Parallel
כריתות 17
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
; and that which taught that he is liable refers to a case where the letters were written in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of their prohibition, [the liability arising] in pursuance of the rule that awareness is of no consequence with regard to half-sizes. But how is it according to Rabbah who says that R. Akiba considers different Sabbaths as one object? It is true that that which taught, ‘he is liable’, may be met either by the case where the letters were written with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of their prohibition, when it is held that the Sabbaths are considered as one object, or by the case where the letters were written in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of their prohibition, when it is held that awareness is of no consequence with regard to half-sizes, But of which case speaks the statement that he is exempt; neither the one nor the other suits! — Rabbah may retort: Rabban Gamaliel follows R. Eliezer's opinion, who holds different Sabbaths are as different objects. But since it states ‘Rabban Gamaliel, however, admits . . .’ It follows that they disagree in the other cases. Now, if we say that he holds with R. Akiba, it is well, for then their dispute is [in the case where the letters were written] in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of their prohibition, Rabban Gamaliel holding awareness is of no consequence with regard to half-sizes; he admits, however, that he is exempt [in the case where the letters were written] with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of their prohibition, because [in that case he holds the view that] different Sabbaths are regarded as different objects. But if, as you say that Rabban Gamaliel follows R. Eliezer, [since the phrase ‘Rabban Gamaliel, however, admits...’] implies that they disagree [in some cases], then [it will be asked], which is the case wherein they differ?If it is in [the case where the letters were written] in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of their prohibition; but [in that case] even R. Eliezer agrees with Rabban Gamaliel that awareness is of no consequence with regard to half-sizes, as has been taught: ‘If one wrote two letters on two Sabbaths, one letter on the one Sabbath and the other on the other Sabbath, R. Eliezer holds he is liable’. Neither [can it be in the law] concerning the weaving of one thread on to a web, for he declares him liable in that case, as we have learnt: ‘R. Eliezer holds, that if one wove [on the Sabbath] three threads at the beginning [of a web] or added one thread on to [an existing] web, he is liable’. Said Raba: [The phrase ‘Rabban Gamaliel, however, admits...’] implying that elsewhere they disagree, is with [reference to the following] one case. For it has been taught: ‘If one carried out [on the Sabbath the bulk of] half a dried fig and then again [the bulk of] half a dried fig, if in one spell of unawareness, he is liable; if in two spells of unawareness, he is exempt. R. Jose said: If in one spell of unawareness and also into the same domain, he is liable; if in different domains, he is exempt’. Rabban Gamaliel thus follows the view of the first Tanna and R. Eliezer that of R. Jose. Come and hear: HE REPLIED TO ME, HE IS LIABLE FOR EACH OF THEM; AND THIS CAN BE DERIVED BY AN A FORTIORI CONCLUSION: IF FOR INTERCOURSE WITH MENSTRUANT WOMEN, IN WHICH PROHIBITION THERE ARE NEITHER MANY CATEGORIES etc. Now, it is well according to R. Hisda who explained that his query [referred to the case where the act was performed] in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of its prohibition, [and that the question was] whether the intervening week-days effected a division or not, for then it is right why the answer [in the Mishnah] speaks of ‘A MENSTRUANT WOMAN’, But according to Rabbah who explained that his query [referred to the case where the act was performed] with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition, [and that the question was] whether different Sabbaths were regarded as different objects, the answer should speak of ‘menstruant women’. — Rabbah can tell you: Read indeed ‘menstruant women’. Samuel read: ‘A menstruant woman . Rab Adda b. Ahaba also read: ‘A menstruant woman’. R. Nathan b. Oshaia read: ‘Menstruant women’. But according to Rab Hisda, who