IT' ETC. … [BOTH HAVE TO SWEAR]. Now this is just the same [as the case where there are witnesses], for when we see a person holding a garment we presume that it is his, and we are in the position of witnesses who can testify that each claimant is entitled to the half he is holding. And yet each claimant has to swear. Now why is it necessary to prove by means of a Kal wa-homer that the admission of a defendant ought not to be more effective [in imposing an oath on the defendant] than the testimony of witnesses? — [It is necessary for this reason:] In the case of a [partial] admission [of a claim] you might say that the Divine Law has imposed an oath upon him for the reason indicated by Rabbah. For Rabbah said: The reason the Torah has declared that he who admits part of his opponent's claim must take an oath is the presumption that nobody would take up such an impertinent attitude towards his creditor [as to give a complete denial to his claim]. The defendant [in this case] would have liked to give a complete denial, but he has not done so because he has not been able to take up such an impertinent attitude.
Sefaria
Bava Metzia 4a · Bava Metzia 6a · Shevuot 45a · Bava Metzia 5a · Shevuot 42b · Gittin 51b · Ketubot 18a · Bava Metzia 5b
Mesoret HaShas
Bava Metzia 5a · Shevuot 42b · Gittin 51b · Ketubot 18a · Bava Metzia 5b