Bava Kamma

There is an excess in [the liability for] Fire over [that for] Pit, and there is [on the other hand] an excess in [the liability for] Pit over [that for] Fire. The excess in [the liability for] Pit over [that for] Fire is that Pit is from its very inception a source of injury; if its owner handed it over to the care of a deaf-mute, an insane person or a minor, he is still responsible [for any damage that may result],  whereas all this is not so in the case of Fire. The excess in [the liability for] Fire over [that for] Pit is that the nature of Fire is to spread and do damage and it is apt to consume both things fit for it and things unfit for it, whereas all this is not so in the case of Pit. Why not include in the excess of [liability for] Ox over [that for] Pit [the fact] that Ox is [also] liable for damage done to inanimate objects  which is not so in the case of Pit?  — The above [Baraitha] is in accordance with R. Judah who enjoins payment for damage to inanimate objects [also] in the case of Pit.  If it is in accordance with R. Judah, look at the concluding clause, 'The excess in [the liability for] Fire over [that for] Pit is that the nature of Fire is to spread and do damage, and it is apt to consume both things fit for it and things unfit for it; whereas all this is not so in the case of Pit.' 'Things fit for it:' are they not 'of wood'? 'Things unfit for it: are they not 'utensils'?  Now 'all this is not so in the case of Pit'. But if the statement is in accordance with R. Judah, did you not say that R. Judah enjoins payment for damage to inanimate objects [also] in the case of Pit? The Baraitha is, therefore, indeed in accordance with the Rabbis, but it mentions [some points] and omits [others].  What else does it omit that it omits that [particular] point?  — It also omits the law of hidden goods.  On the other hand you may also say that the Baraitha can still be reconciled with R. Judah, for 'things unfit for it' do not include utensils,  but do include [damage done by fire] lapping his neighbour's ploughed field and grazing his stones. R. Ashi demurred: Why not include, in the excess of liability for Ox Over [that for] Pit, [the fact] that Ox is [also] liable for damage done to consecrated animals that have become unfit [for the altar],  whereas this is not so in the case of Pit?  No difficulty arises if you assume that the Baraitha is in accordance with the Rabbis; just as it had omitted that point,  it omitted this point too. But if you maintain that the Baraitha is in accordance with R. Judah, what else did it omit that it omits this [one] point? — It omitted [Ox] trampling upon newly broken land.  [No! this is no argument,] for as to [Ox] trampling upon newly broken land there is no omission there, for this [is included in that which] has already been stated, 'It is in its habit to move about and do damage.' WHEN I HAVE PERPETRATED A PART OF THE DAMAGE. Our Rabbis taught: 'When I have perpetrated a part of the damage I become liable for the compensation for the damage as if I had perpetrated the whole of the damage. How is that? If one had dug a Pit nine handbreadths deep and another came along and completed it to a depth of ten handbreadths, the latter person is liable.' Now this ruling is not in accordance with Rabbi; for it was taught:  If one had dug a pit nine handbreadths deep and another came along and completed it to a depth of ten handbreadths, the latter person is liable. Rabbi says: The latter person is liable in cases of death,  but both of them in cases of injury!  — R. Papa said: The Mishnaic ruling  deals with cases of death and is unanimous.  Some read: May we say that the Mishnah is not in accordance with Rabba? — R. Papa thereupon said: It deals with cases of death and is unanimous. R. Zera demurred: Are there no other instances?  Behold there is [the case] where an ox was handed over to the care of five persons and one of them was careless, so that the ox did damage; that one is liable! — But in what circumstances? If without the care of that one, the ox could not be controlled, is it not obvious that it is that one who perpetrated the whole of the damage?  If, [on the other hand] even without the care of that one, the ox could be controlled, what, if anything at all, has that one perpetrated? R. Shesheth, however, demurred: Behold there is [the case] where a man adds a bundle [of dry twigs to an existing fire]! — But in what circumstances?