Yevamot — Daf 91a

פשיטא בת לוי מן המעשר איצטריכא ליה

ובת לוי מן המעשר מי מיפסלא בזנות והתני' לויה שנשבית או שנבעלה בעילת זנות נותנין לה מעשר ואוכלת אמר רב ששת קנסא:

בת כהן מן התרומה: אפי' בתרומה דרבנן:

ואין יורשיו של זה ויורשיו של זה יורשין כתובתה וכו': כתובה מאי עבידתה אמר רב פפא כתובת בנין דיכרין

פשיטא מהו דתימא לדידה דעבדא איסורא קנסוה רבנן לזרעה לא קנסו רבנן קמ"ל:

אחיו של זה ואחיו של זה חולצין ולא מייבמין: אחיו של ראשון חולץ מדאורייתא ולא מייבם מדרבנן אחיו של שני חולץ מדרבנן ולא מייבם לא מדאורייתא ולא מדרבנן:

ר' יוסי אומר כתובתה על נכסי בעלה וכו': אמר רב הונא בתראי מודו לקמאי קמאי לא מודו לבתראי

ר' שמעון מודי ליה לר' אלעזר דמה ביאה דעיקר איסורא לא קניס וכ"ש מציאתה ומעשה ידיה דממונא הוא ור' אלעזר לא מודי ליה לר' שמעון מציאתה ומעשה ידיה דממונא הוא לא קניס אבל ביאה דאיסורא הוא קניס

ותרוייהו מודו ליה לר' יוסי הני דיתבא תותיה לא קניס וכל שכן כתובה דלמשקל ומיפק קאי ורבי יוסי לא מודי להו כתובה דלמשקל ומיפק הוא דלא קניס אבל הני דיתבא תותיה קניס

רבי יוחנן אמר קמאי מודו לבתראי בתראי לא מודו לקמאי ר' יוסי מודי ליה לר' אלעזר כתובה דמדידיה לדידה לא קניס וכ"ש מציאתה ומעשה ידיה דמדידה לדידיה

ור' אלעזר לא מודי ליה מציאתה ומעשה ידיה הוא דמדידה לדידיה לא קניס אבל כתובה דמדידיה לדידה קניס

ותרוייהו מודו ליה לר' שמעון ומה הני דמחיים לא קנסי ביאה דלאחר מיתה לא כ"ש ור' שמעון לא מודי להו ביאה הוא דלאחר מיתה לא קניס אבל הני דמחיים קניס:

נשאת שלא ברשות וכו': אמר רב הונא אמר רב הכי הלכתא א"ל רב נחמן גנבא גנובי למה לך אי סבירא לך כרבי שמעון אימא הלכה כרבי שמעון דשמעתיך כרבי שמעון קאזלה

וכי תימא אי אמינא הלכה כרבי שמעון משמע אפילו בקמייתא אימא הלכה כר' שמעון באחרונה קשיא

א"ר ששת אמינא כי ניים ושכיב רב אמרה להא שמעתתא הלכה מכלל דפליגי מאי הוה לה למיעבד מיאנס אנסה

ועוד תניא כל עריות שבתורה אין צריכות הימנו גט חוץ מאשת איש שניסת על פי ב"ד על פי בית דין הוא דבעיא גיטא על פי עדים לא בעיא גיטא

מני אילימא רבי שמעון על פי בית דין מי בעיא גט והתניא ר' שמעון אומר עשו ב"ד בהוראתן כזדון איש באשה על פי עדים כשגגת איש באשה אידי ואידי לא בעיא גט

אלא לאו רבנן היא

לעולם רבי שמעון היא ותריץ הכי ר"ש אומר עשו ב"ד בהוראתן ככוונת איש באשה [ובעיא גט] על פי עדים כשלא בכוונת איש באשה [ולא בעיא גט]

רב אשי אמר לענין איסורא קתני והכי קאמר עשו ב"ד בהוראתן כזדון איש באשה ומיתסרא על בעלה על פי עדים כשגגת איש באשה ולא מיתסרא על בעלה

