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שבועות 25:2
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
R. Judah b. Bathyra and the Rabbis disagree? For we learnt: If he swore to annul a precept, and did not annul it, he is exempt; to fulfil a precept, and did not fulfil it, he is exempt; though logically he should be liable [in the second case] as is the opinion of R. Judah b. Bathyra, [for] R. Judah b. Bathyra said: If, for an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable; for a precept, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable! — They replied to him: No! If you say that for an oath on an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has made negative equal to positive; but how can you say that for an oath [to fulfil] a precept [he is liable], since [Scripture] in that case, has not made negative equal to positive? — Now, shall we say that Rab agrees with R. Judah b. Bathyra, and Samuel agrees with the Rabbis? — [No!] With reference to R. Judah b. Bathyra's view they do not disagree; since even negative and positive he does not require, will he require future and past? But they disagree as to the view of the Rabbis: Samuel agrees with the Rabbis, and Rab [says], the Rabbis do not make him liable [unless it is applicable] in both negative and positive [forms], for it is written distinctly: to do evil, or to do good; but for future and past, which is deduced [merely] from the amplification of the verse, they make him liable [even if the oath is not applicable in both future and past]. R. Hamnuna raised an objection: [We learnt: If a man says,] ‘I did not eat today’, or, ‘I did not put of tefillin today.’ ‘I adjure you;’ and he said, ‘Amen!’ he is liable. Granted, ‘I did not eat’ is applicable [in the future]: ‘I shall not eat’; but ‘I did not put on [tefillin]’- is this applicable [in the future]: ‘I shall not put on tefillin]’? — He himself put the question, and he himself answered it: The Mishnah means it disjunctively: ‘I did not eat’, [he is liable] for an offering: ‘I did not put on [tefillin’, he is liable] for stripes. Raba raised an objection [We learnt:] What is a vain oath? If he swore that which is contrary to the facts known to man, saying of a pillar of stone that it was of gold. And Ulla said: Provided that it was already known to three men [that it was of stone]. Now, the reason [that he is liable for a vain oath] is because it is known [to three men that it is of stone], but if it were not known [to three men], he would be transgressing an oath of utterance. Why? It is not [applicable in the future: ‘I swear] it will be of gold!’ He himself put the question — and he himself answered it: If it is known, he transgresses a vain oath; if it is not known, he transgresses a false oath. Abaye said: Rab admits that he who says to his neighbour, ‘I swear that I know some testimony for you,’ and it was found that he did not know, is exempt, because it is not applicable [negatively]. ‘I do not know any testimony for you. [If a man says,] ‘I did know [testimony for you]’, or, ‘I did not know;’ [in this there is] disagreement [between Rab and Samuel]. ‘I bore witness [for you],’ or, ‘I did not bear witness’: [ in this there is also] disagreement [between them]. Granted, according to Samuel who says that in a case which is not applicable in the future he is not liable for the past, therefore the Divine Law removed the oath of testimony from the category of the oath of utterance; but, according to Rab, for what purpose did the Divine Law remove it? — The Rabbis said to Abaye: In order to make him liable for it twice. He [however] replied to them: You cannot say [he is liable] twice, for it has been taught: [When he shall be guilty] in one of these things — for one you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two. Well then, according to Abaye, for what purpose did the Divine Law remove [the oath of testimony from the category of the oath of utterance in Rab's view]? — [For this purpose:] It has been taught: In all of them it is said, and it was hidden [from him]; but here, it is not said, and it was hidden; in order to make him liable for wilful as for unwitting [transgression]. The Rabbis said to Abaye: Say that for wilful transgression he is liable one; for unwitting, two. — He replied to them: Is that not what I said: [it is written,] in one [of these things] — for one you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two; and if [it refers to] wilful transgression, are there, then, two? Raba said: Because it was a matter included in a generalisation, and it was singled out [from the generalisation] in order to introduce an anomaly; therefore, you cannot add anything to this anomaly. — This would imply that Abaye holds that the oath [of utterance] is still in existence. But did not Abaye say: Rab admits that he who says to his neighbour, ‘I swear that I know some testimony for you,’ and it was found that he did not know, is exempt, because it is not applicable [negatively], ‘I do not know any testimony for you’! — Abaye withdrew from that [statement]. Or, if you will, you may say,
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