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כריתות 24:2
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
Does not the ruling ‘his words have effect’ imply that it returns to the original owner? — No, ‘his words have effect’ implies that he, too, has not acquired it, but whoever takes hold of it becomes its legal owner. An objection was raised: If a person says to his partner, ‘I have neither right nor claim on this field’, or ‘I have no concern in it’, or ‘I entirely dissociate myself from it’, his words are of no effect. Now, the expression ‘I entirely dissociate myself from it’ corresponds to ‘I do not want it’, and yet we learn here that his words are of no effect! — This case is different; for what he meant was that he dissociates himself from all rights and claims, but not from the real [ownership of the] field. An objection was raised: If a [dying] man assigned his possessions, in writing, to another, and there were among them slaves, and the other said, ‘I do not want them’, if the second master was a priest, they may eat of terumah. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says: As soon as that other said, ‘I do not want them’, the heirs at once become their legal owners. Now according to R. Simeon b. Gamaliel it is well, for he argues: When a man bestows a gift it is with the understanding that it be accepted; and if it is not accepted, it [automatically] returns to its original owner. But what of the first Tanna? If [it is right to say that] whenever a beneficiary says, ‘I do not want it’, whoever takes hold of the property becomes its legal owner, here since the second master said, ‘ I do not want them’, the slaves should be ‘strangers’, and how can ‘strangers’ eat terumah? — He holds: If a man renounces the ownership of his slave, the latter is free but still requires a bill of emancipation from his master; and he also maintains that one who awaits a bill of emancipation may still eat of terumah. R. ELIEZER SAYS: IT SHALL BE OFFERED UP etc. Why does R. Eliezer state [that IT WILL EXPIATE ANOTHER] SIN? Does not R. Eliezer hold that a suspensive guilt-offering may be brought [at any time] as a freewill-offering, as we have learnt: R. Eliezer says. A man may freely offer a suspensive guilt-offering every day? — Replied Rab Ashi: R. Eliezer takes here into consideration what they [the Sages] said to him, as we have learnt: But they said unto me, Wait until you fall into a state of doubt . IF HE LEARNS OF IT AFTER IT WAS SLAUGHTERED etc. [It is stated here:] THE FLESH IS REMOVED TO THE PLACE OF BURNING, from which it follows that non-consecrated animals that were slaughtered in the [Temple] court are to be burnt, whilst [we read later] in contradiction thereto: THE LAW, HOWEVER, IS DIFFERENT WITH AN UNCONDITIONAL GUILT-OFFERING: IF BEFORE THE ANIMAL WAS SLAUGHTERED, IT MAY GO OUT TO PASTURE AMONG THE FLOCK; IF AFTER IT WAS SLAUGHTERED, IT SHALL BE BURIED. — Replied R. Eleazar: The contradiction is obvious; he who taught the one clause cannot have taught the other. Rabbah said: Do you point out a contradiction between the unconditional guilt-offering and the suspensive guilt-offering? As to the unconditional guilt-offering, since it is no longer required we may assume that its owner has not dedicated it; but as to the suspensive guilt-offering, since his conscience troubled him, we may assume that he has dedicated it absolutely. There is, however, a contradiction between two statements relating to the unconditional guilt-offering itself; for here we learn: IT SHALL BE BURIED, whilst the concluding clause reads: THE FLESH IS REMOVED TO THE PLACE OF BURNING! — This is doubtlessly a contradiction; he who taught the one clause cannot have taught the other. Rab Ashi said: Because it has the appearance of a disqualified offering. IF THE BLOOD HAD ALREADY BEEN TOSSED, THE FLESH MAY BE EATEN. Why? Has he not [in the meantime] reached a state of certainty? — Replied Raba: The text says, Though he knew it not, and he shall be forgiven; and this man was in doubt during the ceremony of forgiving. R. JOSE SAYS, EVEN IF THE BLOOD IS STILL IN THE VESSEL etc. How can R. Jose maintain that the blood should be tossed? Has he not arrived at a condition of certainty at the time of the ceremony of forgiving? — Replied Raba: R. Jose follows R. Simeon who holds, Whatever is ready to be tossed is to be regarded as if it had already been tossed. But perhaps R. Simeon maintains his view only with regard to things that are indeed ready to be tossed, whilst this is not ready to be tossed! — In the West they replied: R. Jose holds that the vessels of ministry render fit for offering that which is disqualified from the outset. THE LAW, HOWEVER, IS DIFFERENT WITH AN UNCONDITIONAL GUILT-OFFERING etc. It was stated: When does the heifer whose neck is to be broken become forbidden [for use]? R. Hamnuna says: In its lifetime; Raba says: After the breaking of the neck. Now Raba's opinion is clear, for it is from the time that an act was done to it; but from what specific time according to R. Hamnuna?
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