Bava Kamma

when he caught big ones he took them and when he [subsequently] caught little ones he took them also.  But R. Tabyomi, who in the name of Raba said that [the answer about] having killed [the man in the presence of one witness etc.] was given first, compares him to a fisherman who was catching fishes in the sea and when he caught little ones he took them, but when he [subsequently] caught big ones he threw away the little ones and took the big ones. Another [Baraitha] teaches: 'And the owner of the ox shall be quit' [implies] according to the statement of R. Jose the Galilean, quit from compensating [in the case of Tam killing] embryos. Said R. Akiba to him: Behold Scripture states: If men strive together and hurt a woman with child etc.,  [implying that only] men but not oxen [are liable for killing embryos]!  Was not this a good question on the part of R. Akiba? — R. 'Ulla the son of R. Idi said: [The implication drawn by R. Jose] is essential. For otherwise it might have occurred to you to apply [R. Akiba's] inference 'Men but not oxen' [exclusively to such] oxen as are comparable to men: Just as men are Mu'ad,  so also here the oxen referred to are Mu'ad, whereas in the case of Tam there should be liability. The Divine Law has therefore stated, 'The owner of the ox shall be quit', implying exemption [also in the case of Tam]. Said Raba thereupon: Is the native born to be on the earth and the stranger in the highest heavens?  No, said Raba. [The implication drawn by R. Jose] is essential [for this reason, that] you might have been inclined to apply the inference 'Men but not oxen' only to oxen which could be compared to men — just as men are Mu'ad so the oxen here referred to are Mu'ad — and to have extended the exemption to cases of Tam by an argument a fortiori. Therefore the Divine Law purposely states [further], The owner of the ox shall be quit [to indicate that only] in the case of Tam will there be exemption whereas in the case of Mu'ad there will be liability. Said Abaye to him: If that is so, why not argue in the same way in the case of payment for degradation; thus: [Scripture says] 'Men',  excluding oxen which could be compared with men: just as the men are Mu'ad so the oxen [thus exempted] must be Mu'ad, and a fortiori exemption is extended to cases of Tam. Thereupon the Divine Law on another occasion purposely states, 'The owner of the ox shall be quit' [to indicate that only] in the case of Tam will there be exemption, whereas in the case of Mu'ad there will be liability [for degradation]? Now you could hardly say that this is indeed the case, for if so why not teach that, 'the owner of the ox shall be quit' [means], according to R. Jose the Galilean, quit from compensating [both in the case of Tam killing] embryos and [in the case of it having caused] degradation?  — Abaye and Raba both therefore said: [You might have been inclined to suppose that] in the case of 'men' it is only where no mischief  [resulted to the woman] that a liability to pay [for the embryo is imposed] upon them whereas where a mischief [resulted to the woman] no civil liability  [is imposed] upon them,  but that it is not so with oxen, as in their case even if mischief [results to the woman] a liability to pay is imposed.  The Divine Law has therefore on another occasion purposely stated, The owner of the ox shall be quit, to indicate exemption [in all cases]. R. Adda b. Ahabah demurred to this, saying: Does then the matter of civil liability  depend upon the non-occurrence of mischief to the woman? Does this matter not depend upon intention [of the defendant]?  — R. Adda b. Ahabah therefore said: [You might have been inclined to think thus:] In the case of men where their purpose was to kill one another, even if mischief results to a woman, a civil liability  will be imposed, whereas where they purposed to kill the woman herself [who was in fact killed], no civil liability  would be imposed. In the case of oxen, however, even where their purpose was to kill the woman [who is indeed killed by them] a civil liability should be imposed for the embryo. [To prevent your reasoning thus] the Divine Law on another occasion purposely states, 'The owner of the ox shall be quit' to indicate exemption [altogether in the case of oxen]. And so also R. Haggai upon returning from the South, came [to the College] and brought the teaching [of a Baraitha] with him stating the case in accordance with the interpretation given by R. Adda b. Ahabab. Another [Baraitha] teaches: 'The owner of the ox shall be quit' [implies], according to the statement of R. Akiba, quit from compensating for [the killing of] a slave.