Bava Kamma

through which her pecuniary value is decreased,  whereas regarding mere wounding, through which her pecuniary value would not [usually] decrease there was never any question [that the compensation would not go to the father. How then could R. Johanan speak of mere wounding?] — R. Jose b. Hanina replied: We suppose the wound to have been made in her face, thus causing her pecuniary value to be decreased. ONE WHO INJURES A CANAANITE SLAVE BELONGING TO ANOTHER PERSON IS [SIMILARLY] LIABLE FOR ALL [FIVE ITEMS]. R. JUDAH, HOWEVER, SAYS THAT NO DEGRADATION IS PAID IN THE CASE OF [CANAANITE] SLAVES. What is the reason of R. Judah? — As Scripture says:  'When men strive together one with another' the law applies to one who can claim brotherhood and thus excludes a slave who cannot claim brotherhood.  And the Rabbis?  — They would say that even a slave is a brother in so far as he is subject to commandments. If this is so, would you say that according to R. Judah witnesses proved zomemim  in a capital accusation against a slave would not be subject to be put to death in virtue of the words:  'Then shall ye do unto him as he had purposed to do unto his brother'?  — Raba said that R. Shesheth stated: The verse concludes:  'So shalt thou put away the evil from among you', implying 'on all accounts' — Would you say that according to the Rabbis  a slave would be eligible to be chosen as king?  — I would reply: According to your reasoning would the same difficulty not arise regarding a proselyte, whichever view we accept  unless we suppose that when Scripture says 'One from among thy brethren',  it implies 'one of the choicest of thy brethren'?  — But again would you now also say that according to the Rabbis, a slave would be eligible to give evidence,  since it says, And behold, if the witness be a false witness and hath testified falsely against his brother?  — 'Ulla replied: Regarding evidence you can surely not argue thus. For that he  is disqualified from giving evidence can be learnt by means of an a fortiori from the law in the case of Woman: for if Woman who is eligible to enter [by marriage] into the congregation [of Israel] is yet ineligible to give evidence,  how much more must a slave who is not eligible to enter [by marriage] into the congregation [of Israel] be ineligible to give evidence? But why is Woman disqualified if not perhaps because she is not subject to the law of circumcision? How then can you assert the same In the case of a slave who is subject to circumcision?  — The case of a [male] minor will meet this objection, for in spite of his being subject to circumcision he is disqualified from giving evidence.  But why is a minor disqualified if not perhaps because he is not subject to commandments?  How then can you assert the same in the case of a slave who is subject to commandments?  — The case of Woman will meet this objection, for though she is subject to commandments she is disqualified from giving evidence. The argument is thus endlessly reversible. There are features in the one instance which are not found in the other, and vice versa. The features common to both  are that they are not subject to all the commandments  and that they are disqualified from giving evidence. I will therefore include with them a slave who also is not subject to all the commandments and should therefore also be disqualified from giving evidence. But why [I may ask] is the feature common to them  that they are disqualified from giving evidence if not perhaps because neither of them is a man?  How then can you assert the same in the case of a slave who is a man? — You must therefore deduce the disqualification of a slave from the law applicable in the case of a robber.  But why is there this disqualification in the case of a robber if not because his own deeds caused it? How then can you assert the same in the case of a slave whose own deeds could surely not cause it?  — You must therefore deduce the disqualification of a slave from both the law applicable to a robber and the law applicable to either of these [referred to above].  Mar, the son of Rabina, however, said: Scripture says: 'The fathers shall not be put to death through  the children';  from this it could be inferred that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [persons who if they were to be] fathers would have no legal paternity over their children.  For if you assume that the verse is to be taken literally, 'fathers shall not be put to death through children', meaning, 'through the evidence of children', the Divine Law should have written 'Fathers shall not be put to death through their children'. Why then is it written 'children', unless to indicate that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [persons who if they were to be] fathers would have no legal paternity over their children? If that is so, would you also say that the concluding clause 'neither shall the children be put to death through the fathers' similarly implies that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [witnesses who as] children would have no legal filiation with respect to their fathers, and therefore argue that a proselyte  should similarly be disqualified from giving evidence?  — It may be said that there is no comparison: It is true that a proselyte has no legal relationship to his ancestors, still he has legal relationship with his descendants, [but we may therefore] exclude a slave who has relationships neither with ancestors nor with descendants. For if you should assume that a proselyte is disqualified from giving evidence, the Divine Law should surely have written: 'Fathers shall not be put to death through their children', which would mean what we stated, that they would not be put to death through the evidence of children, and after this the Divine Law should have written: 'Neither shall children be put to death through fathers,' as from such a text you would have derived the two rules: one that children should not be put to death through the evidence of fathers and the other that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [witnesses who as] children have no legal filiation with respect to their fathers.  The disqualification in the case of a slave would surely have been derived by means of an a fortiori from the law applicable to a proselyte: for if a proselyte, who has no legal relationship to his ancestors but has legal relationship to his descendants, is disqualified from giving evidence, how much more must a slave who has legal relationship neither to ancestors nor to descendants be disqualified from giving evidence? But since the Divine Law has written: 'Fathers shall not be put to death through children', which implies that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [witnesses who as] fathers would have no legal paternity over their children, we can derive from this that it is only a [Canaanite] slave who has relationship neither to ancestors nor to descendants that will be disqualified from giving evidence, whereas a proselyte will be eligible to give evidence on account of the fact that he has legal paternity over his children. If you object, why did the Divine Law not write: 'Neither shall children be put to death through their fathers', and why did the Divine Law write 'And neither shall children be put to death through fathers', which appears to imply that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed [on the evidence of] the mouth of [witnesses who as] children would have no legal filiation with respect to fathers,  [my answer is that] since it was written, 'Fathers shall not be put to death through children', it was further written, 'neither shall children be put to death through fathers.' A DEAF, MUTE AN IDIOT AND A MINOR ARE AWKWARD TO DEAL WITH. The mother of R. Samuel b. Abba of Hagronia  was married to R. Abba,  and bequeathed her possessions to R. Samuel b. Abba, her son. After her death