Bava Kamma

'Come, let us go forth to meet the bride, the queen!' Some [explicitly] read:'… to meet Sabbath, the bride, the queen.' R. Jannai, [however,] while dressed in his Sabbath attire used to remain standing and say: 'Come thou, O queen, come thou, O queen!' MISHNAH. IF A MAN SPLITS WOOD ON PRIVATE PREMISES  AND DOES DAMAGE ON PUBLIC GROUND, OR ON PUBLIC GROUND AND DOES DAMAGE ON PRIVATE PREMISES,  OR ON PRIVATE PREMISES  AND DOES DAMAGE ON ANOTHER'S PRIVATE PREMISES, HE IS LIABLE. GEMARA. And [all the cases enumerated] are necessary [as serving respective purposes]. For if the Mishnah had stated only the case of splitting wood on private premises and doing damage on public ground, [the ruling could have been ascribed to the fact] that the damage occurred at a place where many people were to be found, whereas in the case of splitting wood on public ground and doing damage on private premises, since the damage occurred in a place where many people were not to be found, the opposite ruling might have been suggested.  Again, if the Mishnah had dealt only with the case of splitting wood on public ground and doing damage on private premises,  [the ruling could have been explained] on the ground that the act  was even at the very outset unlawful, whereas in the case of splitting wood on private premises  and doing damage on public ground, [in view of the fact] that the act  [as such] was quite lawful, the opposite view might have been suggested.  Again, if the Mishnah had dealt only with these two cases [the ruling could have been explained in] the one case on account of the damage having occurred at a place where many people were to be found, and [in] the other on account of the unlawfulness of the act,  whereas in the case of splitting wood on private premises  and doing damage on another's private premises, since the damage occurred in a place where many people were not to be found and the act  was quite lawful even at the very outset, the opposite view might have been suggested.  It was [hence] essential [to state explicitly all these cases]. Our Rabbis taught: 'If a man entered the workshop of a joiner without permission and a chip of wood flew off and struck him in the face and killed him, he [the joiner] is exempt.  But if he entered with [the] permission [of the joiner], he is liable.' Liable for what? — R. Jose b. Hanina said: He is liable for the four [additional] items,  whereas regarding the law of refuge  he is [still] exempt on account of the fact that the [circumstances of this] case do not [exactly] resemble those of the Wood.  For in the case of the Wood the one [the plaintiff] was entering [as if] into his own domain and the other [the defendant] was [similarly] entering [as if] into his own domain, whereas in this case the one [the plaintiff] had [definitely] been entering into his fellow's [the defendant's] workshop. Raba [however,] said: There is an a fortiori [to the contrary]: If in the case of the Wood where the one [the plaintiff] was entering to his own [exclusive] knowledge and that one [the defendant] was similarly entering of his own accord, it is nevertheless considered [in the eye of the law]  as if he had entered with the consent of his fellow [the defendant] who thus becomes liable to take refuge, should the case before us, where the one [the plaintiff] entered the workshop with the knowledge of his fellow [the joiner], be not all the more subject to the same liability? Raba therefore said: What is meant by being exempt from [being subject to the law of] refuge is that the sin could not be expiated by mere refuge; the real reason of the statement of R. Jose b. Hanina being this: that his offence,  though committed inadvertently, approaches wilful carelessness.  Raba [on his own part] raised [however] an objection: If an officer of the Court inflicted on him  an additional [unauthorized] stroke, from which he died, he [the officer] is liable to take refuge on his account.  Now, does not [the offence] here committed inadvertently approach wilful carelessness?  For surely he had to bear in mind that a person might sometimes die just through one [additional] stroke. Why then state, 'he is liable to take refuge on his account'? — R. Shimi of Nehardea there upon said: [The officer committed the offence as he] made a mistake in [counting] the number [of strokes]. [But] Naba tapped R. Shimi's shoe  and said to him: Is it he who is responsible for the counting [of the strokes]? Was it not taught: The senior judge recites [the prescribed verses],  the second [to him] conducts the counting [of the strokes], and the third directs each stroke to be administered?  — No, said R. Shimi of Nehardea; it was the judge himself who made the mistake in counting. A [further] objection was raised: If a man throws a stone into a public thoroughfare and kills [thereby a human being], he is liable to take refuge.  Now, does not [the offence] here committed inadvertently approach wilful carelessness?  For surely he had to bear in mind that on a public thoroughfare many people were to be found, yet it states, 'he is liable to take refuge'? — R. Samuel b. Isaac said: The offender [threw the stone while he] was pulling down his wall.  But should he not have kept his eyes open? — He was pulling it down at night. But even at night time, should he not have kept his eyes open? — He was [in fact] pulling his wall down in the day time, [but was throwing it] towards a dunghill. [But] how are we to picture this dunghill? If many people were to be found there, is it not a case of wilful carelessness?  If [on the other hand] many were not to be found there, is it not sheer accident?  — R. Papa [thereupon] said: It could [indeed] have no application unless in the case of a dunghill where it was customary for people to resort at night time, but not customary to resort during the day, though it occasionally occurred that some might come to sit there [even in the day time]. [It is therefore] not a case of wilful carelessness since it was not customary for people to resort there during the day. Nor is it sheer accident since it occasionally occurred that some people did come to sit there [even in the day time]. R. Papa in the name of Raba referred [the remark of R. Jose b. Hanina] to the commencing clause: 'If a man entered the workshop of a joiner without permission and a chip of wood flew off and struck him in the face and killed him, he is exempt.' And R. Jose b. Hanina [thereupon] remarked; He would be liable for the four [additional] items,  though he is exempt from [having to take] refuge.  He who refers this remark to the concluding clause  will, with more reason, refer it to the commencing clause,  whereas he who refers it to the commencing clause  maintains that, in the [case dealt with] in the concluding clause where the entrance had been made with [the] permission [of the joiner], he would be liable to take refuge.  But would he be liable to take refuge [in that case]?  Was it not taught: If a man enters the workshop of a smith and sparks fly off and strike him in the face causing his death, he [the smith] is exempt  even where the entrance had been made by permission of the smith? — [In this Baraitha] here, we are dealing with an apprentice of the smith. Is an apprentice of a smith to be killed [with impunity]? — Where his master had been urging him to leave but he did not leave. But even where his master had been urging him to leave, [which he did not do,] may he be killed [with impunity]? — Where the master believed that he had already left. If so, why should not the same apply also to a stranger?