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שבועות 25
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
We mean in the case of a sin offering. Rabina said: The Tanna mentions only that which is applicable to foods, but an oath, which can take effect even on that which is not a food, he does not mention. But [he mentions] holy things, which are applicable also to wood and stone! — Well then, he mentions only that which is applicable to that which has substance, but an oath, which can take effect also on that which has no substance, as, for example, ‘I shall sleep’, or, ‘I shall not sleep.’ he does not mention. MISHNAH. IT IS THE SAME [WHETHER HE SWEARS OF] THINGS CONCERNING HIMSELF, OR OF THINGS CONCERNING OTHERS, OR OF THINGS WHICH HAVE SUBSTANCE, OR OF THINGS WHICH HAVE NO SUBSTANCE. HOW SO? [IF] HE SAID, ‘I SWEAR THAT I SHALL GIVE TO SO-AND-SO,’ OR, ‘I SHALL NOT GIVE;’ ‘I HAVE GIVEN,’ OR ‘I HAVE NOT GIVEN;’ ‘I SHALL SLEEP,’ OR, ‘I SHALL NOT SLEEP;’ ‘I HAVE SLEPT,’ OR, ‘I HAVE NOT SLEPT;’ ‘I SHALL THROW A PEBBLE IN THE SEA.’ OR, ‘I SHALL NOT THROW;’ ‘I HAVE THROWN,’ OR, ‘I HAVE NOT THROWN’; [HE IS LIABLE.] R. ISHMAEL SAYS, HE IS LIABLE ONLY FOR [AN OATH IN] THE FUTURE, FOR IT IS SAID: TO DO EVIL OR TO DO GOOD. R. AKIBA SAID TO HIM: IF SO, WE KNOW ONLY SUCH CASES WHERE DOING EVIL AND DOING GOOD ARE APPLICABLE; BUT HOW DO WE KNOW SUCH CASES WHERE DOING EVIL AND DOING GOOD ARE NOT APPLICABLE.? HE REPLIED TO HIM: FROM THE AMPLIFICATION OF THE VERSE. WHEREUPON HE SAID TO HIM: IF THE VERSE AMPLIFIES FOR THAT, IT AMPLIFIES FOR THIS ALSO. GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: There is a greater restriction in vows than in oaths [in one respect]; and there is a greater restriction in oaths than in vows [in another respect] — The greater restriction in vows is that vows take effect on a precept as on an optional matter, which is not the case in oaths. The greater restriction in oaths is that oaths take effect on a thing which has no substance as on a thing which has substance, which is not the case in vows. HOW SO? [IF] HE SAID, ‘I SWEAR THAT I SHALL GIVE TO SO-AND-SO,’ OR, ‘I SHALL NOT GIVE.’ What is meant by, ‘I shall give’? Shall we say, charity to the poor? [For that] he already stands adjured from Mount Sinai, for it is said: Thou shalt surely give him. — It must therefore mean a gift to a rich man. ‘I SHALL SLEEP,’ OR, ‘I SHALL NOT SLEEP.’ This cannot be, for R. Johanan said: He who says, ‘I shall not sleep three days,’ is given stripes, and he may sleep immediately. — There, he said ‘three’; here, he did not say ‘three’. I SHALL THROW A PEBBLE IN THE SEA,’ OR, ‘I SHALL NOT THROW’. It was stated: [If a man says,] ‘I swear that So-and-so threw a pebble in the sea,’ or, ‘that he did not throw,’ Rab said, he is liable; and Samuel said, he is exempt. Rab said, he is liable, because it is applicable in both negative and positive [forms]; and Samuel said, he is exempt, because it is not applicable in the future. Shall we say that they disagree on the same principle on which R. Ishmael and R. Akiba disagree? For we learnt: R. ISHMAEL SAYS, HE IS LIABLE ONLY FOR [AN OATH IN] THE FUTURE, FOR IT IS SAID: TO DO EVIL OR TO DO GOOD. R. AKIBA SAID TO HIM: IF SO, WE KNOW ONLY SUCH CASES WHERE DOING EVIL AND DOING GOOD ARE APPLICABLE; BUT HOW DO WE KNOW SUCH CASES WHERE DOING EVIL AND DOING GOOD ARE NOT APPLICABLE? HE REPLIED TO HIM: FROM THE AMPLIFICATION OF THE VERSE. WHEREUPON HE SAID TO HIM: IF THE VERSE AMPLIFIED FOR THAT, IT AMPLIFIED FOR THIS ALSO. [Shall we say that] Rab agrees with R. Akiba, and Samuel agrees with R. Ishmael? — [No!] With reference to R. Ishmael's view they do not disagree; for since even in a case which is [possible of application] in the future, R. Ishmael does not make him liable for the past, obviously in a case which is not [possible of application] in the future, he most certainly [does not make him liable for the past]. But they disagree with reference to R. Akiba's view: Rab agrees with R. Akiba; and Samuel says, R. Akiba makes him liable there for [an oath in] the past, because in a case which is [possible of application] in the future, R. Akiba makes him liable for the past, but in a case which is not [possible of application] in the future, he does not [make him liable for the past]. Shall we say that they disagree on the same principle on which
