Bava Kamma

whereas [if this was done] in the case of a deposit he would thereby become disqualified from giving evidence.  But did Ilfa not say that an oath transfers possession,  which appears to prove that it is only the oath which would transfer responsibility, whereas mere denial would not transfer responsibility?  But here also we are dealing with a case where the deposited article was at that time situated on the meadow.  Or if you wish I may say that what was meant to be conveyed by the statement that an oath transfers possession was as in the case of R. Huna, for R. Huna said that Rab stated: [Where one said to another,] 'You have a maneh  of mine' and the other retorted, 'I have nothing of yours'  and confirmed it by an oath  and then witnesses came forward [and proved the defendant to have perjured himself] he would be exempt  as it is stated: And the owner thereof shall accept it and he shall not make restitution,  implying that wherever the plaintiff accepted an oath, the defendant could no more be made liable to pay money. To return to a previous theme: 'R. Huna said that Rab stated [that where one said to another]. "You have a maneh of mine" and the other rejoined. "I have nothing of yours" and confirmed it by an oath and subsequently witnesses came forward [and proved the defendant to have perjured himself] he would be exempt as it is stated: And the owner thereof shall accept it and he shall not make restitution, implying that wherever the plaintiff accepted an oath, the defendant could no more be made liable to pay money.' Raba thereupon said: We should naturally suppose that the statement of Rab is meant to apply to the case of a loan where the money was given to be spent,  but not to a deposit which always remains in the possession of the owner.  But [I affirm] by God that Rab made his statement even with reference to a deposit, as it was regarding a deposit that the text [of the verse quoted]  was written. R. Nahman was sitting and repeating this teaching.  when R. Aha b. Manyumi pointed out to R. Nahman a contradiction [from the following: If a man says to another] 'Where is my deposit?' and the other replies. 'It is lost,' and the depositor then says. 'Will you take an oath,' and the bailee replies. 'Amen!'  then if witnesses testify against him that he himself had consumed it, he has to pay only the Principal,  whereas if he admits [this] on his own accord, he has to pay the Principal together with a Fifth and bring a trespass offering?  — R. Nahman said to him: We are dealing here with a case where the oath was taken outside the Court of Law.  He rejoined:  If so read the concluding clause: [But if on being asked] 'Where is my deposit?', the bailee replied: 'It was stolen!', [and when the depositor retorted] 'Will you take an oath?', the bailee said, 'Amen!' if witnesses testify against him that he himself had stolen it, he has to repay double, whereas if he admits this on his own accord, he has to pay the Principal together with a Fifth and a trespass offering. Now, if you assume that the oath was taken outside the Court of Law, how could there be liability for double payment?  — He replied: I might indeed answer you that [though in the case of] the commencing clause [the oath was taken] outside the Court of Law, [in that of] the concluding clause [it was taken] in the Court of Law. But as I am not going to give you a forced answer I will therefore say that though in the one case as well as in the other the oath was taken in the Court of Law,  there is still no difficulty, as in the first case we suppose that the claimant anticipated the Court  [in administering the oath] and in the other case  he did not do so.  But Rami b. Hama said to R. Nahman: Since you do not personally accept this view of Rab, why are you pledging yourself to defend this statement of Rab? — He replied: I did it [merely] to interpret the view of Rab, presuming that Rab might have thus explained this Mishnaic text. But did not Rab quote a verse  to support his view?  — It might be said that the verse intends only to indicate that those who have to be adjured by [the law of] the Torah are only they who by taking the oath release themselves from payment,  [as it is stated: 'And the owner thereof shall accept it and he shall not make restitution,'  [implying that it is] the one who [otherwise] would be under obligation to make it good that has to take the oath. R. Hamnuna raised an objection [from the following]: 'Where an oath was imposed upon a defendant five times [regarding the same defence], whether in the presence of the Court of Law or not in the presence of the Court of Law, and he denied the claim [on every occasion], he would have to be liable  for each occasion. And R. Simeon said: The reason is that [on each occasion] it was open to him to retract and admit the claim.'  Now in this case you can hardly say that the action of the Court was anticipated, for it is stated: 'Where an oath was imposed upon a defendant' [which naturally would mean, by the sanction of the Court]; you can similarly not say that it was done outside the Court of Law, for it is stated 'in the presence of the Court of Law.'  As he  raised this difficulty so he also solved it, by pointing out that the text should be interpreted disjunctively: 'Where an oath was imposed upon him [by the Court, but taken] outside the Court of law,  or where it was administered in the presence of the Court of Law' but in anticipation of its action.  Raba raised an objection [from the following:] If a bailee  advanced a plea of theft regarding a deposit and confirmed it by an oath but subsequently admitted [his perjury], and witnesses came forward [and testified to the same effect], if he confessed before the appearance of the witnesses, he has to pay the Principal together with a Fifth and a trespass offering; but if he confessed after the appearance of the witnesses he has to repay double and bring a trespass offering.  Now, here it could not be said that it was outside the Court of Law, or that it was done in anticipation [of the action of the Court], since the liability of double payment  is mentioned here!  — Raba therefore said: To all cases of confession,  no matter whether he pleaded in defence loss or theft, Rab did not mean his statement to apply, for it is definitely written: Then they shall confess,  implying [that in all cases] the perjurer would have to pay the Principal and the Fifth, [and so also in the case] where he pleaded theft  and witnesses came forward [and proved otherwise], Rab similarly did not mean his statement to apply, for [it is in this case that] the liability for double payment [is laid down in Scripture];  the statement made by Rab applies only to the case where, e.g., he pleaded in defence loss  and after confirming it by an oath he did not admit his perjury but witnesses appeared [and proved it].  R. Gamda went and repeated this explanation  in the presence of R. Ashi who said to him: Seeing that R. Hamnuna was a disciple of Rab  and surely knew very well that Rab meant his statement to apply also to the case of confession,  since otherwise he would not have raised an objection from a case of confession, how then can you say that Rab did not mean his statement to apply to a case of confession?  — Said R. Aha the Elder to R. Ashi: R. Hamnuna's difficulty may have been this: