Ketubot — Daf 70a

רבי מאיר היא דאמר מצוה לקיים דברי המת

אמר רב חסדא אמר מר עוקבא הלכתא בין שאמר תנו ובין שאמר אל תתנו נותנין להם כל צורכם הא קיימא לן הלכה כרבי מאיר דאמר מצוה לקיים דברי המת ה"מ במילי אחרניתא אבל בהא מינח ניחא ליה והא דאמר הכי לזרוזינהו הוא דאתא

תנן התם הפעוטות מקחן מקח וממכרן מכר במטלטלים

אמר רפרם לא שנו אלא שאין שם אפוטרופוס אבל יש שם אפוטרופוס אין מקחן מקח ואין ממכרן מכר

ממאי מדקתני אין מעשה קטנה כלום ודלמא היכא דאיכא שליש שאני א"כ ליתני אבל בקטנה יעשה שליש מה שהושלש בידו מאי אין מעשה קטנה כלום שמע מינה אפילו בעלמא:

הדרן עלך מציאת האשה

מתני׳ המדיר את אשתו מליהנות לו עד ל' יום יעמיד פרנס יתר מיכן יוציא ויתן כתובה

רבי יהודה אומר בישראל חדש אחד יקיים ושנים יוציא ויתן כתובה בכהן שנים יקיים ושלשה יוציא ויתן כתובה

המדיר את אשתו שלא תטעום אחד מכל הפירות יוציא ויתן כתובה ר' יהודה אומר בישראל יום אחד יקיים שנים יוציא ויתן כתובה ובכהן שנים יקיים שלשה יוציא ויתן כתובה

המדיר את אשתו שלא תתקשט באחד מכל המינין יוציא ויתן כתובה ר' יוסי אומר בעניות שלא נתן קצבה ובעשירות שלשים יום:

גמ׳ וכיון דמשועבד לה היכי מצי מדיר לה כל כמיניה דמפקע לה לשיעבודה

והתנן קונם שאיני עושה לפיך אינו צריך להפר אלמא כיון דמשעבדא ליה לאו כל כמינה דמפקע ליה לשיעבודיה הכא נמי כיון דמשועבד לה לאו כל כמיניה דמפקע לה לשיעבודה

אלא מתוך שיכול לומר לה צאי מעשה ידיך במזונותיך

It is that of R. Meir  who laid down that it is a religious obligation to carry out the instructions of a dying man. R. Hisda stated in the name of Mar 'Ukba: The law is that whether [the dying man] said, 'Give' or 'give no more',  his children are to he given all that they require. But have we not, however, an established principle that the halachah is in agreement with R. Meir who laid down that it is a religious obligation to carry out the instructions of a dying man? — This applies to other matters, but in this case [the father] is quite satisfied [that his children should be provided with all they need]; and in limiting their allowance,  his object was  to encourage them. We learned elsewhere: With regard to little children,  their purchase is a valid purchase and their sale is a valid sale in the case of movable objects.  Rafram explained: This has been taught in the case only where no guardian had been appointed,  but where a guardian had been appointed neither their purchase nor their sale has any legal validity. Whence is this inferred? From the expression, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR. But might not the case where a trustee  had been appointed be different?  — If so,  it should have been stated, 'IN THE CASE OF A MINOR, HOWEVER, a trustee must act in accordance with the conditions of his trust' what [then was the purpose of the expression,] THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR? Hence it may be inferred [that the same law is applicable] in all cases. MISHNAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW TO HAVE ANY BENEFIT FROM HIM HE MAY, [IF THE PROHIBITION IS TO LAST] NOT MORE  THAN THIRTY DAYS, APPOINT A STEWARD,  BUT IF FOR A LONGER PERIOD HE MUST DIVORCE HER  AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE  HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE MONTH, BUT MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH [IF IT WAS FOR] TWO MONTHS. IF HE WAS A PRIEST  HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] TWO MONTHS,  BUT MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH [IF IT WAS FOR] THREE. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT TASTE A CERTAIN FRUIT  HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE  HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE VOW WAS FOR] ONE DAY, [BUT IF FOR] TWO DAYS HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. IF, HOWEVER, HE WAS A PRIEST  HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE VOW WAS FOR] TWO DAYS [BUT IF FOR] THREE HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT MAKE USE OF A CERTAIN ADORNMENT  HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JOSE RULED: [THIS  APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT  IS GIVEN, AND TO RICH WOMEN [IF THE TIME LIMIT  IS] THIRTY DAYS. GEMARA. Since, however, he  is under an obligation to [maintain] her  how can he forbid her by a vow [to have any benefit from him]? Has he then the power  to cancel his obligation? Surely we have learned: [If a woman said to her husband] 'Konam, if I do aught for your mouth' he need not annul her vow;  from which  it is evident that, as she is under an obligation to him,  she has no right to cancel her obligation,  similarly here, since he is under an obligation to [maintain] her he should have no right to cancel his obligation!  — [This,] however, [is the right explanation:] As he  is entitled to say to her,  'Deduct [the proceeds of] your handiwork for your maintenance'