Bava Batra

Raba inquired: What  [is the law] in [the case of] a person in good health?  [Should we say] that this  applies only to a dying person because [we assume] he is desirous [to make provision] for due respect to be paid to her,  but [not] to a person in good health, since he himself is alive;  or, is it the same with a man in good health, since there too he may desire [to make provision] that respect may be paid to her  already in his lifetime?  — Come and hear: [It was taught:] If a person gives the usufruct of his estate to his wife, in writing,  she may [nevertheless] collect her kethubah from [his] landed property.  [If he gave her] a half,  a third or a quarter, she may collect her kethubah from the rest.  If he gave all his property to his wife in writing, and a bond of indebtedness  was produced against him, R. Eliezer said: She may tear up [the deed of] her gift and claim the rights of  her kethubah.  But the Sages said: She tears up her kethubah,  remains with the claim of her gift,  and forfeits both.  And R. Judah the baker related: [Such] a case once happened with the daughter of my sister [who was] a bride,  and [when] the matter was brought before the Sages they decided [that] she must tear up her kethubah, remain with the claims of her gift and forfeit both. [Front this Baraitha it follows that] the reason [why the widow forfeits her claims is] that a bond of indebtedness bad been produced against [her husband] but had no such bond been produced she would have acquired possession [of the entire estate]. Now, with what [kind of testator is the Baraitha concerned]? If it be suggested [that it deals] with a dying man, surely, [it may be pointed out,] it has been said that [a person in such a condition] merely appointed her administratrix! [Must it] not, then, [be concluded that the Baraitha deals] with a person in good health?  — [No; the Baraitha cited may] really [be concerned] with a dying man but  R. 'Awira establishes it as dealing with all cases  [while] Rabina establishes it as dealing with one's betrothed, or divorced wife. R. Joseph b. Manyumi said in the name of R. Nahman: The halachah is that she is to tear up her kethubah,  remain with the claim of her gift  and forfeit both.  Does this  imply that R. Nahman is not guided by an assumption?  Surely, it has been taught: in the case of [a person] whose son went to a distant country,  and having heard that the latter  had died, assigned all his property, in writing, to strangers; though his son subsequently appeared, his gift is [nevertheless, legally] valid.  R. Simeon b. Menasya said: His gift is not [legally] a gift, for had he known that his son was alive, he would not have given it away.  And R. Nahman said: The halachah is in accordance with R. Simeon b. Menasya!  — There  it is different, for she is content [to renounce her claim to her kethubah] for the pleasure of having it known  that [her husband] had presented  her with that property. We learned elsewhere:  If [a person] assigns his property to his sons, in writing, and he [also] assigns to his wife [a piece of] land of any size whatsoever  she loses [the claims of] her kethubah.  [Does] she lose her kethubah because he assigned to her any [small] piece of land?  — Rab replied: [This applies to the case] where he  confers the ownership upon them  through her  agency.  Samuel replied: [This applies also to the case] where he  made the distribution in her presence and she remained silent.  R. Jose b. Hanina replied: [This may also apply to the case] where he said to her,  'Take this [piece of] land in place of your kethubah'.