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כתובות 74
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In the name of R. Eliezer, however, it was stated: She must perform halizah but may not contract the levirate marriage. Now, here, surely, it is a case similar to that of an error affecting merely one woman and they nevertheless differ! — In that case also [it may be said that] they differ on the following principles. One Master maintains that everyone is aware that there is no validity in the betrothal of a minor and, consequently, any man having intercourse [after such an invalid act] determines that his intercourse shall serve the purpose of a betrothal. The other Master, however, maintains that not everyone is aware that there is no validity in the betrothal of a minor, and when a man has intercourse [after such an act he does so] in reliance on his original betrothal. [So] it was also stated: R. Aha b. Jacob stated in the name of R. Johanan. If a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then had intercourse with her, she, it is the opinion of all, requires no letter of divorce from him. R. Aha the son of R. Ika, his sister's son raised an objection against him: A halizah under a false pretext is valid; and what is 'a halizah under a false pretext'? Resh Lakish explained: Where a levir is told, 'Submit to her halizah and you will thereby wed her'. Said R. Johanan to him: I am in the habit of repeating [a Baraitha,] 'Whether he had the intention [of performing the commandment of halizah] and she had no such intention, or whether she had such intention and he had not, her halizah is invalid, it being necessary that both shall [at the same time] have such intention', and you say that her halizah is valid? But, said R. Johanan, [this is the meaning:] When a levir is told, 'Submit to her halizah on the con dition that she gives you two hundred zuz'. Thus it clearly follows that as soon as a man has performed an act he has thereby dispensed with his condition, [why then should it not be said] here also that as soon as the man has intercourse he has thereby dispensed with his condition? — The other replied: Young hopeful, do you speak sensibly? Consider: Whence do we derive [the law of the validity of] any condition? [Obviously] from the condition in respect of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben; [hence it is only] a condition that may be carried out through an agent, as was the case there, that is regarded as a valid condition; but one which cannot be carried out through an agent, as was the case there, is not regarded as a valid condition. But is not intercourse an act which cannot be performed through an agent as was the case there and yet a condition in connection with it is valid? — The reason there is because the various forms of betrothal were compared to one another. R. 'Ulla b. Abba in the name of 'Ulla in the name of R. Eleazar stated: If a man betrothed a woman by a loan and then had intercourse with her, or on a certain condition and then had intercourse with her, or with less than the value of a perutah and then had intercourse with her, she, it is the opinion of all, requires from him a letter of divorce. R. Joseph b. Abba, in the name of R. Menahem in the name of R. Ammi stated: If a man betrothed a woman with something worth less than a perutah and then had intercourse with her, she requires a letter of divorce from him. It is only in this case that no one could be mistaken, but in the case of the others a man may be mistaken. R. Kahana stated in the name of 'Ulla: If a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then had intercourse with her, she requires a divorce from him. Such a case once occurred and the Sages could find no legal ground for releasing the woman without a letter of divorce. [This is meant] to exclude [the ruling] of the following Tanna. For Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel in the name of R. Ishmael: And she be not seized [only then is she] forbidden; if, however, she was seized she is permitted. There is, however, another [kind of woman] who is permitted even though she was not seized. And who is she? A woman whose betrothal was a mistaken one and who may, even if her son sits riding on her shoulder,
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make a declaration of refusal [against her husband] and go away. Our Rabbis taught: If she went to a Sage [after her betrothal] and he disallowed her vow her betrothal is valid. [If one went] to a physician who cured her, her betrothal is invalid. What is the difference between the act of the Sage and that of the physician? — A Sage annuls the vow retrospectively while a physician effects the cure only from that moment onwards. But was it not, however, taught, [that if she went] to a Sage and he disallowed her vow or to a physician and he cured her, her betrothal is invalid? — Rabbah replied: There is no contradiction. The former represents the view of R. Meir; the latter represents that of R. Eleazar. 'The former represents the view of R. Meir', who holds that a man does not mind his wife's being exposed to the publicity of a court of law. 'The latter represents that of R. Eleazar' who holds that no man wants his wife to be exposed to the publicity of a court of law. What is the source [of these statements]? — [The following] where we learned: If a man divorced his wife on account of a vow [she had made] he may not remarry her, nor may he remarry his wife [if he divorced her] on account of a had name. R. Judah ruled: In the case of a vow that was made in the presence of many people he may not remarry her, but if it was not made in the presence of many people he may remarry her. R. Meir ruled: In the case of a vow [the disallowance of which] necessitates the investigation of a Sage her husband may not remarry her, but if it does not require the investigation of a Sage he may remarry her. R. Eleazar said: The prohibition against [remarriage where the disallowance of the vow] required [the investigation of a Sage] was ordained only on account [of a vow] which requires [no such investigation]. (What is R. Judah's reason? Because it is written in Scripture,
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