explained that his query [referred to the case where the act was performed] in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of its prohibition, [and that the question was] whether the intervening week-days effected a division or not, how [can such a query as to] whether the intervening days effect a division or not apply to one menstruant woman? — Raba answered: For instance, he united with her [the menstruant] and she then immersed herself; she again became unclean and he united with her once more and she then immersed; and again she became unclean and he united with her once more, etc.; the immersions thus correspond to the intervening week-days [in the case relating to Sabbath]. Come and hear: LET THEN THE CASE OF INTERCOURSE WITH MENSTRUANT MINORS SERVE AS YOUR PREMISE. Now according to Rabbah it is well that it speaks of ‘minors’; but why does it speak of ‘minors’ according to Rab Hisda? — It speaks of ‘minors’ in a general way. Our Mishnah is not in accordance with the following Tanna. For it has been taught: R. Simeon son of Eleazar said, Not so was the question of R. Akiba to R. Eliezer, but thus: If one united with his menstruant wife and then united with her again, in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to one [offering] for all the acts, or to [separate offerings] for each act? He replied, He is liable for each act,and this is derived [from the law of Sabbath] by an a fortiori conclusion: If in the instance of Sabbath, where there is but one prohibition, in that man is cautioned against [profaning] the Sabbath but the Sabbath is not cautioned against him, one is liable for each act, how much more should he be liable for each act in the instance of a menstruant woman, where the prohibition is twofold, in that a man is cautioned against connection with a menstruant woman, and a menstruant woman is cautioned against connection with a man! He [R. Akiba] retorted: No. You may hold this view in the case of the Sabbath, because there are concerning it many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning; but can you hold the same in the case of the menstruant woman where there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning? He [R. Eliezer] replied: Let the case of intercourse with [menstruant] minors serve as your premise, where there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, and yet one is liable for each act. He [R. Akiba] retorted: No. You may hold thus in the case of [menstruant] minors since they are different bodies. He [R. Eliezer] replied: Let the law concerning copulation with a beast serve as your premise, where there are not different bodies, and one is nevertheless liable for each act. He [R. Akiba] retorted: [The law concerning copulation with] a beast is indeed comparable to [that of] the menstruant woman. MISHNAH. IF [A PERSON WAS] IN DOUBT WHETHER HE HAD EATEN HELEB OR NOT, OR EVEN IF HE HAD CERTAINLY EATEN [OF IT] BUT [WAS] IN DOUBT AS TO WHETHER IT HAD THE REQUISITE QUANTITY,
—
OR LESS; OR [IF THERE WERE] BEFORE HIM PERMITTED FAT AS WELL AS HELEB, AND HE ATE OF ONE OF THEM AND DOES NOT KNOW OF WHICH OF THEM HE ATE; OR IF HIS WIFE AND HIS SISTER WERE WITH HIM IN THE ROOM AND HE UNWITTINGLY UNITED WITH ONE OF THEM AND DOES NOT KNOW WITH WHICH OF THEM HE UNWITTINGLY UNITED; OR IF HE DID FORBIDDEN LABOUR AND DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER IT WAS ON THE SABBATH OR ON A WEEK-DAY, HE IS LIABLE TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING. JUST AS A PERSON WHO ATE HELEB TWICE IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS IS LIABLE ONLY TO ONE SIN-OFFERING, SO, TOO, WHEN THE TRANSGRESSION IS IN DOUBT, HE IS ONLY LIABLE TO ONE SUSPENSIVE GUILT OFFERING. IF IN THE MEANTIME HE BECAME AWARE [OF THE POSSIBLE TRESPASS]. HE IS LIABLE TO A SEPARATE SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING FOR EACH ACT, JUST AS HE WOULD [IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES] BE LIABLE TO A SEPARATE SIN-OFFERING FOR EACH ACT. JUST AS ONE IS LIABLE TO SEPARATE SIN-OFFERINGS IF HE ATE, IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS, HELEB AND BLOOD AND PIGGUL AND NOTHAR, SO, TOO, WHEN THE TRANSGRESSION IS IN DOUBT, HE IS LIABLE TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING FOR EACH ACT. GEMARA. It was stated: Rab Assi said, [The first case of the Mishnah] refers to one piece about which there was a doubt whether it was heleb or permissible fat; Hiyya b. Rab said: It refers to one of two pieces. What is the basis of their dispute? Rab Assi holds that the traditional spelling of the text is authoritative, and [in Scripture] it is written: ‘A commandment’ ; while Hiyya b. Rab holds that the reading of the text is authoritative, and we read, ‘commandments’. R. Huna raised an objection to Rab Assi, — others say: Hiyya b. Rab raised the objection to Rab Assi: [It reads in the Mishnah] ‘[IF THERE WERE] BEFORE HIM PERMITTED FAT AS WELL AS HELEB AND HE ATE OF ONE OF THEM . . .’