Bava Kamma

'You can take it for granted that in the ordinary run of thefts there is Renunciation on the part of the owner; since the Torah has laid down that where the thief slaughtered or sold [the stolen sheep or ox] he should pay fourfold or five-fold payments [respectively]. For is there not a possibility that the owner had not abandoned hope? We must therefore say that in the ordinary run of thefts there is Renunciation on the part of the owner.'  But why should the liability not hold good even where hope was not abandoned?  — I would say, let not this enter your mind. For selling is placed on a par with slaughter: just as in the case of slaughter his act is of practical avail, so also in the case of selling his act should be of practical validity; and if it takes place before Renunciation, what would be the legal validity?  But again can it not be [that the liability is confined to cases] where we actually heard the owner abandoning hope? — I would reply, let not this enter your mind. For selling is put on a par with slaughter, and just as slaughter involves liability [if carried out] immediately [after the theft], so would selling similarly involve liability soon after the theft. R. Johanan said to him:  The law in the case of stealing a man  could prove that even where there is no Renunciation on the part of the owner  there will be liability. This statement seems to show that R. Johanan held that selling before Renunciation involves liability.  What then about selling after Renunciation?  — R. Johanan said that the thief is liable, but Resh Lakish said he is exempt. R. Johanan who said that he would be liable held that the liability was both before Renunciation and after Renunciation. But Resh Lakish, who said that he would be exempt,  maintained that the liability was only before Renunciation, whereas after Renunciation he would have already acquired title to the animal, and it was his that he slaughtered and his that he sold. R. Johanan objected to Resh Lakish's view [from the following:] If he stole [a sheep or an ox] and after consecrating it slaughtered it, he should make double payment  but would not make four-fold and five-fold payments.  Now, when could this be? If before Renunciation, how does the animal become consecrated? Does not the Divine Law say 'And when a man shall sanctify his house to be holy',  [implying that] just as his house is his,  so also anything he consecrates must be his?  It must therefore apply to the time after Renunciation.  Now the reason is that he consecrated it: he has not to make four-fold and five-fold payments because when he slaughtered the animal it was a consecrated animal that he slaughtered; had he not, however, consecrated it he would have had to make four-fold and five-fold payments if he would have slaughtered it. Now, if you assume that Renunciation transfers ownership why should he  pay since it was his that he slaughtered and his that he sold? — He replied:  We are dealing here with a case where, for instance, the owner  consecrated the animal while it was in the possession of the thief.  But will it in that case become consecrated? Did not R. Johanan say  that where a robber misappropriated an article and the owner has not abandoned hope of recovering it, neither of them is able to consecrate it: the one  because it is not his, the other  because it is not in his possession? — We might reply that he  had in mind the practice of the virtuous, as we have learnt: The virtuous  used to set aside money and to declare that whatever has been gleaned [by passers-by] from this [vineyard]  shall be redeemed by this money.  But [if the owner consecrated the animal], has not the principal thus been restored to the owner? [Why then should a thief pay double on it? — We assume a case where the consecration took place] after the case came into court [and evidence had already been given against the thief]. What were the circumstances? If the judges had already ordered him to go and pay the owner, why should exemption be only where he consecrated the animal? Why even where the owner did not consecrate it should the thief be liable? For did Raba not say that if [after the judges said], 'Go forth and pay him,' the thief slaughtered or sold the animal, he would be exempt, the reason being that since the judges had given their final sentence on the matter, when he sold or slaughtered the animal, he became [in the eye of the law] a 'robber', and a 'robber' has not to pay four-fold and five-fold payments,