Bava Kamma

If without his co-operation the fire would not have spread, is it not obvious [that he is totally to blame]? If [on the other hand] even without his co-operation the fire would have spread, what, if anything at all, has he perpetrated? R. Papa demurred: Behold there is that case which is taught: 'Five persons were sitting upon one bench and did not break it; when, however, there came along one person more and sat upon it, it broke down; the latter is liable' — supposing him, added R. Papa, to have been as stout as Papa b. Abba.  But under what circumstances? If without him the bench would not have broken, is it not obvious [that he is totally to blame]? If, on the other hand, without him it would also have broken, what, if anything at all, has he perpetrated? Be this as it may, how can the Baraitha be justified? — It could hold good when, without the newcomer, the bench would have broken after two hours, whereas now it broke in one hour. They  therefore can say to him: 'If not for you we would have remained sitting a little while longer and would then have got up.'  But why should he not say to them: 'Had you not been [sitting] there, through me the bench would not have broken'?  — No; it holds good when he [did not sit at all on the bench but] merely leaned upon them and the bench broke down. Is it not obvious [that he is liable]? — You might have argued '[Damage done by] a man's force is not comparable with [that done directly by] his body.'It is therefore made known to us that [a man is responsible for] his force [just as he] is [for] his body, for whenever his body breaks [anything] his force also participates in the damage. Are there no other instances? Behold there is that which is taught:  When ten persons beat a man with ten sticks, whether simultaneously or successively, so that he died, none of them is guilty of murder. R. Judah b. Bathyra says: If [they hit] successively, the last is liable, for he was the immediate cause of the death!  — Cases of murder are not dealt with here.  You may also say that controversial cases are not dealt with.  Are they not? Did not we suggest that the Mishnah is not in accordance with Rabbi?  — That the Mishnah is not in accordance with Rabbi but in accordance with the Rabbis, we may suggest;  whereas that it is in accordance with R. Judah b. Bathyra, and not in accordance with the Rabbis, we are not inclined to suggest. I AM LIABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DAMAGE. 'I become liable for the replacement of the damage' is not stated but '… TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DAMAGE'. We have thus learnt here that which the Rabbis taught elsewhere:  '"To compensate for damage" imports that the owners [plaintiffs] have to retain the carcass as part payment'. What is the authority for this ruling? — R. Ammi said: Scripture states, He that killeth a beast yeshallemennah [shall make it good];  do not read yeshallemennah ['he shall pay for it'], but yashlimennah  ['He shall complete its deficiency']. R. Kahana infers it from the following: If it be torn in pieces, let him bring compensation up to ['ad]  the value of the carcass,' he shall not make good that which was torn.  'Up to' the value of the carcass  he must pay, but for the carcass itself he has not to pay. Hezekiah infers it from the following: And the dead shall be his own,  which refers to the plaintiff. It has similarly been taught in the school of Hezekiah: And the dead shall be his own,  refers to the plaintiff. You say 'the plaintiff'. Why not the defendant? You may safely assert: 'This is not the case.' Why is this not the case? — Abaye said: If you assume that the carcass must remain with the defendant, why did not the Divine law, stating He shall surely pay ox for ox,  stop at that? Why write at all And the dead shall be his own?  This shows that it refers to the plaintiff. And all the quotations serve each its specific purpose. For if the Divine Law had laid down [this ruling only in] the verse 'He that killeth a beast shall make it good,' the reason of the ruling would have been assigned to the infrequency of the occurrence,  whereas in the case of an animal torn in pieces [by wild beasts]'  which is [comparatively] of frequent occurrence, the opposite view might have been held;  hence special reference is essential.  If [on the other hand] this ruling had been made known to us only in the case of an animal torn in pieces.  it would have been explained by the fact that the damage there was done by an indirect agency,  whereas in the case of a man killing a beast, where the damage was done by a direct agency, the opposite view might have been held. Again, were this ruling intimated in both cases, it would have been explained in the one case on account of its infrequency,  and in the other account of the indirect agency,  whereas in the damage to which 'And the dead shall be his own'  refers, which is both frequent and direct,  an opposite view might have been taken. If [on the other hand] this ruling had been intimated only in the case referred to by 'And the dead shall be his own, it would have been explained by the fact of the damage having been done only by man's possession,  whereas in cases where the damage resulted from man's person  an opposite view might have been taken. Hence all quotations are essential. R. Kahana said to Rab: The reason [for the ruling] is that the Divine Law says 'And the dead shall be his own', and but for this I might have thought that the carcass shall remain with the defendant [yet how can this be]? If, when there are with him  several carcasses he is entitled to pay him  with them, for the Master stated: He shall return,  includes payment in kind, even with bran,  what question then about the carcass of his own animal? — No, the verse is required only for the law regarding the decrease of the value of the carcass May we say that the decrease of the value of the carcass is a point at issue between Tannaitic authorities? For it has been taught: If it be torn in pieces, let him bring it for witness: