Bava Kamma

that no action can be instituted against him in civil courts though there is liability  according to divine justice. The Sages agree however, with R. Meir that, in the case of a stone, a knife and luggage which were left on the top of the roof and fell down because of a wind of usual occurrence  and did damage, there will be liability.  R. Meir [on the other hand] agrees with the Sages that, regarding bottles that were placed upon the top of the roof for the purpose of getting dry and fell down because of a wind of unusual occurrence  and did damage, there is exemption.  [Does not this prove that even regarding damages all agree that there is exemption in cases of sheer accident?] — Abaye therefore said: It is on two points that they  differ [in the Mishnah]; they differ regarding damage done at the time of the fall [of the pitcher] and they again differ regarding damage occasioned [by the potsherds] subsequently to the fall. The difference of opinion regarding damage done at the time of the fall of the pitcher arises on the question whether stumbling implies negligence [or not];  one Master  maintaining that stumbling does imply negligence, whereas the other Master  is of the opinion that stumbling does not [necessarily] imply negligence.  The point at issue in the case of damage occasioned [by the potsherds] subsequently to the fall, is the law as applicable to abandoned nuisances;  one Master  maintaining that for damage occasioned by abandoned nuisances there is liability,  whereas the other Master  maintains exemption.  But how can you prove this?  — From the text which presents two [independent] cases [as follows]; SOMEONE SLIPPED IN THE WATER OR WAS INJURED BY THE POTSHERD; for indeed is not one case the same as the other,  unless it was intended to convey, 'Someone slipped in the water while the pitcher had been falling  or was injured by the potsherd subsequently to the fall.' Now that the Mishnah presents two independent cases, it is only reasonable to assume that the Baraitha  similarly deals with the same two problems. That is all very well as regards the 'pitcher' where the two [problems] have application [in the case of damage done] at the time of the fall or subsequently to the fall [respectively]. But how in the case of the 'camel'? For though concerning damage occasioned subsequently to the fall, it may well have application where the carcass has been abandoned,  yet in the case of damage done at the time of the fall, what point of difference can be found?  — R. Aha thereupon said: [It deals with a case] where the camel was led in water along the slippery shore of a river.  But under what circumstances? If where there was another [better] way, is it not a case of culpa lata?  If on the other hand there was no other way [to pass through], is it not a case of no alternative? — The point at issue can therefore only be where the driver stumbled and together with him the camel also stumbled. But in the case of abandoning nuisances,  where could [the condition of] intention [laid down by R. Judah] come in? — Said R. Joseph: The intention [in this case] refers to the retaining of the ownership of the potsherd.  So also said R. Ashi, that the intention [in this case] refers to the retaining of the ownership of the potsherd. R. Eleazar said: 'It is regarding damage done at the time of the fall that there is a difference of opinion.' But how in the case of damage done subsequently to the fall? Would there be unanimity that there is exemption? Surely there is R. Meir who expressed [his opinion]  that there is liability! What else [would you suggest? That in this case] there is unanimity [imposing] liability? Surely there are the Rabbis who stated [their view] that there is exemption! — Hence, what he means [to convey by his statement] 'damage done at the time of the fall', is that there is difference of opinion 'even regarding damage done at the time of the fall', making thus known to us [the conclusions arrived at] by Abaye.