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כתובות 73
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
It must not be suggested that Rab's reason is that, because the man has married her without attaching any conditions, he has entirely dispensed with his former condition. Rab's reason rather is that no man treats his intercourse as a mere act of prostitution. Surely they once disputed on such a principle. For it was stated: Where [an orphan] minor who did not exercise her right of mi'un and who, when she came of age, left [her husband] and married [another man], Rab ruled: She requires no letter of divorce from her second husband, and Samuel ruled: She requires a letter of divorce from her second husband! — [Both disputes were] necessary. For if the latter only had been stated, it might have been assumed that Rab adhered to his opinion in that case only because no condition was attached [to the betrothal], but that in the former case, where a condition was attached [to the betrothal], he agrees with Samuel. And if the former case only had been stated, it might have been assumed that in that case only did Samuel maintain his view but that in the latter he agrees with Rab. [Hence both were] required. We have learned: IF HE MARRIED HER WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONDITION AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE UNDER A VOW, SHE MAY BE DIVORCED WITHOUT RECEIVING HER KETHUBAH [which implies that] it is only her kethubah that she cannot claim but that she nevertheless requires a letter of divorce. Now does not this refer to one who has betrothed a woman on condition [that she was under no vow] and married her without making any condition? This then represents an objection against Samuel!
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— No; [this refers to one who] betrothed her without attaching a condition and also married her without attaching a condition. If, however, one betrothed a woman on a certain condition and subsequently married her without attaching a condition would she, [according to our Mishnah], indeed require no divorce? If so, then, instead of stating, IF A MAN BETROTHED A WOMAN ON THE CONDITION THAT SHE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY VOWS AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE UNDER A VOW, HER BETROTHAL IS INVALID, it should rather have been stated: If a man married a woman without attaching a condition and she was found to be under a vow, her betrothal is invalid, and [it would be evident, would it not, that this applies] even more so to the former? — It is really this reading that was meant: IF A MAN BETROTHED A WOMAN ON THE CONDITION THAT SHE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY VOWS, and then he married her without making any conditions, AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE UNDER A VOW, HER BETROTHAL IS INVALID; if, however, he betrothed her without making any conditions and also MARRIED HER WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONDITIONS, SHE MAY BE DIVORCED WITHOUT RECEIVING HER KETHUBAH; it is only her kethubah that she cannot claim but it is necessary for her to obtain a divorce. But why has she no claim to her kethubah? Because, [apparently], he could plead, 'I do not want a wife that is in the habit of making vows', but if that is the case there should be no need for her to obtain a divorce either! — Rabbah replied: It is only according to Rabbinical law that she requires a divorce. So also said R. Hisda: It is only in accordance with the Rabbinical law that she requires a divorce. Raba replied: The Tanna was really in doubt. [Hence he adopted] the lenient view in monetary matters and the stricter one in the case of prohibitions. Rabbah stated: They differ only in the case of an error [affecting] two women, but where an error [affects] one woman all agree that she requires no divorce from him. Said Abaye: But our Mishnah, surely, is one which [has been assumed to refer to] an error [affecting] one woman but was nevertheless adduced as an objection! If, however, such a statement was made at all it must have been made in this form: Rabbah stated: They differ only in the case of an error [affecting] a woman [who is in a position] similar [to that of one of] two women, but in the case of an error [affecting] merely one woman all agree that she requires no divorce from him. Abaye raised an objection against him: If a man betrothed a woman in error or [with something worth] less than a perutah, and, similarly, if a minor betrothed a woman, even if any [of them] has subsequently sent presents [to the woman], her betrothal is invalid, because he has sent these gifts on account of the original betrothal. If, however, they had intercourse they have thereby effected legal kinyan. R. Simeon b. Judah in the name of R. Ishmael said: Even if they had intercourse they effect no kinyan. Now here, surely, it is an error [affecting] only one woman and they nevertheless differ. Would you not [admit that by 'error' is meant] an error in respect of vows? — No; [what was meant is] an error in respect of that which was worth less than a perutah. — But was not 'less than than a perutah' explicitly mentioned: 'If a man betrothed a woman in error or [with something worth] less than a perutah'? — [The latter part is] really an explanation [of the former:] What is meant by 'If a man betrothed a woman in error'? If, for instance, he betrothed her with 'something worth less than 'a perutah'. On what principle do they differ? — One Master holds the view that everyone is aware that with less than the value of a perutah no betrothal can be effected, and consequently any man having intercourse [after such an invalid act] determines [to do so] for the purpose of betrothal. The other Master, however, holds the view that not everyone is aware that with less than the value of a perutah no betrothal can be effected, and when a man has intercourse [after such an act he does so] in reliance on his first betrothal. He raised [another] objection against him: [If a man said to a woman,] 'I am having intercourse with you on the condition that my father will consent', she is betrothed to him even if his father did not consent. R. Simeon b. Judah, however, stated in the name of R. Simeon, If his father consented she is betrothed but if his father did not consent she is not betrothed. Now here, surely, it is a case similar to that of an error affecting one woman and they nevertheless differ! — They differ in this case on the following points. One Master holds the opinion that [the expression] 'On the condition that my father consents' implies, 'On condition that my father will remain silent', and [the betrothal is valid] because, surely, his father remained silent. And the other Master holds the opinion [that the meaning of the expression is] that his father will say, 'yes', and [the betrothal is invalid] because his father in fact did not say, 'yes'. He raised [a further] objection against him. The Sages agree with R. Eliezer in respect of a minor whom her father had given in marriage and who was divorced, [in consequence of which] she is regarded as an 'orphan' in her father's lifetime, and who was then remarried, that she must perform halizah but may not contract the levirate marriage because her divorce was a perfectly legal divorce, but her remarriage was not a perfectly legal remarriage. This, however, applies only where he divorced her while she was a minor and remarried her while she was still a minor; but if he divorced her while she was a minor and remarried her while she was still a minor and she became of age while she was still with him, and then he died, she must either perform halizah or contract the levirate marriage.
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