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מנחות 79:1
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
If he slaughtered it and it was found to have a blemish, R. Eliezer says, The bread is hallowed; but R. Joshua says, It is not hallowed. So R. Meir. R. Judah said, R. Eliezer and R. Joshua do not dispute the ruling that [if at the slaughtering there was an intention of eating thereof] outside its proper time the bread is hallowed, or that if it was found to have a blemish the bread is not hallowed. They differ only where [there was an intention of eating thereof] outside its proper place; in this case R. Eliezer says, The bread is hallowed; and R. Joshua says, It is not hallowed. R. Eliezer argued, Since [the intention to eat of the offering] outside the proper time is a disqualifying defect, and [the intention to eat thereof] outside the proper place is also a disqualifying defect: as in the former case the bread is nevertheless hallowed, so in the latter case. too, the bread is hallowed. R. Joshua argued, Since [the intention to eat of the offering] outside its proper place is a disqualifying defect, and a blemish in the animal is also a disqualifying defect: as in the latter case the bread is not hallowed, so in the former, too, it is not hallowed. R. Eliezer replied. I likened it to [the case where there was an intention to eat thereof] outside its proper time, but you likened it to the case of a blemish in the animal. Let us then see to which [of the two] is it more similar. If it is more similar to [the case where there was an intention to eat thereof] outside its proper time then we must infer it from this, and if it is more similar to the case of the blemish in the animal then we must infer it from this. And so R. Eliezer began to argue as follows: We may infer that which is a defect by reason of the intention from that which is also a defect by reason of the intention, but we may not infer that which is a defect by reason of the intention from that which is a defect by reason of a physical blemish. Thereupon R. Joshua began to argue as follows: We may infer a defect which does not involve the penalty of kareth from a defect which also does not involve the penalty of kareth, and let not [the intention to eat of the offering] outside its proper time enter into the argument since it is a defect which involves the penalty of kareth. Moreover, we should infer it from [the slaughtering of the offering] under another name, for this is a defect by reason of the intention and also does not involve the penalty of kareth. At this R. Eliezer was silent. Why is it, according to R. Meir's view, that where [the thank-offering] was slaughtered and was found to be trefah [the bread is not hallowed, for] the defect is regarded as having befallen it before the slaughtering, and that where it was slaughtered and was found to have a blemish [the bread is, according to the ruling of R. Eliezer, hallowed. for] the defect is not regarded as having befallen it before the slaughtering? — [It refers only to such blemishes as] a film over the eye. and it agrees with R. Akiba who said that [in such cases] if they were brought up [on the altar] they must not be taken down. And the other? — He will reply, It is only when [the blemish] affects the validity of [the animal] itself [as a sacrifice] that R. Akiba says that if they were brought up they must not be taken down, but he does not say so where it affects the hallowing of the bread. It was stated: If a sin-offering was slaughtered [with the intention of performing a service or of eating thereof] outside its proper time and it was brought up [on the altar], it must not be taken down. If [it was slaughtered with the intention of performing a service or of eating thereof] outside its proper place and it was taken up, Rabbah said, It must be taken down; but Raba said, It must not be taken down. Rabbah evidently agrees with R. Joshua and Raba with R. Eliezer; but Raba retracted in favour of Rabbah's view seeing that R. Eliezer retracted in favour of R. Joshua's view. There are some, however, who say that although R. Eliezer retracted in favour of R. Joshua's view Raba did not retract in favour of Rabbah's view; for there [R. Joshua] convinced [R. Eliezer] by his argument: We should infer it from [the slaughtering of the offering] under another name; here, however, if we derive it from [the slaughtering of the offering] under another name, [we obtain the ruling that] if it was brought up it must not be taken down. IF HE SLAUGHTERED IT UNDER ANOTHER NAME, etc, R. Papa said, Our Tanna omits the ram of the Nazirite-offering which is frequent and deals with the ram of the Consecration-offering! And our Tanna? — He deals with the very first offering. MISHNAH. IF THE DRINK-OFFERINGS HAD ALREADY BEEN HALLOWED IN A VESSEL WHEN THE ANIMAL-OFFERING WAS FOUND TO BE INVALID, IF THERE IS ANOTHER ANIMAL-OFFERING, THEY MAY BE OFFERED WITH IT; BUT IF NOT, THEY ARE LEFT TO BECOME INVALID BY REMAINING OVERNIGHT. GEMARA. Ze'iri said, The drink-offerings are hallowed only by the slaughtering of the animal-offering. Why is this? Because the verse says, Animal-offerings and drink-offerings. We have learnt: IF THE DRINK-OFFERINGS HAD ALREADY BEEN HALLOWED IN A VESSEL WHEN THE ANIMAL-OFFERING WAS FOUND TO BE INVALID, IF THERE IS ANOTHER ANIMAL-OFFERING, THEY MAY BE OFFERED WITH IT; BUT IF NOT, THEY ARE LEFT TO BECOME INVALID BY REMAINING OVERNIGHT, Now presumably it became invalid in the act of slaughtering? — No, it became invalid in the act of sprinkling. With whom [would this agree]? [Shall I say only] with Rabbi, who ruled that where there are two acts which [jointly] render the offering permissible, one can promote [to sanctity] even without the other? — You may even say that it agrees with R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, for we are dealing here with the case where the blood had been received in a bowl and was spilt.
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