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כריתות 3:1
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
to ‘his sister’ who is his father's daughter and his mother's daughter, and to teach you that the trespass of a law deduced ad majus is not punishable. R. Isaac on the other hand holds that it is punishable. Or, if you will, I can say he will derive [the inclusion of the full sister in the pronouncement of] punishment from [its inclusion in the pronouncement of] prohibition. Said R. Eleazar in the name of R. Hoshaia: Wherever two negative commands are combined in one [collective pronouncement of the penalty of] kareth, separate sin-offerings are to be brought for each of them. Where is this exemplified? — In the instances of one who compounds or uses the sacred oil of anointment, for it is written: Upon the flesh of man shall it not be poured [neither shall ye make any like it], according to the composition thereof; whilst as to the one [pronouncement of] kareth, it is written: Whosoever compoundeth any like it, or whosoever putteth any of it upon a stranger, he shall be cut off from his people. Now, [according to this rule] since there is a separate negative command for each of the forbidden relations, why was it necessary [to single out in the Torah the] kareth [penalty] in the case of ‘his sister’? — According to R. Isaac it is as we have explained above; whilst as to the Rabbis, [they employ the text] to let us know that a law derived by the conclusion ad majus is not punishable. Said R. Nahman son of Isaac: We have also learnt to this effect: WHEN ONE COMPOUNDS OIL [OF ANOINTING] OR COMPOUNDS INCENSE, OR USES OIL OF ANOINTING. Why has [the law concerning] one who compounds incense been placed between [the other two laws] if not to let us know: As [the law concerning] incense is a separate prohibition and one is liable on account thereof to a separate sin-offering, so also where one compounds oil of anointing and uses it, since they are the subject of separate prohibitions, one is liable on account of them to separate sin-offerings. And if you argue [that the reason of this order in the Mishnah is] because the instances concerning compounding had to be stated together, [then I would argue] that [the Tanna] should have reversed the order and stated as follows: When one compounds incense, or compounds the oil, or uses the oil [of anointing]; wherefore has he separated [the laws relating to] oil one from the other, if not to let us know that separate sin-offerings are to be brought for them? This proves it. WHEN A MAN HAS CONNECTION WITH A MALE. Whom has the Tanna in mind? If a male, then you must omit the instance of the woman that is covered by a beast, and you are one short; if a woman, you must omit the instances of the man who has connection with a male or covers a beast, and you are short of two. — Said R. Johanan: Indeed the Tanna refers to a male, but read thus: When a male has connection with a male or causes a male to have connection with him; and [the Mishnah] is in accordance with R. Ishmael, who holds that one is liable to two sin-offerings. But since the case of the blasphemer is stated in the latter clause of the Mishnah and has been explained in accordance with R. Akiba, have we not to assume that also the earlier clause is in accordance with R. Akiba? And if you should argue that [the Mishnah] is indeed according to R. Akiba, but that he himself agrees with R. Ishmael's view in the case dealt with in the earlier clause, [I would retort,] did not R. Abbahu say: If a man has connection with a man or causes a man to have connection with him, on the view of R. Ishmael, who derives these [prohibitions] from two different texts, viz., Thou shalt not lie with mankind, and Neither shall there be a sodomite of the sons of Israel, he is liable to two sin-offerings; but according to R. Akiba he is liable to one sin-offering, since he derives both [prohibitions] from one and the same text, viz., ‘Thou shalt not lie with mankind’, Interpreting this: Thou shalt not cause [mankind] to lie [with thee]? Rather [you must say]: The first clause is according to R. Ishmael, but in the case of the blasphemer he agrees with R. Akiba. If so, the Mishnah should have also stated: When a man covers a beast or causes a beast to cover him? — Surely Abaye said: If a man covers a beast and causes a beast to cover him, even according to R. Ishmael, he is liable to one offering only, because the Scriptural text refers to human males only! R. Eleazar in the name of Rab said: The Tanna of our Mishnah meant to imply the possibility of one person bringing thirty-three sin-offerings, and he mentions the other three instances in order to complete the list of sins punishable with kareth. For it reads in the concluding clause: [WHEN ONE TRANSGRESSES THE LAWS OF] THE PASCHAL OFFERING AND CIRCUMCISION — FROM AMONG POSITIVE COMMANDMENTS. Now, wherefore have [the laws concerning the] paschal lamb and circumcision been enumerated? Should you say to intimate that one has to offer a sacrifice on their account? But does one bring a sacrifice on their account? Has it not been taught: All the laws of the Torah have been brought into analogy with idolatry, viz., Ye shall have one law for him that doeth ought in error, and But the person that doeth aught with a high hand: Just as the law concerning idolatry is the subject of a prohibition, so have all other transgressions to be the subjects of a prohibition? This, therefore, proves that the Tanna speaks of thirty-three transgressions committed in error, and that the other three cases have been mentioned only for the purpose of completing the list of sins punishable with kareth. This proves it. WHEN ONE DESECRATES THE SABBATH. It was remarked: Are there not thirty-nine different classes of work on Sabbath? — Said R. Johanan: Our Tanna speaks of the case [where one was] in error in respect of the Sabbath, but aware of [the prohibition of the various kinds] of work [thereon], in which case one is liable to one sacrifice only. For it has been taught: How is ‘these’ resulting in ‘one’: If one is in error in respect of the Sabbath but aware of the prohibition of [various kinds of] work! But why does not the Tanna speak of the case where one was aware of the Sabbath and in error in respect to the prohibition of the various kinds of labour, making him then liable to thirty-nine [sin-offerings]? For has it not been taught: . . . and shall do any one of these [transgressions]? Sometimes one is liable to one offering for all transgressions and sometimes to an offering for each of them? [How is] ‘one’ resulting in ‘these’: If he was aware of the Sabbath and in error in respect of the work? — Our Tanna prefers to state the instance of the error in respect of the Sabbath and awareness [of the prohibition] of the various kinds of work to let us know that one is not altogether exempted from a sin-offering in such a case. And you must likewise explain the instance of idolatry of which our Mishnah speaks as referring to an error in respect of the idol but with an awareness of the prohibition of the forms of [idolatrous] worship. How is error in respect of the idol’ to be understood? Shall I say that he stood in a house of idolatry and, thinking it was a synagogue, prostrated himself? But then his heart was directed towards Heaven. Again, if he saw a statue and prostrated himself to it, then if he accepted it as a deity, he is subject to stoning; on the other hand, if he did not acknowledge it as a deity, what has he done? Rather he served idols out of love or fear [of a fellow-man]. That is right according to Abaye who holds one is liable [in such a case!, but according to Raba who says that one Is exempted, how is it to be understood?
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