Bava Kamma

What would be the law where [instead of availing himself of this plea] the robber took a [false] oath  [that he never misappropriated the leaven]? Shall we say that since if the leaven were to be stolen from him he would have to pay for it, there was therefore here a denial of money,  or perhaps since the leaven was still intact and was [in the eyes of the law] but mere ashes, there was no denial here of an intrinsic pecuniary value?  [It appears that] this matter on which Raba was doubtful was pretty certain to Rabbah, for Rabbah stated: [If one man says to another] 'You have stolen my ox'. and the other says. 'I did not steal it at all,' and when the first asks, 'What then is the reason of its being with you?' the other replies, 'I am a gratuitous bailee regarding it,' [and after affirming this defence by an oath he admitted his guilt], he would be liable,  for by this [false] defence he would have been able to release himself from liability in the case of theft or loss;  so also where the [false] defence was 'I am a paid bailee regarding it,' he would similarly be liable,  as he would thereby have released himself from liability in the case where the animal became maimed or died;  again, even where the false defence was that 'I am a borrower regarding it,' he would be liable,  for he would thereby have released himself from any liability were the animal to have died merely because of the usual work performed with it.  Now, this surely proves that though the animal now stands intact, since if it were to be stolen  the statement would amount to a denial of money, it is even now considered to be a denial of money.  So also here in this case though the leaven at present is considered [in the eyes of the law] to be equivalent to mere ashes, yet since if it were to be stolen he would have to pay him with proper value, even now there is a denial there of actual money. Rabbah  was once sitting and repeating this teaching when R. Amram pointed out to Rabbah a difficulty [from the following]: And lieth concerning it  [has the effect of] excepting a case where there is admission of the substance of the claim, as [where in answer to the plea] 'You have stolen my ox,' the accused says. 'I did not steal it,' but when the plaintiff retorts, 'What then is the reason of its being with you?' the defendant states, 'You sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, your father sold it to me, your father gave it to me as a gift, or the ox was running after my cow, or it came of its own accord to me, or I found it straying on the road, or I am a gratuitous bailee regarding it, or I am a paid bailee regarding it, or I am a borrower regarding it,' and after confirming [such a false defence] by an oath he admitted his guilt. But as you might say that he would be liable here, it is therefore stated further: And lieth concerning it,  to except a case like this where there is an admission of the substance of the claim'!  — He replied:  This argument is confused, for the teaching there dealt with a case where the defendant tendered him immediate delivery  whereas the statement I made refers to a case where the animal was at that time kept on the meadow.  But what admission in the substance of the claim could there be in the defence 'You have sold it to me?' — It might have application where the defendant said to him, 'As I have not yet paid you its value, take your ox back and go.' But still what admission in the substance of the claim is there in the defence, 'You gave it to me as a gift or your father gave it to me as a gift'? — It might be [admission] where the defendant said to him, '[As the gift was made] on the condition that I should do you some favour and since I did not do anything for you, you are entitled to take your ox back and go.' But again, where the defence was, 'I found it straying on the road,' why should the plaintiff not plead, 'You surely have had to return it to me'? — But the father of Samuel  said: The defendant was alleging, and confirming it by an oath: 'I found it as a lost article and was not aware that it was yours to return it to you.' It was taught: Ben 'Azzai said: [The following] three [false] oaths [taken by a single witness  are subject to one law]:  Where he had cognizance of the lost animal but not of the person who found it, of the person who found it but not of the lost animal, neither of the lost animal nor its finder.  But if he had cognizance neither of the lost animal nor of its finder, was he not swearing truly?  — Say therefore: '[He had cognizance] both of the lost animal and of its finder.  To what decision does this statement  point? — R. Ammi said on behalf of R. Hanina: To exemption; but Samuel said: To liability. They are divided on the point at issue between the [following] Tannaim, as taught: 'Where a single witness was adjured  [and the oath was subsequently admitted by him to have been false], he would be exempt, but R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon makes him liable.'  In what fundamental principle do they differ? — The [latter] Master  maintained that a matter which might merely cause some pecuniary liability  is regarded in law as directly touching upon money.  whereas the [other] Master maintained that it is not regarded as directly touching upon money. R. Shesheth said: He who [falsely] denies a deposit is [instantly] considered as if he had misappropriated it, and will therefore become liable for all accidents;  this is also supported by the [following] Tannaitic teaching:  [From the verse] And he lieth concerning it  we could derive the penalty,  but whence could the warning be derived? From the significant words: Neither shall ye deal falsely.  Now, does this not refer to the 'penalty' for merely having denied the money?  — No, it refers to the 'penalty' for the [false] oath.  But since the concluding clause refers to a case where an oath was taken, it surely follows that the commencing clause deals with a case where no oath was taken, for it was stated in the concluding clause:  [From the text] 'And sweareth falsely'  we can derive the penalty;  but whence can the warning be derived? From the injunction, 'Nor lie.'  Now, since the concluding clause deals with a case where an oath was taken, must not the commencing clause deal with a case where no oath was taken?  — It may, however, be said that the one clause as well as the other deals with a case where an oath was taken. But while in the case of the concluding clause the defendant admitted [his perjury], in that of the commencing clause witnesses appeared and proved it. Where witnesses appeared and proved the perjury,  the defendant would become liable for all accidents [from the very moment he took the false oath], whereas where he himself admitted his perjury he would be liable for the Principal and the Fifth and the trespass offering.  Rami b. Hama raised an objection [from the following]:  'Where the other party was suspected regarding the oath.  How so? [Where he took falsely] either an oath regarding evidence  or an oath regarding a deposit  or an oath in vain.'  But if there is legal force in your statement,  would not that party have become disqualified from the very moment of the denial?  — It might, however, be said that we are dealing here with a case where the deposited animal was at that time placed on the meadow, so that the denial could not be considered a genuine one, since he might have thought to himself, 'I will get rid of the plaintiff for the time being [so that he should no more press me for it] and later I will go and deliver up to him the deposited animal.'  This view could even be proved [from the following statement]:  R. Idi b. Abin said that he who [falsely] denies a loan  is not yet disqualified from giving evidence,