Is not this obvious!  — [The statement] IF THE DAUGHTER OF A LEVITE [she becomes disqualified] FROM THE EATING OF TITHE was required.  Does, however, the daughter of a Levite become disqualified by prostitution from the eating of tithe? Surely, it was taught: If the daughter of a Levite was taken into captivity  or was subjected to an act of prostitution,  she may nevertheless be given tithe and she may eat it!  — R. Shesheth replied: This  is a punitive measure. IF THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST, [she becomes disqualified] FROM THE EATING OF TERUMAH, even Rabbinical terumah. NEITHER THE HEIRS OF THE ONE HUSBAND NOR THE HEIRS OF THE OTHER ARE ENTITLED TO INHERIT HER KETHUBAH etc. How does the question of kethubah arise here?  R. Papa replied: The kethubah of the male children.  [Is not this also] obvious!  — It might have been assumed that the Rabbis had penalized only her, since she had committed the forbidden act, but not her children, hence we were informed [that they also lose the kethubah]. THE BROTHER OF THE ONE AND THE BROTHER OF THE OTHER MUST SUBMIT TO HALIZAH, BUT MAY NOT CONTRACT THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE. The brother of the first husband submits to halizah in accordance with the Pentateuchal law,  and may not contract the levirate marriage in accordance with Rabbinic law;  the brother of the second, however, submits to halizah in accordance with Rabbinical law,  and may not contract the levirate marriage either in accordance with Pentateuchal, or in accordance with Rabbinical law. R. JOSE SAID: HER KETHUBAH [REMAINS A CHARGE] UPON THE ESTATE OF HER FIRST HUSBAND etc. Said R. Huna: The latter agree with the former,  but the former do not agree with the latter: R. Simeon agrees with R. Eleazar;  since he  does not penalize [the woman  in the case of] cohabitation which constitutes the main prohibition. how much less [would he do so in respect of] what she finds and what she makes with her hands.which are only monetary matters. R. Eleazar, however, does not agree with R. Simeon; [since it is only in respect of] what the woman finds and what she makes with her hands, which are monetary matters, that he does not penalize her, but in respect of cohabitation which is a religious prohibition he does penalize her. And both of them agree with R. Jose; [since they] do not penalize [the woman in respect of] those matters which are applicable while she continues to live with her husband,  how much less [would they do so in respect of] the kethubah the purpose of which is  [for the woman] to take it and depart.  R. Jose, on the other hand, does not agree with them; [since it is only in respect of] the kethubah [the purpose of which is for the woman] to take it and depart,  that he does not penalize her, but in respect of those matters which are applicable while she continues to live with her husband,  he does penalize her. R. Johanan stated: The former agree with the latter, but the latter do not agree with the former: R. Jose agrees with R. Eleazar; since he does not penalize [the woman in respect of] the kethubah which has to be taken from the husband and given to the wife,  how much less [would be do so in respect of] what she finds and what she makes with her hands which have to be taken from her and given to him.  R. Eleazar, however, does not agree with him; [since it is only in respect of] what she finds and what she makes with her hands which have to be taken from the woman and given to the husband,  that he does not penalize her, but in respect of the kethubah which has to be taken from him and given to her,  he does penalize her. And both of them agree with R. Simeon; since they do not penalize her in respect of matters which [are applicable] while [her first husband] is alive, how much less [would they do so in respect of] cohabitation which takes place after his death. R. Simeon, however, does not agree with them; [since it is only in respect of] cohabitation which [takes place] after [her husband's] death, that he does not penalize her, but [in respect of] those matters which [are applicable] while [he is] alive, he does penalize her. IF SHE MARRIED WITHOUT AN AUTHORIZATION etc. Said R. Huna in the name of Rab: This is the accepted law.  R. Nahman said to him: Why should you indulge in circumlocution!  If you hold the same view as R. Simeon, say. 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Simeon' for, indeed, your traditional statement runs on the same lines as that of R. Simeon! And should you reply. 'If I were to say "the halachah is in agreement with R. Simeon", it might be assumed to apply even to his first statement',  then say. 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Simeon in his latter statement'!  — This is a difficulty. R. Shesheth said: It occurs to me  that Rab made this reported statement while he was sleepy and about to doze off.  [His statement] 'This is the accepted law' implies that  [the Rabbis] differ;  but what could she do? She was but the victim of circumstances!  Furthermore, it was taught: 'None of the women in incestuous marriages forbidden in the Torah, requires a letter of divorce from the man who married her,  except a married woman who married again in accordance with a decision of a Beth din'. Only [where she married again] 'in accordance with a decision of a Beth din'  does she require a letter of divorce, but where [the marriage took place] in accordance with the evidence of two witnesses she requires no letter of divorce.  Now, whose view is here represented?  If it be suggested [that it is the view of] R. Simeon, does she [it may be retorted] require a letter of divorce [even where her marriage took place] in accordance with a decision of the Beth din? Surely it was taught: R. Simeon stated, 'If the Beth din acted  on their own judgment  [the marriage is regarded] as a wilful [act of adultery between] a man and a [married] woman;  [if, however, they acted],  in accordance with the evidence of [two] witnesses, [the marriage is regarded] as [intercourse between] a man and a woman that was due to error'.  In both cases, however,  no letter of divorce is thus  required.  Consequently it must represent the view of the Rabbis!  The fact is [that it  represents the view of] R. Simeon, and you may interpret it as follows. R. Simeon stated: If the Beth din acted  on their own judgment, [the marriage is regarded] as intentional [intercourse  between] a man and an [unmarried] woman and [the latter]  consequently requires a letter of divorce; [If, however, they acted],  in accordance with the evidence of [two] witnesses [the marriage is regarded] as wanton [intercourse between] a man and an [unmarried] woman  and [the latter consequently] requires no letter of divorce. R. Ashi replied: The statement  was mainly concerned with the question of the prohibition,  and is to be understood as follows:  If the Beth din acted  on their own judgment, [the marriage is regarded] as a wilful [act of adultery between] a man and a [married] woman, and [the latter is consequently] forbidden to her [first] husband; [if, however, they acted]  in accordance with the evidence of [two] witnesses, [the marriage is regarded] as [intercourse between] a man and a woman that was due to error, and [the latter is consequently] not forbidden to her [first] husband.