כריתות 16 — parallel

16:1

Now [in the last instance] it does not continue, ‘And in case of doubt, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering’! Now whose view does this statement follow? Shall I say R. Akiba's? Then it should have stated in the latter clause, ‘And in case of doubt,he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering’; for we have learnt: ‘R. Akiba prescribes a suspensive guilt-offering in the case of doubtful sacrilege’. It must therefore follow R. Joshua's view, and yet we read, ‘If . . . in five different spells of unawareness, he is liable to five sin-offerings’. We thus learn that R. Joshua gave way to his [R. Akiba's] objection. But cannot the opposite also be proved from one of the latter clauses which reads, ‘If the portions were from five offerings, though consumed in one spell of unawareness, he is liable for each of them’; thus proving that he did not accept his objection? Hence you are compelled [to assume] that we have [here the views of two different] Tannaim: according to one Tanna, he [R. Joshua] gave way; according to another he did not give way [to R. Akiba's objection]; then you might also answer that R. Akiba's view is followed, but that the [anonymous] Tanna accepts his one opinion and rejects the other; thus, he agrees with him [R. Akiba] in the rules relating to unawareness of sin, but disagrees with regard to sacrilege. How is one guilty fivefold of the law of sacrilege? — Said Samuel: As we have learnt, ‘Five things in a burnt-offering can combine one with the other: the meat, the fat, the wine, the fine flour and the oil’. Hezekiah said, If he ate of five different limbs. Resh Lakish said, You may even say [that he ate] of one limb, yet [the fivefold sacrilege] can arise in the case of the fore-limb. R. Isaac the Smith said, If he ate it with five different dishes. R. Johanan said,If he ate it in five different preparations. MISHNAH. SAID R. AKIBA:I ASKED R. ELIEZER, IF ONE PERFORMED MANY ACTS OF WORK OF THE SAME CATEGORY ON DIFFERENT SABBATHS BUT IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS, WHAT IS THE LAW? IS HE LIABLE TO ONE [OFFERING] ONLY FOR ALL OF THEM, OR TO A SEPARATE ONE FOR EACH OF THEM? HE REPLIED TO ME: HE IS LIABLE FOR EACH OF THEM; AND THIS CAN BE DERIVED BY AN A FORTIORI CONCLUSION: IF FOR INTERCOURSE WITH MENSTRUANT WOMEN, IN WHICH PROHIBITION THERE ARE NEITHER MANY CATEGORIES NOR MANY WAYS OF SINNING, ONE IS LIABLE FOR EACH ACT, HOW MUCH MORE MUST ONE BE LIABLE TO SEPARATE OFFERINGS IN THE CASE OF THE SABBATH, IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH THERE ARE MANY CATEGORIES [OF WORK] AND MANY WAYS OF SINNING! I RETORTED TO HIM: NO, YOU MAY HOLD THIS VIEW IN THE CASE OF THE MENSTRUANT WOMEN, SINCE THEREIN THERE IS A TWOFOLD PROHIBITION: THE MAN IS CAUTIONED AGAINST CONNECTION WITH A MENSTRUANT WOMAN, AND THE MENSTRUANT WOMAN IS CAUTIONED AGAINST CONNECTION WITH A MAN; BUT CAN YOU HOLD THE SAME IN THE CASE OF THE SABBATH WHERE THERE IS ONLY ONE PROHIBITION? HE SAID TO ME: LET THEN THE CASE OF INTERCOURSE WITH [MENSTRUANT] MINORS SERVE AS YOUR PREMISE, WHERE THERE IS BUT ONE PROHIBITION, AND YET ONE IS LIABLE FOR EACH ACT. I RETORTED TO HIM: YOU MAY HOLD THIS VIEW IN THE CASE OF MINORS BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH NO PROHIBITION NOW APPLIES, IT WILL APPLY AFTER A TIME; BUT CAN YOU HOLD THE SAME OF THE SABBATH WHERE NEITHER NOW NOR AFTER A TIME [IS THE PROHIBITION WAIVED]? HE SAID TO ME: THEN LET THE LAW CONCERNING COPULATION WITH A BEAST SERVE AS YOUR PREMISE. I REPLIED TO HIM: THE LAW CONCERNING COPULATION WITH A BEAST IS INDEED COMPARABLE TO [THAT CONCERNING] SABBATH. GEMARA. What was his query? If his query was whether separate Sabbaths were comparable to separate objects, then he should have put the question thus: [What is the law] if one performed the same act of work on different Sabbaths? And if his query was whether secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work, then he should have put the question thus: [What is the law] if one performed on one Sabbath several [secondary] acts of the same [principal] class? — Replied Raba: In the school of Rab they explained that the two questions were put. He asked whether [different] Sabbaths were comparable to different objects, and he also asked whether secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work. Now as to the Sabbaths what was his query? [Are we to say that, where a man performed an act of work on several Sabbaths] in ignorance of the Sabbath, though knowing full well that that act was prohibited, [Rabbi Akiba] had no doubt at all that the intervening week-days effected a knowledge to separate [the occasions]; and his question was only where [he performed the act] knowing full well [on each occasion] that it was Sabbath but not knowing that it was a prohibited act, [the query being] whether different Sabbaths were comparable to different objects or not? Or [rather that, where a man performed an act of work on several Sabbaths] with knowledge of the Sabbath [on each occasion] but in ignorance of its prohibition, [R. Akiba] had no doubt at all that the different Sabbaths were comparable to different objects; and his question was only where [he performed the act] in ignorance of the Sabbaths, though knowing full well that that act was prohibited, [his query being] whether the intervening week-days effected a knowledge to separate the occasions or not? — Said Rabbah:

