Bava Kamma

Where an ox [of a private owner] together with an ox that was sacred  but became disqualified  [for the altar], gored [an animal]. Abaye said that the private owner would have to pay half damages,  whereas Rabina said that he would have to pay quarter damages.  Both the one and the other are speaking of Tam, but while Rabina followed the view of the Rabbis,  Abaye followed that of R. Nathan.  Or if you wish you may say that both the one and the other followed the view of the Rabbis,  but while Rabina was speaking of Tam  Abaye was speaking of Mu'ad. Some report that Abaye stated half damages and Rabina full damages. The one ruling like the other would refer to the case of Mu'ad, but while one  followed the Rabbis  the other  followed the view of R. Nathan.  If you wish you may say that the one ruling like the other followed the view of R. Nathan, but while ones was speaking of Mu'ad, the other  was speaking of Tam. Raba said: If an ox along with a man pushes [certain things] into a pit, on account of Depreciation  they would all [three]  be liable, but on account of the four [additional] items  or with respect to compensation for the value of [lost] embryos.  Man would be liable  but Cattle and Pit exempt;  in respect of kofer  or the thirty shekels  for [the killing of] a slave, Cattle would be liable  but Man and Pit exempt;  in respect of damage done to inanimate objects or to a sacred ox which had become disqualified [for the altar], Man and Cattle would be liable but Pit exempt, the reason being that Scripture says, And the dead beast shall be his,  [implying that it was only] in the case of an ox whose carcass could be his  [that there would be liability], excluding thus the case of this [ox] whose carcass could not be his.  Does this mean that this last point was quite certain to Raba? Did not Raba put it as a query? For Raba asked; If a sacred ox which had become disqualified  [for the altar] fell into a pit, what would be the legal position? Shall we say that this [verse], And the beast shall be his, [confines liability to the case of] an ox whose carcass could be his, thus excluding the case of this ox whose carcass could never be his,  or shall we say that the words And the dead beast shall be his are intended only to lay down that the owners [plaintiffs] have to retain the carcass as part payment?  [The fact is that] after raising the question he himself solved it. But whence [then] would he derive the law that the owners [plaintiffs] have to retain the carcass as part payment? — He would derive it from the clause and the dead shall be his own  [inserted in the case] of Cattle. What reason have you for rising [the clause] And the dead shall be his own [in the context dealing] with Cattle to derive from it the law that the owners [plaintiffs] have to retain the carcass as part payment, while you rise [the clause] And the dead beast shall be his  [in the context dealing] with Pit [to confine liability] to an animal whose carcass could be his?  Why should I not reverse [the implications of the clauses]? — It stands to reason that the exemption should be connected with Pit, since there is in Pit exemption also in the case of inanimate objects.  On the contrary, should not the exemption be connected with Cattle, since in Cattle there is exemption from half damages [in the case of Tam]? — In any case, exemption from the whole payment is not found [in the case of cattle]. WHERE THERE FELL INTO IT AN OX TOGETHER WITH ITS IMPLEMENTS WHICH THEREBY BROKE etc. This Mishnaic ruling is not in accordance with R. Judah. For it was taught: R. Judah imposes liability for damage to inanimate objects done by Pit. But what was the reason of the Rabbis?  — Because Scripture says, And an ox or an ass fall therein,  [implying] 'ox' but not 'man',  'ass' but not 'inanimate objects'. R. Judah, [however, maintained that the word] 'or' [was intended] to describe inanimate objects while the [other] Rabbis