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R. Judah b. Bathyra and the Rabbis disagree? For we learnt: If he swore to annul a precept, and did not annul it, he is exempt; to fulfil a precept, and did not fulfil it, he is exempt; though logically he should be liable [in the second case] as is the opinion of R. Judah b. Bathyra, [for] R. Judah b. Bathyra said: If, for an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable; for a precept, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable! — They replied to him: No! If you say that for an oath on an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has made negative equal to positive; but how can you say that for an oath [to fulfil] a precept [he is liable], since [Scripture] in that case, has not made negative equal to positive? — Now, shall we say that Rab agrees with R. Judah b. Bathyra, and Samuel agrees with the Rabbis? — [No!] With reference to R. Judah b. Bathyra's view they do not disagree; since even negative and positive he does not require, will he require future and past? But they disagree as to the view of the Rabbis: Samuel agrees with the Rabbis, and Rab [says], the Rabbis do not make him liable [unless it is applicable] in both negative and positive [forms], for it is written distinctly: to do evil, or to do good; but for future and past, which is deduced [merely] from the amplification of the verse, they make him liable [even if the oath is not applicable in both future and past]. R. Hamnuna raised an objection: [We learnt: If a man says,] ‘I did not eat today’, or, ‘I did not put of tefillin today.’ ‘I adjure you;’ and he said, ‘Amen!’ he is liable. Granted, ‘I did not eat’ is applicable [in the future]: ‘I shall not eat’; but ‘I did not put on [tefillin]’- is this applicable [in the future]: ‘I shall not put on tefillin]’? — He himself put the question, and he himself answered it: The Mishnah means it disjunctively: ‘I did not eat’, [he is liable] for an offering: ‘I did not put on [tefillin’, he is liable] for stripes. Raba raised an objection [We learnt:] What is a vain oath? If he swore that which is contrary to the facts known to man, saying of a pillar of stone that it was of gold. And Ulla said: Provided that it was already known to three men [that it was of stone]. Now, the reason [that he is liable for a vain oath] is because it is known [to three men that it is of stone], but if it were not known [to three men], he would be transgressing an oath of utterance. Why? It is not [applicable in the future: ‘I swear] it will be of gold!’ He himself put the question — and he himself answered it: If it is known, he transgresses a vain oath; if it is not known, he transgresses a false oath. Abaye said: Rab admits that he who says to his neighbour, ‘I swear that I know some testimony for you,’ and it was found that he did not know, is exempt, because it is not applicable [negatively]. ‘I do not know any testimony for you. [If a man says,] ‘I did know [testimony for you]’, or, ‘I did not know;’ [in this there is] disagreement [between Rab and Samuel]. ‘I bore witness [for you],’ or, ‘I did not bear witness’: [ in this there is also] disagreement [between them]. Granted, according to Samuel who says that in a case which is not applicable in the future he is not liable for the past, therefore the Divine Law removed the oath of testimony from the category of the oath of utterance; but, according to Rab, for what purpose did the Divine Law remove it? — The Rabbis said to Abaye: In order to make him liable for it twice. He [however] replied to them: You cannot say [he is liable] twice, for it has been taught: [When he shall be guilty] in one of these things — for one you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two. Well then, according to Abaye, for what purpose did the Divine Law remove [the oath of testimony from the category of the oath of utterance in Rab's view]? — [For this purpose:] It has been taught: In all of them it is said, and it was hidden [from him]; but here, it is not said, and it was hidden; in order to make him liable for wilful as for unwitting [transgression]. The Rabbis said to Abaye: Say that for wilful transgression he is liable one; for unwitting, two. — He replied to them: Is that not what I said: [it is written,] in one [of these things] — for one you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two; and if [it refers to] wilful transgression, are there, then, two? Raba said: Because it was a matter included in a generalisation, and it was singled out [from the generalisation] in order to introduce an anomaly; therefore, you cannot add anything to this anomaly. — This would imply that Abaye holds that the oath [of utterance] is still in existence. But did not Abaye say: Rab admits that he who says to his neighbour, ‘I swear that I know some testimony for you,’ and it was found that he did not know, is exempt, because it is not applicable [negatively], ‘I do not know any testimony for you’! — Abaye withdrew from that [statement]. Or, if you will, you may say,
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