Bava Kamma

— A stranger need not fear the master-smith  whereas the apprentice is in fear of his master. R. Zebid in the name of Raba referred [the remark of R Jose b. Hanina] to the following: [The verse,] And [it] lighteth [upon his neighbour],  excludes [a case] where the neighbour brings himself [within the range of the missile]. Hence the statement made by R. Eliezer b. Jacob: If a man lets [fly] a stone out of his hand and another [at that moment] puts out his head [through a window] and receives the blow [and is killed], he is exempt.  [Now, it was with reference to this case that] R. Jose b. Hanina said: He is exempt from having to take refuge,  but he would be liable for the four [additional] items.  He who refers this remark to this [last] case will with more reason refer it to the cases dealt with previously,  whereas he who refers it to those dealt with previously  would maintain that in this [last] case  the exemption is from all [kinds of liability]. Our Rabbis taught: If employees come to [the private residence of] their employer to demand their wages from him and [it so happens that] their employer's ox gores them or their employer's dog bites them, with fatal results, he [the employer] is exempt [from ransom].  Others,  however, maintain that employees have the right to [come and] demand their wages from their employer. Now, what were the circumstances [of the case]? If the employer could be found in [his] city [offices], what reason [could be adduced] for [the view maintained by] the 'Others'.  If [on the other hand] he could be found only at home, what reason [could be given] for [the anonymous view expressed by] the first Tanna? — No, the application [of the case] is where the employer could [sometimes] be found [in his city offices] but could not [always] be found [there]. The employees therefore called at his [private] door, when the reply was 'Yes'. One view  maintains that 'Yes' implies: 'Enter and come in.' But the other view  maintains that 'Yes' may signify: 'Remain standing in the place where you are.' It has indeed been taught in accordance with the view  maintaining that 'Yes' may [in this case] signify: 'Remain standing in the place where you are.' For it has been taught: 'If an employee enters the [private] residence of his employer to demand his wages from him and the employer's ox gores him or the employer's dog bites him, he [the employer] is exempt even where the entrance had been made by permission.' Why should there indeed be exemption  unless in the case where he called at the door and the employer said: 'Yes'? This thus proves that 'Yes' [in such a case] signifies: 'Remain standing in the place where you are. MISHNAH. IN THE CASE OF TWO TAM OXEN INJURING EACH OTHER, THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF HALF-DAMAGES.  WHERE BOTH WERE MU'AD THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE WILL BE IN FULL.  WHERE ONE WAS TAM AND THE OTHER MU'AD THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE FOR DAMAGE DONE BY MU'AD TO TAM WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF FULL COMPENSATION, WHEREAS THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE FOR DAMAGE DONE BY TAM TO MU'AD WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF HALF-DAMAGES. SIMILARLY IN THE CASE OF TWO PERSONS INJURING EACH OTHER, THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE WILL BE IN FULL. WHERE MAN HAS DAMAGED MU'AD AND MU'AD HAS INJURED MAN, THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE WILL BE IN FULL. BUT WHERE MAN DAMAGED TAM AND TAM INJURED MAN, THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE FOR DAMAGE DONE BY MAN TO TAM WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF FULL COMPENSATION, WHEREAS THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE FOR DAMAGE DONE BY TAM TO MU'AD WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF HALF-DAMAGES. R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, SAYS: EVEN IN THE CASE OF TAM INJURING MAN THE PAYMENT OF THE DIFFERENCE WILL BE IN FULL. GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: [The words of the Torah] According to this judgement shall be done unto it  [imply that] the judgement in the case of Ox damaging ox applies also in the case of Ox injuring man. Just as where Ox has damaged ox half-damages are paid in the case of Tam and full compensation in the case of Mu'ad, so also where Ox has injured man only half damages will be paid in the case of Tam and full compensation in the case of Mu'ad. R. Akiba, however, says: [The words,] 'According to this judgement' refer to [the ruling that would apply to the circumstances described in] the latter verse  and not in the former verse.  Could this then mean that the [full] payment is to be made out of the best [of the estate]?  [Not so; for] it is stated 'Shall it be done unto it [self],' to emphasise that payment will be made out of the body of Tam, but no payment is to be made out of any other source whatsoever.  According to the Rabbis then, what purpose is served by the word 'this'? — To exempt from liability for the four [additional] items.  Whence then does R. Akiba derive the exemption [in this case] from liability for the four [additional] items? — He derives it from the text, And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbour  [which indicates that there is liability only where] Man injures his neighbour but not where Ox injures the neighbour [of the owner]. And the Rabbis?  — Had the deduction been from that text we might have referred it exclusively to Pain,  but as to Medical Expenses and Loss of Time  we might have held there is still a liability to pay. We are therefore told  [that this is not the case]. MISHNAH. IF AN OX [TAM] OF THE VALUE OF ONE HUNDRED ZUZ HAS GORED AN OX OF THE VALUE OF TWO HUNDRED ZUZ AND THE CARCASS HAD NO VALUE AT ALL, THE PLAINTIFF WILL TAKE POSSESSION OF THE [DEFENDANT'S] OX [THAT DID THE DAMAGE]. GEMARA. Who is the author of our Mishnah? — It is R. Akiba, as it has been taught: The ox [that did the damage] has to be assessed by the Court of law;  this is the view of R. Ishmael. R. Akiba, however, says: The [body of the] ox becomes transferred [to the plaintiff]. What is the point at issue? — R. Ishmael maintains that he [the plaintiff] is but a creditor and that he has only a claim of money against him [the defendant], whereas R. Akiba is of the opinion that they both [the plaintiff and defendant] become the owners in common of the ox  [that did the damage]. They [thus also] differ as to the interpretation of the verse, Then they shall sell the live ox and divide the money of it.  R. Ishmael maintains that it is the Court on which this injunction is laid by Divine Law,  whereas R. Akiba is of the opinion that it is the plaintiff and defendant on which it is laid.  What is the practical difference between R. Ishmael and R. Akiba? — There is a practical difference between them where the plaintiff consecrated the ox [that did the damage]. Raba put the following question to R. Nahman: Should the defendant meanwhile dispose of the ox, what would be the law according to R. Ishmael? [Shall we say that] since R. Ishmael considers the plaintiff to be a creditor whose claim [against the defendant] is only regarding money, the sale is valid, or that