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Parallel Talmud

Bava Kamma — Daf 6a

Babylonian Talmud (Gemara) · Soncino English Talmud

לאתויי ליחכה נירו וסכסכה אבניו

הצד השוה שבהן לאתויי מאי אמר אביי לאתויי אבנו סכינו ומשאו שהניחן בראש גגו ונפלו ברוח מצויה והזיקו

היכי דמי אי בהדי דקא אזלי קא מזקי היינו אש

מאי שנא אש דכח אחר מעורב בו וממונך ושמירתו עליך הני נמי כח אחר מעורב בהן וממונך ושמירתו עליך

ואלא בתר דנייחי אי דאפקרינהו בין לרב בין לשמואל היינו בור

מאי שנא בור שכן תחילת עשייתו לנזק וממונך ושמירתן עליך הני נמי תחילת עשייתן לנזק וממונך ושמירתן עליך

אלא דלא אפקרינהו לשמואל דאמר כולם מבורו למדנו היינו בור

לעולם דאפקרינהו ולא דמו לבור מה לבור שכן אין כח אחר מעורב בו תאמר בהני שכח אחר מעורב בהן

אש תוכיח

מה לאש שכן דרכו לילך ולהזיק

בור תוכיח וחזר הדין

רבא אמר לאתויי בור המתגלגל ברגלי אדם וברגלי בהמה

ה"ד אי דאפקרינהו בין לרב בין לשמואל היינו בור

מאי שנא בור שכן תחילת עשייתו לנזק ושמירתו עליך הני נמי תחילת עשייתן לנזק ושמירתן עליך

אלא דלא אפקרינהו לשמואל דאמר כולם מבורו למדנו היינו בור

לעולם דאפקרינהו ולא דמי לבור מה לבור שכן מעשיו גרמו לו תאמר בהני שאין מעשיו גרמו לו

שור יוכיח

מה לשור שכן דרכו לילך ולהזיק בור תוכיח

וחזר הדין לא ראי זה כראי זה

רב אדא בר אהבה אמר לאתויי הא דתניא כל אלו שאמרו פותקין ביבותיהן וגורפין מערותיהן בימות החמה אין להם רשות בימות הגשמים יש להם רשות אע"פ שברשות אם הזיקו חייבים לשלם

היכי דמי אי בהדי דקאזלי מזקי כחו הוא

אלא בתר דנייח היכי דמי אי דאפקרינהו בין לרב בין לשמואל היינו בור מ"ש בור דתחילת עשייתו לנזק וממונך ושמירתו עליך הני נמי תחילת עשייתן לנזק וממונך ושמירתן עליך

אלא דלא אפקרינהו לשמואל דאמר כולם מבורו למדנו היינו בור

לעולם דאפקרינהו ולא דמי לבור מה לבור שכן שלא ברשות תאמר בהני דברשות

— To include [damage done by fire] lapping his neighbour's ploughed field and grazing his stones. THE FEATURE COMMON TO THEM ALL … What else is this clause intended to include? — Abaye said: A stone, a knife and luggage which, having been placed by a person on the top of his roof, fell down through a normal wind and did damage.  In what circumstances [did they do the damage]? If while they were in motion, they are equivalent to Fire! How is this case different? Just as Fire is aided by an external force  and, being your possession, is under your control, so also is the case with those which are likewise aided by an external force and, being your possessions are under your control. If [on the other hand, damage was done] after they were at rest, then, if abandoned, according to both Rab and Samuel, they are equivalent to Pit.  How is their case different? Just as Pit is from its very inception a source of injury, and, being your possession is under your control, so also is the case with those  which from their very inception [as nuisances] are likewise sources of injury, and, being your possession are under your control.  Furthermore, even if they were not abandoned, according to Samuel who maintains that we deduce [the law governing] all nuisances from Pit,  they are [again] equivalent to Pit? — Indeed they were abandoned, still they are not equivalent to Pit. Why [is liability attached] to Pit if not because no external force assists it? How then can you assert [the same] in the case of those  which are assisted by an external force? — Fire,  however, will refute [this reasoning]. But [you may ask] why [is liability attached] to Fire if not because of its nature to travel and do damage?  — Pit, however, will refute [this reasoning]. The argument is [thus endlessly] reversible [and liability  can be deduced only from the Common Aspects]. Raba said: [This clause is intended] to include a nuisance which is rolled about [from one place to another] by the feet of man and by the feet of animal [and causes damage]. In what circumstances [did it do the damage]? If it was abandoned, according to both Rab and Samuel,  it is equivalent to Pit! How does its case differ? Just as Pit is from its very inception a source of injury, and is under your control, so also is the case with that which from its very inception [as a nuisance] is likewise a source of injury, and is under your control. Furthermore, even if it were not abandoned, according to Samuel,  who maintains that we deduce [the law governing] all nuisances from Pit, it is [again] equivalent to Pit? — Indeed it was abandoned, still it is not equivalent to Pit: Why [is liability attached] to Pit if not because the making of it solely caused the damage? How then can you assert [the same] in the case of such nuisances,  the making of which did not directly cause the damage?  — Ox, however, will refute [this reasoning]. But [you may ask] why [is liability attached] to Ox if not because of its habit to walk about and do damage? — Pit will refute [this reasoning]. The argument is [thus endlessly] reversible as the aspect of the one is not comparable to the aspect of the other, [and liability  therefore can be deduced only from the Common Aspects]. R. Adda b. Ahabah said: To include that which is taught:  'All those who open their gutters or sweep out the dust of their cellars [into public thoroughfares] are in the summer period acting unlawfully, but lawfully in winter; [in all cases] however, even though they act lawfully, if special damage resulted they are liable to compensate.' But in what circumstances? If the damage occurred while [the nuisances were] in motion, is it not man's direct act?  If, on the other hand, it occurred after they were at rest, [again] in what circumstances? If they were abandoned, then, according to both Rab and Samuel,  they are equivalent to Pit! How does their case differ? Just as Pit is from its very inception a source of injury, and, being your possession, is under your control, so also is the case with those which are likewise from their very inception [as nuisances] sources of injury and, being your possession, are under your control. Furthermore, even if they were not abandoned, according to Samuel,  who maintains that we deduce [the law governing] all nuisances from Pit, they are [again] equivalent to Pit? — Indeed they were abandoned, still they are not equivalent to Pit: Why [is liability attached] to Pit if not because of its being unlawful?  How then could you assert [the same] in the case of those which [in winter] are lawful? —