. May we not infer therefrom that as this latter clause refers to two pieces, so does also the first clause refer to two pieces? — Replied Rab: Do not draw conclusions from something which may be interpreted in the opposite direction. I can answer you that the latter clause deals with two pieces and the former with one piece. But, if so, may we not argue: If one is liable [to an offering] in the case of one piece, how much more so in the case of two pieces! — [The statement of the Mishnah is after the pattern of] ‘this and needless to say also this’. Now according to Hiyya b. Rab who holds: As the latter clause refers to two pieces so does also the former refer to two pieces, why this repetition? — [The latter clause is] an explanation [of the former]: IF [A PERSON WAS] IN DOUBT WHETHER HE HAD EATEN HELEB OR NOT . . . HE IS LIABLE TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING; and how does such a case arise? [IF THERE WERE] BEFORE HIM PERMITTED FAT AS WELL AS HELEB. Said Rab Judah in the name of Rab: If there were before a person two pieces, one of permitted fat and the other of heleb, and he ate of one of them and does not know of which of them he ate, he is liable; [if there was] one piece [before him] about which [there was] a doubt whether it was permitted fat or heleb, and he ate of it, he is exempt. Said Raba: What is the reason for Rab's view? It is that Scripture says, And will do one of the commandments of the Lord, in error; — the error must be produced by two objects, for although the spelling is ‘a commandment’, we read ‘commandments’. Abaye raised an objection to him:’ [It has been taught:] R. Eliezer says, [If one eats of the heleb of] a koy, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering! — He replied: R. Eliezer holds that the spelling is authoritative, and the spelling is ‘a commandment’. He raised another objection: [We have learnt:] If it is doubtful whether [what is born] is a nine-months’ child of the first husband or a seven-months’ child of the second, he must put her away, and the child is [deemed] legitimate, but each is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering! This, too, follows R. Eliezer's view. He raised a further objection: [We have learnt:] If [the stain] was found on his [cloth] , they are both unclean and liable to an offering; if upon hers and immediately [after the coition], they are unclean and liable to an offering, but if upon hers some time after, they must regard themselves unclean by reason of the doubt, but are exempt from offerings. And upon this it was taught: They are nevertheless liable to suspensive guilt-offerings. — This, too, follows R. Eliezer's view. Said R. Hiyya in the name of Rab: If there were before a person two pieces, one heleb and the other permitted fat, and he ate of one of them and does not know of which he ate, he is liable; if [there was only] one piece about which there was a doubt whether it was permitted fat or heleb, and he ate it, he is exempt. Said R. Zera: What is Rab's reason? He is of the opinion that in the case of two pieces it is possible to determine the transgression, in the case of one piece it is not possible to determine the transgression. What is the difference between the reason [offered above] by Raba and that of R. Zera? — [If there were] one and a half olive-sizes. According to Raba [he is exempt, for] there are not two pieces; according to R. Zera, however, there is the possibility of determining the transgression. R. Jeremiah raised an objection to R. Zera: ‘R. Eliezer says, ‘[If one eats of the heleb of] a koy, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering!’ — The latter replied: R. Eliezer, to be sure, holds that the possibility of determining the transgression is not an essential condition [for the bringing of a suspensive guilt-offering].
—