Bava Kamma

the fall in each case being into the pit. Rab thus adhered to his own view as [elsewhere]  stated by Rab, that the liability in the case of Pit imposed by the Torah  is for injury caused by the unhealthy air [of the pit] but not for the blow [given by it]. Samuel, however, said that where the ox fell into the pit, whether on its face or on its back, there would always be liability, since Samuel adhered to the view stated by him [elsewhere]  that [the liability is] for the unhealthy air, and a plus forte raison for the blow. How then are we to understand [the words 'Where it fell] BACKWARD ON ACCOUNT OF THE NOISE OF DIGGING', in which case [we are told] there should be exemption? — As, for instance, where it stumbled over the pit and fell to the back of the pit, [i.e.,] outside the pit. An objection was raised [from the following: If it fell] inside the pit whether on its face or on its back there would be liability. Is not this a contradiction of the statement of Rab? — R. Hisda replied: Rab would admit that in the case of a pit in private ground  there would be liability, as the plaintiff could argue against the defendant: 'Whichever way you take it, if the animal died through the unhealthy air, was not the unhealthy air yours? If [on the other hand] it died through the blow, was not the blow given by your ground?  Rabbah, however, said: We are dealing here  with a case where the animal turned itself over; it started to fall upon its face but [before reaching the bottom of the pit it] turned itself over and finally fell upon its back, so that the unhealthy air which affected it [at the outset] really did the mischief. R. Joseph. however, said that we are dealing here  with a case where damage was done to the pit by the ox, i.e., where the ox made foul the water in the pit,  in which case no difference could be made whether it fell on its face or on its back, as there would always be liability. R. Hananiah learnt [in a Baraitha] in support of the statement of Rab: [Scripture says] And it fall,  [implying that there would be no liability] unless where it fell in the usual way of falling.  Hence the Sages said: If it fell forward on account of the noise of digging there would be liability, but if it fell backward on account of the noise of digging there would be exemption, though in both cases [it fell] into the pit. The Master stated: Where it fell forward on account of the noise of digging there would be liability. But why not say that it was the digger who caused it?  — R. Shimi b. Ashi thereupon said: This ruling is in accordance with R. Nathan, who stated that it was the owner of the pit who did the actual damage, and whenever no payment can be enforced from one [co-defendant] it is made up from the other  as indeed it has been taught: 'If an ox pushes another ox into a pit, the owner of the ox is liable, while the owner of the pit is exempt. R. Nathan, however, said that the owner of the ox would have to pay a half [of the damages] and the owner of the pit would have to pay the other half.' But was it not taught: R. Nathan says: The owner of the pit has to pay three-quarters, and the owner of the ox one quarter? — There is no contradiction, as the latter statement refers to Tam  and the former to Mu'ad.  On what principle did he base his ruling in the case of Tam? If he held that this [co-defendant] should be considered [in the eye of the law] as having done the whole of the damage, and so also the other co-defendant as having done the whole of the damage, why should not the one pay half and the other also pay half? If [on the other hand] he held that the one did half the damage and the other one also did half the damage, then let the owner of the pit pay half [of the damages] and the owner of the ox a quarter,  while the remaining quarter will be lost to the plaintiff? Raba thereupon said: R. Nathan was a judge, and went down to the depth of the law:  He did in fact hold that the one was considered as having done the whole of the damage and so also the other was considered as having done the whole of the damage; and as for your question 'Why should the one not pay half and the other half?' [he could answer] because the owner of the ox  could say to the owner of the pit, 'What will this your joining me [in the defence] benefit me?'  Or if you wish you may [alternatively] say that R. Nathan did in fact hold that the one did half of the damage and the other did half of the damage, and as for your question, 'Why not let the owner of the pit pay half and the owner of the ox a quarter while the remaining quarter will be lost to the plaintiff?' he might answer, because the owner of the killed ox would be entitled to say to the owner of the pit, 'As I have found my ox in your pit, you have killed it. Whatever is paid to me by the other defendant I do not mind being paid [by him], but whatever is not paid to me by him, I will require to be paid by you.' Raba said: If a man puts a stone near the mouth of a pit [which had been dug by another person] and an ox coming along stumbles over the stone and falls into the pit, we are here brought face to face  with the difference of opinion between R. Nathan and the Rabbis.  But is this not obvious? — You might perhaps have said that [the difference of opinion was confined to that case] where the owner of the pit could say to the owner of the ox, 'Had not my pit been there at all, your ox would in any case have killed the other ox,' whereas in this case the person who put the stone [near the pit] could certainly say to the owner of the pit, 'If not for your pit what harm would my stone have done? Were the ox even to have stumbled over it, it might have fallen but would have got up again.' We are therefore told [by this] that the other party can retort, 'If not for your stone, the ox would not have fallen into the pit at all.' It was stated: