Bava Kamma

could he then be called 'rooted in sin' [since the sale is of no validity]? It must therefore be after Renunciation.  But if you assume that Renunciation transfers ownership, why should he make four-fold and five-fold payments,  when it is his that he slaughters and his that he sells? — It may, however, be said as Raba stated elsewhere,  that it means 'because he doubled  his sin,' so likewise here it means, 'because he doubled his sin.' Come and hear: 'He slaughtered it and sold it;  just as the slaughter cannot be undone so the sale cannot be undone.' Now, when could this be so? If before Renunciation, why can it not be undone?  It must surely therefore be after Renunciation.  But if you assume that Renunciation transfers ownership, why should he pay fourfold and five-fold  when it is his that he slaughters and his that he sells? — As R. Nahman stated elsewhere, that it means to except a case where he transferred the animal for thirty days,  so also here it means to except a case where he transferred the beast for thirty days. An objection was raised [against this]: If a man steals an article and another comes and steals it from him, the first thief has to make double payment, whereas the second will not pay [anything] but the principal alone.  If, however, one stole [a sheep or an ox] and sold it, after which another one came and stole it, the first thief has to make four-fold and five-fold payments [respectively], while the second has to make double payment.  If one stole [a sheep or an ox] and slaughtered it, and another one came and stole it, the first thief will make four-fold and five-fold payments [respectively], whereas the second has not to make double payment but to repay the principal only.  Now, it has been taught in the middle clause: 'If however, one stole [a sheep or an ox] and sold it, after which another came and stole it, the first thief has to make four-fold and five-fold payments [respectively], while the second has to make double payment.'  But when could this be? If before Renunciation, why should the second make  double payment?  Is there any authority who maintains that a change in possession without Renunciation transfers ownership? It must therefore be after Renunciation. But if you assume that Renunciation transfers ownership, why then has he to make four-fold and five-fold payments,  seeing that it is his which he sold? And further, it was taught in the opening clause: 'If a man steals an article and another comes and steals it from him, the first thief has to make double payment, but the second will not pay [anything] but the principal.'  Now, since it is the time after Renunciation with which we are dealing, if you assume that Renunciation transfers ownership, why should the second 'not pay anything but the principal'?  Does not this show that Renunciation does not transfer ownership, in contradiction to the view of Rab? — Raba said: Do you really think that the text of this teaching is correct? For was it not taught in the concluding clause: 'If one stole [a sheep or an ox] and slaughtered it and another came and stole it, the first thief will make fourfold and five-fold payments [respectively], whereas the second has to pay nothing but the principal'? Now, is there any authority who maintains that a change in substance does not transfer ownership?  It must therefore surely still be said that the whole teaching refers to the time before Renunciation, but we have to transpose the ruling of the concluding clause to the case in the middle clause, and the ruling of the middle clause to the case in the concluding clause and read thus: If one stole [a sheep or an ox] and sold it, and another came and stole it, the first thief has to make four-fold and five-fold payments [respectively], but the second has not to pay anything but the principal, as a change in possession without Renunciation transfers no ownership. If, however, one stole [a sheep or an ox] and slaughtered it and another came and stole it, the first thief makes four-fold and five-fold payments [respectively], and the second makes double payment,  as ownership was transferred [to the first thief] by the change in substance.' R. Papa, however, said: All the same  you need not transpose [the rulings], since [we may say that] the concluding clause is in accordance with Beth Shammai, who maintain  that a change leaves the article in its previous status. But if so [that it was after Renunciation], will not the opening clause and middle clause be in contradiction to the view of Rab? — R. Zebid therefore said: The whole text could still refer to the time before Renunciation, as we are dealing here with a case where the owner abandoned hope [of regaining the stolen object] when it was already in the possession of the buyer, but had not abandoned it while it was still in the possession of the thief, so that [so far as the buyer was concerned] there was Renunciation [as well as a change in possession].  You should, however, not think [that this is so] because we need both Renunciation and a change in possession for the purpose of transferring ownership, as even Renunciation alone would also transfer ownership  to the thief.  It is, however, impossible to find a case in which both the first thief and the second thief should simultaneously pay except in this way. It was stated: If the thief sells before Renunciation, R. Nahman said that he is liable, while R. Shesheth said that he is exempt. R. Nahman who said that he would be liable held that since the Divine Law says 'and he sold it' and as the thief [in this case] did sell it, it makes no difference whether it was before Renunciation or after Renunciation, while R. Shesheth, who said that he would be exempt, held that the liability was only where he sold it after Renunciation,  where the act has a legal validity, whereas before Renunciation, when the act has no legal validity,  there could be no liability, as selling is compared to slaughter where it is necessary that the act should be of practical avail. R. Shesheth said: Whence have I inferred the view expressed by me? It was taught: 'R. Akiba said: Why does the Torah say that where the thief slaughtered and sold the stolen [sheep or ox] he should make four-fold and five-fold payments respectively? Because he became thereby rooted in sin.' Now, when could this be said of him? If before Renunciation, could he then be called 'rooted in sin' [since the sale is of no legal validity]?  Must it therefore not be after Renunciation?  — Raba said: It only means, because he doubled his sin. Come and hear: 'And he slaughtered it or sold it,'  just as slaughter cannot be undone, so the sale [must be one] which cannot be undone.' Now, when could this be so? If before Renunciation, why can it not be undone?  Must it therefore not be after Renunciation,  thus proving that the liability is only if it is sold after Renunciation?  — But R. Nahman interpreted it merely to except a case where he transferred the animal for thirty days.  Also R. Eleazar maintained that the liability would be only after Renunciation, as R. Eleazar stated: