Bava Kamma

But if it be suggested that the three days refer to the warning given the owner,  why should not the first set say: 'Could we have known that after three days there would appear other sets to render the cattle Mu'ad?'  — R. Ashi thereupon said: I repeated this argument to R. Kahana, and he said to me: 'And even if the three days refer to [the goring of] the cattle,  is the explanation satisfactory? Why should not the last set say: "How could we have known that all those present at the Court  had come to give evidence against the [same] ox? Our aim in coming was only to make the defendant liable for half damages."?'  — [But we may be dealing with a case where] all the sets were hinting to one another  [thus definitely conspiring to act concurrently]. R. Ashi further said that we may deal with a case where all the sets appeared [in Court] simultaneously.  Rabina even said: 'Where the witnesses know only the owner but could not identify the ox.'  How then can they render it Mu'ad?  — By saying: 'As you have in your herd an ox prone to goring, it should be your duty to control the whole of the herd.' There arose the following question: In the case of a neighbour's dog having been set on a third person, what is the law? The inciter could undoubtedly not be made liable,  but what about the owner of the dog? Are we to say that the owner is entitled to plead: 'What offence have I committed here?' Or may we retort: 'Since you were aware that your dog could easily be incited and do damage you ought not to have left it [unguarded]'? R. Zera [thereto] said: Come and hear: [CATTLE BECOME AGAIN] TAM, WHEN CHILDREN KEEP ON TOUCHING THEM AND NO GORING RESULTS, implying that were goring to result therefrom there would be liability [though it were caused by incitement]! — Abaye however said: Is it stated: If goring results therefrom there is liability? What perhaps is meant is: If goring does result therefrom there will be no return to the state of Tam, though regarding that [particular] goring no liability will be incurred. Come and hear: If he incited a dog or incited a serpent against him, there is exemption.  Does this not mean that the inciter is free, but the owner of the dog is liable? — No, read: '… the inciter too is free.' Raba said: Assuming that in the case of inciting a neighbour's dog against a third person, the owner of the dog is liable, if the incited dog turns upon the inciter, the owner is free on the ground that where the plaintiff himself has acted wrongly, the defendant who follows suit and equally acts wrongly [against the former] could not be made liable [to him]. R. Papa thereupon said to Raba: A statement was made in the name of Resh Lakish agreeing with yours; for Resh Lakish said:  'In the case of two cows on public ground, one lying and the other walking, if the walking cow kicks the other, there is no liability [as the plaintiff's cow had no right to be lying on the public ground], but if the lying cow kicks the other cow there will be liability.' Raba, however, said to him: In the case of the two cows I would always order payment  as [on behalf of the plaintiff] we may argue against the defendant: 'Your cow may be entitled to tread upon my cow, she has however no right to kick her.' MISHNAH WHAT IS MEANT BY 'OX DOING DAMAGE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES'?  IN CASE OF GORING, PUSHING, BITING, LYING DOWN OR KICKING, IF ON PUBLIC GROUND THE PAYMENT  IS HALF, BUT IF ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES R. TARFON ORDERS PAYMENT IN FULL  WHEREAS THE SAGES ORDER ONLY HALF DAMAGES. R. TARFON THERE UPON SAID TO THEM: SEEING THAT, WHILE THE LAW WAS LENIENT TO TOOTH AND FOOT IN THE CASE OF PUBLIC GROUND ALLOWING TOTAL EXEMPTION,  IT WAS NEVERTHELESS STRICT WITH THEM REGARDING [DAMAGE DONE ON] THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES WHERE IT IMPOSED PAYMENT IN FULL, IN THE CASE OF HORN, WHERE THE LAW WAS STRICT REGARDING [DAMAGE DONE ON] PUBLIC GROUND IMPOSING AT LEAST THE PAYMENT OF HALF DAMAGES, DOES IT NOT STAND TO REASON THAT WE SHOULD MAKE IT EQUALLY STRICT WITH REFERENCE TO THE PLAINTIFFS PREMISES SO AS TO REQUIRE COMPENSATION IN FULL? THEIR ANSWER WAS: IT IS QUITE SUFFICIENT THAT THE LAW IN RESPECT OF THE THING INFERRED  SHOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO THAT FROM WHICH IT IS DERIVED:  JUST AS FOR DAMAGE DONE ON PUBLIC GROUND THE COMPENSATION [IN THE CASE OF HORN] IS HALF, SO ALSO FOR DAMAGE DONE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES THE COMPENSATION SHOULD NOT BE MORE THAN HALF. R. TARFON, HOWEVER, REJOINED: BUT NEITHER DO I