Bava Kamma

— He answered him: 'I have since changed my mind [on this matter].'' But behold R. Johanan said that in regard to the liability of half damages there is no distinction between the plaintiff's premises and public ground. Now, does not this statement also deal with a case where the pebbles were made both to fly up on public ground and to do damage on public ground? — No, though the pebbles were made to fly up on public ground, the damage resulted on the plaintiff's premises. But did you not say [that in such a case there would still be exemption on account of the argument], 'If the cause of raising [the pebbles] is not there [to institute liability], how could any liability be attached to the falling down [of the pebbles]?' — He answered him: 'I have since changed my mind [on this matter].' Alternatively, you might say that R. Johanan referred only to [the liability attached to] Horn. R. Judah [II] the Prince and R. Oshaia had both been sitting near the entrance of the house of R. Judah, when the following matter was raised between them: In the case of an animal knocking about with its tail, [and doing thereby damage on public ground] what would be the law? — One of them said in answer: Could the owner be asked to hold the tail of his animal continuously wherever it goes?  But if so, why in the case of Horn shall we not say the same: 'Could the owner be asked to hold the horn of his animal continuously wherever it goes?' — There is no comparison. In the case of Horn the damage is unusual, whereas it is quite usual [for an animal] to knock about with its tail.  But if it is usual for an animal to knock about with its tail, what then was the problem?  — The problem was raised regarding an excessive knocking about. R. 'Ena queried: In the case of an animal knocking about with its membrum virile and doing thereby damage,  what is the law? Shall we say it is analogous to Horn?  For in the case of Horn do not its passions get the better of it, as may be said here also? Or shall we perhaps say that in the case of Horn, the animal is prompted by a malicious desire to do damage, whereas, in the case before us, there is no malicious desire to do damage?  — Let it stand undecided. POULTRY ARE MU'AD TO WALK IN THEIR USUAL WAY AND TO BREAK [THINGS]. IF A STRING BECAME ATTACHED TO THEIR FEET OR WHERE THEY HOP ABOUT AND BREAK UTENSILS, [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES WILL BE PAID. R. Huna said: The ruling regarding half damages applies only to a case where the string became attached of itself, but in a case where it was attached by a human being the liability would be in full. But in the case where the string was attached of itself, who would be liable to pay the half damages? It could hardly be suggested that the owner of the string  would have to pay it, for in what circumstances could that be possible? If when the string was kept by him in a safe place [so that the fact of the poultry taking hold of it could in no way be attributed to him], surely it was but a sheer accident?  If [on the other hand] it was not kept in a safe place, should he not be liable for negligence [to pay in full]? It was therefore the owner of the poultry who would have to pay the half damages. But again why differentiate [his case so as to excuse him from full payment]? If there was exemption from full payment on account of [the inference drawn from] the verse, If a man shall open a pit,  which implies that there would be no liability for Cattle opening a Pit,  half damages should [for the very reason] similarly not be imposed here as [there could be liability only when] Man created a pit but not [when] Cattle [created] a pit? — The Mishnaic ruling [regarding half damages] must therefore be applicable only to a case where the poultry made the string fly [from one place to another, where it broke the utensils, being thus subject to the law of Pebbles]; and the statement made by R. Huna will accordingly refer to a case which has been dealt with elsewhere [viz.]: In the case of an ownerless string, R. Huna said that if it had become attached of itself to poultry [and though damage resulted to an animate object tripping over it while it was still attached to the poultry] there would be exemption.  But if it had been attached to the poultry by a human being, he would be liable to pay [in full]. Under what category of damage could this liability come?  — R. Huna b. Manoah said: Under the category of Pit, which is rolled about by feet of man and feet of animal. MISHNAH. WITH REFERENCE TO WHAT IS TOOTH MU'AD?  [IT IS MU'AD] TO CONSUME WHATEVER IS FIT FOR IT. ANIMAL IS MUA'D TO CONSUME BOTH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. BUT IF IT HAS DESTROYED CLOTHES OR UTENSILS, [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES WILL BE PAID.  THIS RULING APPLIES ONLY TO DAMAGE DONE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES, BUT IF IT IS DONE ON PUBLIC GROUND THERE WOULD BE EXEMPTION.  WHERE, HOWEVER, THE ANIMAL HAS DERIVED SOME BENEFIT [FROM THE DAMAGE DONE BY IT], PAYMENT WILL [IN ANY CASE] BE MADE TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT. WHEN WILL PAYMENT BE MADE TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT? IF IT CONSUMED [FOOD] IN THE MARKET, PAYMENT TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT WILL BE MADE; [BUT IF IT CONSUMED] IN THE SIDEWAYS OF THE MARKET, THE PAYMENT WILL BE FOR THE ACTUAL DAMAGE DONE BY THE ANIMAL. [SO ALSO IF IT CONSUMED] AT THE ENTRANCE OF A SHOP, PAYMENT TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT WILL BE MADE, [BUT IF IT CONSUMED] INSIDE THE SHOP, THE PAYMENT WILL BE FOR THE ACTUAL DAMAGE DONE BY THE ANIMAL. GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: Tooth is Mu'ad to consume whatever is fit for it. How is that? In the case of an animal entering the plaintiff's premises and consuming food that is fit for it or drinking liquids that are fit for it, the payment will be in full. Similarly in the case of a wild beast entering the plaintiff's premises, tearing an animal to pieces and consuming its flesh, the payment will be in full. So also in the case of a cow consuming barley, an ass consuming horse-beans, a dog licking oil, or a pig consuming a piece of meat, the payment will be in full. R. Papa [thereupon] said: Since it has been stated that things which in the usual way would be unfit as food [for particular animals] but which under pressing circumstances are consumed by them,  come under the designation of food, in the case of a cat consuming dates, and an ass consuming fish, the payment will similarly be in full. There was a case where an ass consumed bread and chewed also the basket  [in which the bread had been kept]. Rab Judah thereupon ordered full payment for the bread, but only half damages for the basket. Why can it not be argued that since it was usual for the ass to consume the bread, it was similarly usual for it to chew at the same time the basket too? — It was only after it had already completed consuming the bread, that the ass chewed the basket. But could bread be considered the usual food of an animal? Here is [a Baraitha] which contradicts this: If it [the animal] consumed bread, meat or broth, only half damages will be paid.  Now, does not this ruling refer to [a domestic] animal?  — No, it refers to a wild beast. To a wild beast? Is not meat its usual food? — The meat was roasted.  Alternatively, you may say: It refers to a deer.  You may still further say alternatively that it refers to a [domestic] animal, but the bread was consumed upon a table.