Bava Kamma

or a proselytess the defendant would be the first to acquire title [to all the claims and thus be released from any liability]? — Rabbah thereupon said: We deal [in this latter case] with a divorced woman.  So also said R. Nahman [that we deal here] with a divorced woman. [But] I might [here] object: If she was divorced, why should she not also share in the compensation for the value of the embryo?  — R. Papa thereupon said: The Torah awarded the value of embryos to the husband even where the cohabitation had taken place not in a married state, the reason being that Scripture says: According as the cohabitator  of the woman will lay upon him. But why should not Rabbah refer the ruling  to the case where the payment of the compensation had been collected in money, and R. Nahman to the case where it had been collected out of land? For did Rabbah not say  that where an outstanding debt had been collected  out of land, the first-born son would take in it [a double portion],  but where it had been collected in money the first-born son would not [take in it a double portion]?  Or again did R. Nahman not say  that [on the contrary] where the debt had been collected in money the first-born would take [in it a double portion],  but where it has been collected out of land, the first-born son would not [take in it a double portion]?  — It could, however, be answered that these statements were made on the basis of the despatch of the Western Sages according to the view of the Rabbis,  whereas in the case here [where Rabbah and R. Nahman interpreted it to have referred to a divorced woman] they were stating the law as maintained by Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Lakish said: Where an ox killed a slave without purposing to do so, there would be exemption from the payment of thirty shekels, since it is written, He shall give unto their master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned,  [implying that] where the ox would be liable to be stoned the owner is to pay thirty shekels, but where the ox would not be liable to be stoned  the owner need not pay thirty shekels. Rabbah [similarly] said: Where an ox killed a freeman without purposing to do so there would be exemption from kofer, for it is written  The ox should be stoned and its owner also shall be put to death. If there be laid on him a ransom, [implying that] where the ox has to be stoned  the owner has not to pay kofer. Abaye raised an objection to this [from the following Mishnah]:  If a man says: 'My ox has killed so-and-so' or 'has killed so-and-so's' ox, [in either case] the defendant has to pay in virtue of his own admission. Now, does the payment [in the former case]  not mean kofer [though the ox would not become liable to be stoned through the owner's admission]?  — No; [it means for] the actual value.  If [it means payment for] the pecuniary loss, read the concluding clause: [If he says], 'My ox has killed so-and-so's slave,' the defendant is not liable to pay in virtue of his own admission.  Now, if [the payment referred to in the first clause was meant for] the pecuniary loss, why is there no liability [to pay for the pecuniary loss in the case of a slave]?  — He, however, said to him: I could have answered you that the opening clause refers to the actual value  [of the killed person],  whereas the concluding clause refers to the fixed fine [of thirty shekels]. As, however, I have no intention to answer you by means of forced interpretations, [I will say that] both clauses do in fact refer to the actual value [of the killed person].