Bava Kamma

so that the point at issue [between the contradictory statements] will be that the one Master [the former] maintains that the law of Mu'ad applies [also to Pebbles]  whereas the other Master [the latter] holds that the law of Mu'ad does not apply [to Pebbles]?  — No, we suppose the act not to have been repeated, the point at issue being the same as that between Symmachus and the Rabbis. But is it not unusual [for a cock to crow into a utensil]?  — There had been some seeds there [in which case it was not unusual]. R. Ashi asked: Would an unusual act  reduce Pebbles [by half, i.e.,] to the payment of quarter damages or would an unusual act not reduce Pebbles to the payment of quarter damages?  — But why not solve this question from that of Raba, for Raba asked [the following]:  Is there such a thing as becoming Mu'ad in the case of Pebbles  or is there no such thing as becoming Mu'ad in the case of Pebbles?  Now, does not this query imply that no unusual act [affects the law of Pebbles]?  — Raba may perhaps have formulated his query upon a mere supposition as follows: If you suppose that no unusual act [affects the law of Pebbles], is there such a thing as becoming Mu'ad [in the case of Pebbles] or is there no such thing as becoming Mu'ad? — Let it stand undecided. R. Ashi further asked: Is [damage occasioned by] indirect force, according to Symmachus,  subject to the law applicable to direct force or not so? Is he  acquainted with the special halachic tradition [on the matter]  but he confines its effect to damage done by indirect force or is he perhaps not acquainted at all with this tradition? — Let it stand undecided. IF IT WAS KICKING OR PEBBLES WERE FLYING FROM UNDER IT'S FEET AND UTENSILS WERE BROKEN, [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES WILL BE PAID. The following query was put forward: Does the text mean to say: 'If it was kicking so that damage resulted from the kicking, or in the case of pebbles flying in the usual way … [only] half damages will be paid,' being thus in accordance with the Rabbis;  or does it perhaps mean to say: 'If it was kicking so that damage resulted from the kicking, or when pebbles were flying as a result of the kicking … [only] half damages will be paid.' thus implying that in the case of pebbles flying in the usual way, the payment would be in full, being therefore in accordance with Symmachus? Come and hear the concluding clause: IF IT TROD UPON A UTENSIL AND BROKE IT, AND A FRAGMENT [OF IT] FELL UPON ANOTHER UTENSIL WHICH WAS ALSO BROKEN, FOR THE FIRST UTENSIL FULL COMPENSATION MUST BE PAID, BUT FOR THE SECOND, [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES. Now, how could the Mishnah be in accordance with Symmachus,  who is against half damages [in the case of Pebbles]? If you, however, suggest that THE FIRST UTENSIL refers to the utensil broken by a fragment that flew off from the first [broken] utensil, and THE SECOND refers thus to the utensil broken by a fragment that flew off from, the second [broken] utensil, and further assume that according to Symmachus there is a distinction between damage done by direct force and damage done by indirect force [so that in the latter case only half damages will be paid], then [if so] what about the question of R. Ashi: 'Is [damage occasioned by] indirect force, according to Symmachus, subject to the law of direct force or not subject to the law of direct force?' Why is it not evident to him [R. Ashi] that it is not subject to the law applicable to direct force? — R. Ashi undoubtedly explains the Mishnah in accordance with the Rabbis, and the query  is put by him as follows: [Does it mean to say:] 'If it was kicking so that damage resulted from the kicking, or in the case of pebbles flying in the usual way … [only] half damages will be paid', thus implying that [in the case of Pebbles flying] as a result of kicking, [only] quarter damages would be paid on account of the fact that an unusual act reduces payment [in the case of Pebbles]  or [does it perhaps mean to say:] 'If it was kicking so that damage resulted from the kicking or when pebbles were flying as a result of the kicking … half damages will be paid,' thus making it plain that an unusual act does not reduce payment [in the case of Pebbles]? — Let it stand undecided. R. Abba b. Memel asked of R. Ammi, some say of R. Hiyya b. Abba, [the following Problem]: In the case of an animal walking in a place where it was unavoidable for it not to make pebbles fly [from under its feet], while in fact it was kicking and in this way making pebbles fly and doing damage, what would be the law? [Should it be maintained that] since it was unavoidable for it not to make pebbles fly there, the damage would be considered usual;  or should it perhaps be argued otherwise, since in fact the damage resulted from kicking  that caused the pebbles to fly? — Let it stand undecided. R. Jeremiah asked R. Zera: In the case of an animal walking on public ground and making pebbles fly from which there resulted damage, what would be the law? Should we compare this case  to Horn  and thus impose liability; or since, on the other hand, it is a derivative of Foot, should there be exemption [for damage done on public ground]? — He answered him: It stands to reason that [since] it is a secondary kind of Foot [there is exemption on Public ground]. Again [he asked him]: In a case where the pebbles were kicked up on public ground but the damage that resulted therefrom was done in the plaintiff's premises, what would be the law? — He answered him: if the cause of raising [the pebbles] is not there [to institute liability],  how could any liability be attached to the falling down [of the pebbles]? Thereupon he [R. Jeremiah] raised an objection [from the following]: In the case of an animal walking on the road and making pebbles fly either in the plaintiff's premises or on public ground, there is liability to pay. Now, does not this Baraitha deal with a case where the pebbles were made both to fly up on public ground and to do damage on public ground?  — No, though the pebbles were made to fly on public ground, the damage resulted on the plaintiff's premises. But did you not say [he asked him further, that in such a case there would still be exemption on account of the argument].'If the cause of raising [the pebbles] is not there [to institute liability], how could any liability be attached to the falling down [of the pebbles]?' He answered him: 'I have since changed my mind [on this matter].' He raised another objection: IF IT TROD UPON A UTENSIL AND BROKE IT, AND A FRAGMENT [OF IT] FELL UPON ANOTHER UTENSIL WHICH WAS ALSO BROKEN, FOR THE FIRST UTENSIL FULL COMPENSATION MUST BE PAID, BUT FOR THE SECOND [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES. And it was taught on the matter: This ruling is confined to [damage done on] the plaintiff's premises, whereas if it took place on public ground there would be exemption regarding the first utensil though with respect to the second there would be liability to pay. Now, does not the Baraitha present a case where the fragment was made both to fly up on public ground and to do damage on public ground?  — No, though the fragment was made to fly on public ground, the damage resulted on the plaintiff's premises. But did you not say [that in such a case there would still be exemption on account of the argument]: 'If the cause of raising [the pebbles] is not there [to institute liability], how could any liability be attached to the falling down [of the pebbles?]'