Bava Kamma

— To include [damage done by fire] lapping his neighbour's ploughed field and grazing his stones. THE FEATURE COMMON TO THEM ALL … What else is this clause intended to include? — Abaye said: A stone, a knife and luggage which, having been placed by a person on the top of his roof, fell down through a normal wind and did damage.  In what circumstances [did they do the damage]? If while they were in motion, they are equivalent to Fire! How is this case different? Just as Fire is aided by an external force  and, being your possession, is under your control, so also is the case with those which are likewise aided by an external force and, being your possessions are under your control. If [on the other hand, damage was done] after they were at rest, then, if abandoned, according to both Rab and Samuel, they are equivalent to Pit.  How is their case different? Just as Pit is from its very inception a source of injury, and, being your possession is under your control, so also is the case with those  which from their very inception [as nuisances] are likewise sources of injury, and, being your possession are under your control.  Furthermore, even if they were not abandoned, according to Samuel who maintains that we deduce [the law governing] all nuisances from Pit,  they are [again] equivalent to Pit? — Indeed they were abandoned, still they are not equivalent to Pit. Why [is liability attached] to Pit if not because no external force assists it? How then can you assert [the same] in the case of those  which are assisted by an external force? — Fire,  however, will refute [this reasoning]. But [you may ask] why [is liability attached] to Fire if not because of its nature to travel and do damage?  — Pit, however, will refute [this reasoning]. The argument is [thus endlessly] reversible [and liability  can be deduced only from the Common Aspects]. Raba said: [This clause is intended] to include a nuisance which is rolled about [from one place to another] by the feet of man and by the feet of animal [and causes damage]. In what circumstances [did it do the damage]? If it was abandoned, according to both Rab and Samuel,  it is equivalent to Pit! How does its case differ? Just as Pit is from its very inception a source of injury, and is under your control, so also is the case with that which from its very inception [as a nuisance] is likewise a source of injury, and is under your control. Furthermore, even if it were not abandoned, according to Samuel,  who maintains that we deduce [the law governing] all nuisances from Pit, it is [again] equivalent to Pit? — Indeed it was abandoned, still it is not equivalent to Pit: Why [is liability attached] to Pit if not because the making of it solely caused the damage? How then can you assert [the same] in the case of such nuisances,  the making of which did not directly cause the damage?  — Ox, however, will refute [this reasoning]. But [you may ask] why [is liability attached] to Ox if not because of its habit to walk about and do damage? — Pit will refute [this reasoning]. The argument is [thus endlessly] reversible as the aspect of the one is not comparable to the aspect of the other, [and liability  therefore can be deduced only from the Common Aspects]. R. Adda b. Ahabah said: To include that which is taught:  'All those who open their gutters or sweep out the dust of their cellars [into public thoroughfares] are in the summer period acting unlawfully, but lawfully in winter; [in all cases] however, even though they act lawfully, if special damage resulted they are liable to compensate.' But in what circumstances? If the damage occurred while [the nuisances were] in motion, is it not man's direct act?  If, on the other hand, it occurred after they were at rest, [again] in what circumstances? If they were abandoned, then, according to both Rab and Samuel,  they are equivalent to Pit! How does their case differ? Just as Pit is from its very inception a source of injury, and, being your possession, is under your control, so also is the case with those which are likewise from their very inception [as nuisances] sources of injury and, being your possession, are under your control. Furthermore, even if they were not abandoned, according to Samuel,  who maintains that we deduce [the law governing] all nuisances from Pit, they are [again] equivalent to Pit? — Indeed they were abandoned, still they are not equivalent to Pit: Why [is liability attached] to Pit if not because of its being unlawful?  How then could you assert [the same] in the case of those which [in winter] are lawful? —