Arakhin

But why was it necessary [for Rab] to state [this ruling] on the view of R. Meir? — One might have thought the reason for R. Meir in that case was that he decreed [the obligation to pay] in the case of a child less than one month old out of consideration1 for one which was one month old, but that in the case here,2 where no such decree is warranted, one might [assume that R. Meir would] not [rule thus], therefore we are informed that R. Meir's reason is that no man utters his words at random, so that the same rule applies in both cases. According to whose view will be the teaching of Rabbah b. Jose3 in the name of Rab [according to others R. Yeba b. Jose in the name of Rab]: If one consecrates [to the sanctuary] his neighbour's animal, he shall pay its worth.4 According to whom? According to R. Meir. But Rab has already said that once before, for R. Giddal in the name of Rab said: If one said, ‘The valuation of a vessel be upon me, he shall pay its worth’. — You might have said: In the one case he knew that a vessel has no valuation whereupon he made up his statement with the intention for its worth, but in the case of an animal, which is normally fit to be consecrated, one might say that this is what he meant: If I report it to its owner he will sell it [to me], therefore let it be consecrated as from now already, and I shall offer it up [after having purchased it], but that he did not mean its worth,5 therefore he informs us [that this is not so].6 R. Ashi7 said: This applies only where he said: I undertake the responsibility [for an animal], but not if he said: I assume the obligation [to consecrate] this [animal].8 MISHNAH. AN IDOL-WORSHIPPER ACCORDING TO R. MEIR CAN BE MADE THE SUBJECT OF A VALUATION BUT CANNOT EVALUATE, WHEREAS ACCORDING TO R. JUDAH HE MAY EVALUATE BUT CANNOT BE MADE THE SUBJECT OF A VALUATION. BOTH AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT HE CAN BOTH VOW ANOTHER'S WORTH AND HAVE HIS WORTH VOWED BY OTHERS. GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: The children of Israel9 may evaluate, but idol-worshippers may not evaluate. One might have assumed that they cannot be made the subject of a valuation either, therefore the text states: Man,10 these are the words of R. Meir. Said R. Meir: Now that one Scriptural verse includes and the other excludes, whence am I [justified in] saying: He may be made the subject of a valuation, but may not evaluate himself?11 It is because Scripture has included more among those subject to valuation than among those fit to evaluate; for a deaf-mute, an imbecile and a minor each may be made the subject of a valuation, but is not fit to evaluate. R. Judah said: The children of Israel may be made the subject of a valuation, but idol-worshippers are not fit to be made the subject of a valuation. One might have assumed that they [the latter] are not fit to evaluate either, therefore the text states: ‘Man’. Said R. Judah: Since one verse includes and the other excludes, whence do I come to make the statement that idol-worshippers are fit to evaluate and are not subject to valuation? Because Scripture has included more among those fit to evaluate than among those subject to valuation. For one of doubtful sex and a hermaphrodite are fit to evaluate, but are not subject to valuation. Said Raba: The decision of R. Meir appeals to logic, but not the reason; the reason of R. Judah is logical, but not his decision. The decision of R. Meir appeals to logic as it is written: Ye have nothing to do with us to build a house unto our God.12 His reason does not appeal, for he argues from the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor; but it is different with them since they have no intelligence. The reason of R. Judah is logical, for he deduces it from the case of one of doubtful sex and a hermaphrodite, which, although endowed with intelligence, are yet excluded by the Divine Law [from evaluation]. His decision, however, does not appeal, as it is written: ‘Ye have nothing to do with us to build a house unto our God’. How, indeed, does R. Judah deal with ‘Ye have nothing to do with us’? — R. Hisda said in the name of Abimi: His valuation [money] must be hidden.13 But then one should not be guilty of sacrilege in connection with them, for it was taught: Concerning the five kinds of sin-offerings which must be left to die, and all moneys that must be cast into the Dead Sea, one must not derive any benefit from them, nor is one guilty of sacrilege [if one has used them].14 Why then was it taught with regard to the consecration of idol-worshippers: These things apply only to things consecrated for the altar, but things consecrated for Temple repairs are subject to the law of sacrilege?15 — Rather, said Raba: It16 was due to the ‘weakening of the hands’, as it is written: Then the people of the land weakened the hands of the people of Judah and harried them while they were building.17 value of the object in question, such offering, of course, being independent of his owning the animal. vain and no obligation results: The money value he had not vowed, the animal itself did not belong to him, wherefore he incurred no obligation whatsoever. had in mind the payment of its market value, which is now obligatory. if he said ‘This animal’ shall I provide for the altar,’ he obviously has said nothing. For he could undertake to make himself responsible for the money value of an animal, but he could surely not oblige himself to dedicate the animal that does not belong to him. In the latter case his words are for practical purposes meaningless. He has said nothing. 2), the inference being obvious. inclusive and exclusive indications. ‘The children of Israel’ excludes, while ‘man’ includes. excluded by Ezra IV, 3, — but it does mean that it acquires sacredness, so as to be forbidden for profane use; and since it is also not fit for sacred use, it must be hidden or destroyed. sacrilege.