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עירובין 99:1
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
He thought that since the final clause represented the view of R. Meir the first clause also must represent the view of R. Meir. In fact, however, this is not so. While the final clause represents the view of R. Meir the first represents the view of the Rabbis. PROVIDED HE DOES NOT TAKE THEM BEYOND. Thus it follows that if he did take them beyond the four cubits he incurs the obligation of a sin-offering. May it then be suggested that this provides support for Raba who laid down that if a man transferred an object from the beginning of four cubits to the end of the four cubits, and the transfer was made above his head, he is guilty of an offence? Was it stated: ‘If he took them beyond, he incurs the obligation of a sin-offering’? It is quite possible that if he took them beyond [the four cubits] he is exempt, but the act is [nevertheless] forbidden. Others read: Thus it follows that if he did take them out he Is exempt though this is forbidden. Must it be conceded that this presents an objection against Raba who laid down that if a man transferred an object from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits, and the transfer was made above his head, he is guilty of an offence? Was it stated: ‘if he took them out he is exempt though this is forbidden’? It is quite possible that if he took them beyond [the four cubits] he does incur the obligation of a sin-offering? A MAN MUST NOT STAND IN A PRIVATE DOMAIN etc. R. Joseph ruled: If a man made water or spat he incurs the obligation of a sin-offering. But is it not necessary that the lifting up and the putting down shall respectively be from, and upon a place that was four handbreadths wide, which is not the case here? — His intention confers upon him the status of a proper place. For should you not concede this principle, how would you explain the following ruling of Raba: ‘If a man threw some object and it dropped into the mouth of a dog or into the mouth of a furnace he incurs the obligation of a sin-offering’, in view of the objection: Is it not necessary that the putting down should be upon a place that was four handbreadths wide, which is not the case here? You must consequently admit that the man's intention confers upon it the status of a proper place, so also here, it may well be explained, it is his intention that confers upon him the status of a valid place. Raba enquired: What is the legal position where a man stood in a private domain and the orifice of the organ projected into a public domain? Are we guided by the source or by the point of exit? — This remains undecided. AND THE SAME APPLIES TO SPITTING. R. JUDAH RULED etc. Even though he did not turn it over? Have we not, however, learnt: If a man was eating a pressed fig with soiled hands and he put his hand into his mouth to remove a small stone, R. Meir declares the fig to be unclean while R. Jose regards it as clean. R. Judah ruled: If he turned it over the fig is unclean but if he did not turn it over the fig remains clean? — R. Johanan replied: Reverse the statement , Resh Lakish said: You have no need to reverse the statement,for we are dealing here with phlegm. But was it not taught: R. Judah ruled: ‘If his phlegm was detached’, which implies also, does it not, ‘if his spittle was detached’? — No, only that if his phlegm was detached. But was it not taught: R. Judah ruled: Whether his phlegm was detached or his spittle was detached he must not walk four cubits before he spat it out?- Clearly the explanation is the one originally given. Resh Lakish stated: One who coughs up phlegm in the presence of his master deserves an untimely death, for it is said in Scripture: All that hate me love death, read not ‘that hate me’ but ‘those that cause me to be hated’. But does not one merely act under an impulsion? — The person meant is one who coughs up the phlegm and ejects it. MISHNAH. A MAN MUST NOT STAND IN A PRIVATE DOMAIN AND DRINK IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OR STAND IN A PUBLIC DOMAIN AND DRINK IN A PRIVATE DOMAIN UNLESS HE PUT HIS HEAD AND THE GREATER PART OF HIS BODY INTO THE DOMAIN IN WHICH HE DRINKS. AND A SIMILAR LAW APPLIES TO A WINEPRESS. GEMARA. Does then the first clause represent the view of the Rabbis while the final clause represents that of R. Meir? — R. Joseph replied: The latter clause deals with objects that are among one's necessities and it represents the general opinion. The question was raised: What is the ruling in respect of a karmelith? — Abaye replied: The same law applies. Raba replied: The very law of karmelith is but a preventive measure, shall we then go as far as to enact a preventive measure in addition to another preventive measure! Whence, observed Abaye, do I derive my view? From the statement,
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