Bava Kamma

For regarding injury to the person there is exemption, since it was public ground  that hurt him.  When repeating this statement in the presence of Samuel he said to me: 'Well, is not [the liability for damage occasioned by] a stone, a knife or luggage  derived from Pit?  So that I adopt regarding them all [the interpretation]: An ox  excluding man, An ass  excluding inanimate objects! This qualification  however applies only to cases of killing, whereas as regards [mere] injury, in the case of man there is liability, though with respect to inanimate objects there is [always] exemption?'  — Rab [however, maintains  that] these statements apply only to nuisances abandoned [by their owners],  whereas in cases where they are not abandoned they still remain [their owner's] chattel. R. Oshaia however raised an objection: 'And an ox or an ass fall therein':  'An ox' excluding man; 'an ass' excluding inanimate objects. Hence the Rabbis stated: If there fell into it an ox together with its tools and they thereby broke, [or] an ass together with its equipment which rent, there is liability for the beast but exemption as regards the inanimate objects.  To what may the ruling in this case be compared? To that applicable in the case of a stone, a knife and luggage  that had been left on public ground and did damage. (Should it not on the contrary read, 'What case may be compared to this ruling?'  — It must therefore indeed mean thus: 'What may [be said to] be similar to this ruling? The case of a stone, a knife and luggage that had been left on public ground and did damage'.) 'It thus follows that where a bottle broke against the stone there is liability.' Now, does not the commencing clause  contradict the view of Rab,  whereas the concluding clause  opposes that of Samuel?  — But [even] on your view, does not the text contradict itself, stating exemption in the commencing clause  and liability in the concluding clause!  Rab therefore interprets it so as to accord with his reasoning, whereas Samuel [on the other hand] expounds it so as to reconcile it with his view. Rab in accordance with his reasoning interprets it thus: The [above] statement  was made only regarding nuisances that have been abandoned, whereas where they have not been abandoned there is liability.  It therefore follows that where a bottle broke against the stone there is liability. Samuel [on the other hand] in reconciling it with his view expounds it thus: Since you have now decided that a stone, a knife and luggage [constitute nuisances that] are equivalent [in law] to Pit, it follows that, according to R. Judah who orders compensation for inanimate objects damaged by Pit,  where a bottle smashed against the stone there is liability. R. Eleazar said: This ruling  refers only to a case where the person stumbled over the stone and the bottle broke against the stone. For if the person stumbled because of the public ground, though the bottle broke against the stone, there is exemption.  Whose view is here followed? — Of course not that of R. Nathan.  There are, however, some who [on the other hand] read: R. Eleazar said: Do not suggest that it is only where the person stumbled upon the stone and the bottle broke against the stone that there is liability, so that where the person stumbled because of the public ground, though the bottle broke against the stone, there would be exemption. For even in the case where the person stumbled because of the public ground, provided the bottle broke against the stone there is liability. Whose view is here followed? — Of course that of Nathan. R. JUDAH SAYS: IF IT WAS DONE INTENTIONALLY HE IS LIABLE, BUT IF UNINTENTIONALLY HE IS EXEMPT. What does INTENTIONALLY denote? — Rabbah said: [It is sufficient  if there was] an intention to bring the pitcher below the shoulder.  Said Abaye to him: Does this imply that R. Meir  imposes liability even when the pitcher slipped down [by sheer accident]? — He answered him:  'Yes, R. Meir imposes liability even where the handle remained in the carrier's hand.' But why? Is it not sheer accident, and has not the Divine Law prescribed exemption in cases of accident as recorded,  But unto the damsel thou shalt do nothing?  You can hardly suggest this ruling to apply only to capital punishment, whereas regarding damages there should [always] be liability, for it was taught:  If his pitcher broke and he did not remove the potsherds, [or] his camel fell down and he did not raise it, R. Meir orders payment for any damage resulting therefrom, whereas the Sages maintain