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16:2

It is reasonable to assume that in the case of the act being performed in ignorance of the Sabbaths and with knowledge of its prohibition he had no doubt at all that the intervening week-days effected separateness, and that his question was only when the act was performed with the knowledge of the Sabbaths but in ignorance of its prohibition, [the point in doubt being] whether different Sabbaths are like different objects or not. His reply was that in the case of the act being done with knowledge of the Sabbaths but in ignorance of its prohibition the different Sabbaths were like different objects. This reply, however, he [R. Akiba] did not accept. He then proved that secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work, but this too he rejected. Said Rabbah: Whence do I derive this? From that which we have learnt: ‘A great general rule has been laid down with regard to Sabbath: He who was altogether oblivious of the principle of Sabbath and performed many acts of work on many Sabbaths, is liable to one offering only. If he knew the principle of Sabbath and did many acts of work on many Sabbaths, he is liable for each Sabbath. If he knew each time that the day was Sabbath, and did many acts of work on many Sabbaths, he is liable for each principal act of work’. Now, it does not say, ‘he is liable for each principal act of work and for each Sabbath’. Whom does [the Mishnah] follow? Shall I say R. Eliezer? Read then the latter clause: ‘If he did many [secondary] acts of work of the same [principal] class, he is liable only to one offering’; but according to R. Eliezer he should be liable for each of the secondary acts of work as if they were principal acts of work! Hence it is clear [that this Mishnah, then, represents] R. Akiba's view, and it is hereby proved that he had no doubt at all that in the case of an act being done in ignorance of the Sabbath and with knowledge of its prohibition the intervening week-days effected separateness, and that his question was only when the act was performed with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition, the point being whether different Sabbaths are like different objects or not. The other's solution was that they were like different objects, and that secondary acts were on a par with principal acts of work; but both answers were rejected by him. Said Abaye to him: Indeed I maintain that R. Akiba had no doubt that different Sabbaths were not comparable to different objects in the case where an act was done with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition; and his question was only in the case where an act was done in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of its prohibition, [the query being] whether the intervening week-days effected separateness or not. The solution offered was that the intervening week-days effected separateness, and this was accepted by him; he also ruled that secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work, but this was rejected by him. Rab Hisda said: In the case of an act being done with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition even R. Akiba agrees that the different Sabbath days are like different objects; but his query was whether the intervening week-days effected separateness in the case where an act was done in ignorance of the Sabbath but with knowledge of its prohibition. The other's solution was that the intervening week-days effected separateness; and this was accepted by him. He also ruled that secondary acts of work were on a par with principal acts of work, but this was rejected by him. Said Rab Hisda: Whence do I derive this? From that which has been taught: ‘If one wrote [on Sabbath] two letters in one spell of unawareness, he is liable [to an offering]; if in separate spells of unawareness, Rabban Gamaliel says: He is liable; and the Sages say: He is not. Rabban Gamaliel, however, admits that if he wrote one letter on one Sabbath and the other on another, he is exempt’. Whereas in another [Baraitha] it has been taught: ‘If one wrote two letters on two different Sabbaths, one on one Sabbath and the other on another, Rabban Gamaliel declares him liable, and the Sages declare him not liable’. On the assumption that Rabban Gamaliel followed R. Akiba's opinion, [Rab Hisda argued thus:] According to me, who hold that in the case of an act being performed with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of its prohibition even R. Akiba agrees that the different Sabbath days are like different objects, there is no contradiction, for that which taught that he is exempt refers to a case where the letters were written with knowledge of the Sabbath but in ignorance of the prohibition, in which case the different Sabbaths are like different objects 21

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