Bava Kamma

INFER HORN [DOING DAMAGE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES] FROM HORN [DOING DAMAGE ON PUBLIC GROUND]; I INFER HORN FROM FOOT: SEEING THAT IN THE CASE OF PUBLIC GROUND THE LAW, THOUGH LENIENT WITH REFERENCE TO TOOTH AND FOOT, IS NEVERTHELESS STRICT REGARDING HORN, IN THE CASE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES, WHERE THE LAW IS STRICT WITH REFERENCE TO TOOTH AND FOOT, DOES IT NOT STAND TO REASON THAT WE SHOULD APPLY THE SAME STRICTNESS TO HORN? THEY, HOWEVER, STILL ARGUED: IT IS QUITE SUFFICIENT IF THE LAW IN RESPECT OF THE THING INFERRED IS  EQUIVALENT TO THAT FROM WHICH IT IS DERIVED.  JUST AS FOR DAMAGE DONE ON PUBLIC GROUND THE COMPENSATION [IN THE CASE OF HORN] IS HALF, SO ALSO FOR DAMAGE DONE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES, THE COMPENSATION SHOULD NOT BE MORE THAN HALF. GEMARA. Does R. Tarfon really ignore the principle of Dayyo?  Is not Dayyo of Biblical origin as taught:  How does the rule of Kal wa-homer  work? And the Lord said unto Moses, If her father had but spit in her face, should she not be ashamed seven days?  How much the more so then in the case of divine [reproof] should she be ashamed fourteen days? Yet the number of days remains seven, for it is sufficient if the law in respect of the thing inferred  be equivalent to that from which it is derived!  — The principle of Dayyo is ignored by him [R. Tarfon] only when it would defeat the purpose of the a fortiori,  but where it does not defeat the purpose of the a fortiori, even he maintains the principle of Dayyo. In the instance quoted there is no mention made at all of seven days in the case of divine reproof; nevertheless, by the working of the a fortiori, fourteen days may be suggested: there follows, however, the principle of Dayyo so that the additional seven days are excluded, whilst the original seven are retained. Whereas in the case before us  the payment of not less than half damages has been explicitly ordained [in all kinds of premises]. When therefore an a fortiori is employed, another half-payment is added [for damage on the plaintiff's premises], making thus the compensation complete. If [however] you apply the principle of Dayyo, the sole purpose of the a fortiori would thereby be defeated.  And the Rabbis?  — They argue that also in the case of divine [reproof] the minimum of seven days has been decreed in the words: Let her be shut out from the camp seven days.  And R. Tarfon?  — He maintains that the ruling in the words, 'Let her be shut out etc.', is but the result of the application of the principle of Dayyo  [decreasing the number of days to seven]. And the Rabbis? — They argue that this is expressed in the further verse: And Miriam was shut out from the camp.  And R. Tarfon? — He maintains that the additional statement was intended to introduce the principle of Dayyo for general application so that you should not suggest limiting its working only to that case where the dignity of Moses was involved, excluding thus its acceptance for general application: it has therefore been made known to us [by the additional statement] that this is not the case. R. Papa said to Abaye: Behold, there is a Tanna who does not employ the principle of Dayyo even when the a fortiori would thereby not be defeated, for it was taught: Whence do we know that the discharge of semen virile in the case of zab  causes defilement [either by 'touching' or by 'carrying']?  It is a logical conclusion: For if a discharge  that is clean in the case of a clean person is defiling in the case of zab,  is it not cogent reasoning that a discharge  which is defiling in the case of a clean person,  should defile in the case of zab? Now this reasoning applies to both 'touching' and 'carrying',  But why not argue that the a fortiori serves a useful purpose in the case of 'touching', whilst the principle of Dayyo can be employed to exclude defilement by mere 'carrying'?  If, however, you maintain that regarding 'touching' there is no need to apply the a fortiori on the ground that [apart from all inferences] zab could surely not be less defiling than an ordinary clean person,  my contention is [that the case may not be so, and] that the a fortiori may [still] be essential. For I could argue: By reason of uncleanness that chanceth him by night  is stated in Scripture to imply that the law of defilement applies only to those whose uncleanness has been occasioned solely by reason of their discharging semen virile, excluding thus zab, whose uncleanness has been occasioned not [solely] by his discharging semen virile but by another cause altogether.  May not the a fortiori thus have to serve the purpose of letting us know that zab is not excluded?  — But where in the verse is it stated that the uncleanness must not have [concurrently] resulted also from any other cause? Who is the Tanna whom you may have heard maintain that semen virile of zab causes [of itself] defilement by mere 'carrying'? He could surely be neither R. Eliezer, nor R. Joshua, for it was taught:  The semen virile of zab causes defilement by 'touching', but causes no defilement by mere 'carrying'. This is the view of R. Eliezer. R. Joshua, however, maintains that it also causes defilement by mere 'carrying', for it must necessarily contain particles of gonorrhoea.  Now, the sole reason there of R. Joshua's view is that semen virile cannot possibly be altogether free from particles of gonorrhoea, but taken on its own it would not cause defilement. The Tanna who maintains this  must therefore be he who is responsible for what we have learnt: More severe than the former [causes of defilement]