Bava Kamma

The Mishnah states, HIS STRAW AND STUBBLE which are slippery [and may never be removed into public ground even according to R. Judah]. WHOEVER SEIZES THEM FIRST ACQUIRES TITLE TO THEM. Rab said: Both to their corpus and to their increase [in value],  whereas Ze'ire said: Only to their increase but not to their corpus.  Wherein is the point at issue?  — Rab maintains that they [the Rabbis] extended the penalty to the corpus on account of the increase thereof, but Ze'ire is of the opinion that they did not extend the penalty to the corpus on account of the increase thereof. We have learnt: IF HE TURNS UP DUNG THAT HAD BEEN LYING ON PUBLIC GROUND AND DAMAGE [SUBSEQUENTLY] RESULTS TO ANOTHER PERSON, HE IS LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE. Now, [in this case] it is not stated that 'Whoever seizes it first acquires title to it.'  — [This ruling has been] inserted in the commencing clause, and applies as well to the concluding clause. But has it not in this connection  been taught [in a Baraitha]: They are prohibited [to be taken possession of] on account of [the law of] robbery?  — When [the Baraitha] states 'They are prohibited on account of robbery' the reference is to all the cases [presented] in the Mishnaic text  and [is intended] to [protect] the one who had seized [of them] first, having thereby acquired title [to them]. But surely it was not meant thus, seeing that it was taught:  'If a man removes straw and stubble into the public ground to be formed into manure and damage results to another person, he is liable for the damage, and whoever seizes them first acquires title to them, as this may be done irrespective of [the law of] robbery. [However] where he turns up dung on public ground and damage [subsequently] results to another person, he is liable [to compensate] but no possession may be taken of the dung on account of [the law of] robbery'?  — R. Nahman b. Isaac [thereupon] exclaimed: What an objection to adduce from the case of dung! [It is only in the case of] an object that is susceptible to increase [in value] that the penalty is extended to the corpus  for the purpose of [discouraging any idea of] gain, whereas with regard to an object that yields no increase there is no penalty [at all]. The question was asked: According to the view that the penalty extends also to the corpus for the purpose of [discouraging the idea of] gain,  is this penalty imposed at once  or is it only after some gain has been produced that the penalty will be imposed? — Come and hear: An objection was raised [against Rab] from the case of dung!  But do you really think this [solves the problem]? The objection from the case of dung was raised only before R. Nahman expounded the underlying principle;  for after the explanation given by R. Nahman what objection indeed could there be raised from the case of dung? Might not one suggest [the argument between Rab and Ze'ire to have been] the point at issue between [the following] Tannaim? For it was taught: If a bill contains a stipulation of interest,  a penalty is imposed so that neither the principal nor the interest is enforced; these are the words of R. Meir, whereas the Sages maintain that the principal is enforced though not the interest.  Now, can we not say that Rab adopts the view of R. Meir  whereas Ze'ire follows that of the Rabbis?  — Rab may explain [himself] to you [as follows]: 'I made my statement even according to the Rabbis: for the Rabbis maintain their view only there, where the principal as such is quite lawful, whereas here in the case of nuisances the corpus itself is liable to do damage.' Ze'ire [on the other hand] may explain [himself] to you [thus]: 'I made my statement even in accordance with R. Meir; for R. Meir expressed his view only there, where immediately, at the time of the bill having been drawn up, [the evil had been committed] by stipulating the usury, whereas here in the case of nuisances, who can assert that [special] damage will result?' Might not one suggest [the argument between Rab and Ze'ire to have been] the point at issue between these Tannaim? For it was taught: If a man removes straw and stubble into the public ground to be formed into manure and damage results to another person, he is liable for the damage, and whoever seizes them first acquires title to them. They are prohibited [to be taken possession of] on account of [the law of] robbery. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says: Whoever creates any nuisances on public ground and causes [special] damage is liable to compensate, though whoever takes possession of them first acquires title to them, and this may be done irrespective of [the law of] robbery. Now, is not the text a contradiction in itself? You read, 'Whoever seizes them first acquires title to them,' then you state [in the same breath], 'They are prohibited [to be taken possession of] on account of [the law of] robbery'! It must therefore mean thus: 'Whoever seizes them first acquires title to them,' viz., to their increase, whereas, 'they are prohibited to be taken possession of on account of [the law of] robbery,' refers to their corpus. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel thereupon proceeded to state that even concerning their corpus, 'whoever seizes them first, acquires title to them.' Now, according to Ze'ire, his view must unquestionably have been the point at issue between these Tannaim,  but according to Rab, are we similarly to say that [his view] was the point at issue between these Tannaim? — Rab may say to you: 'It is [indeed] unanimously held that the penalty must extend to the corpus for the purpose [of discouraging the idea] of gain; the point at issue [between the Tannaim] here is whether this halachah  should be made the practical rule of the law'.  For it was stated: R. Huna on behalf of Rab said: This halachah  should not be made the practical rule of the law,  whereas R. Adda b. Ahabah said: This halachah  should be made the practical rule of the law. But is this really so? Did not R. Huna declare barley [that had been spread out on public ground] ownerless, [just as] R. Adda b. Ahabah declared