עירובין 69

69:1

But have we not learnt: If a tenant presented his share and then he carried out something, whether he acted unwittingly or intentionally, he imposes restrictions; so R. Meir? — R. Joseph replied. Read: He imposes no restrictions. Abaye replied: There is no contradiction, the former dealing with a case where the residents of the alley had taken possession of the alley while the latter deals with one where the residents of the alley had not taken possession of the alley; and so it was also taught: If he carried out an object before he had renounced his share, whether he acted unwittingly or intentionally, he is entitled to renounce his right; so R. Meir. R. Judah ruled: If he acted unwittingly he is entitled to renounce his right but if he acted with intention he is no longer entitled to renounce his right. He who presented his share and then carried out an object. whether he acted unwittingly or with intention, he imposes restrictions; so R. Meir. R. Judah ruled: If he acted with intention he imposes restrictions but if unwittingly he does not. This, however, applies only where the residents of the alley did not take possession of the alley. but where they did take possession of it he imposes no restrictions upon them irrespective of whether he acted unwittingly or intentionally. The Master said: ‘R. Judah related, [The instruction was given] in a different form: "Hasten and attend to your requirements in the alley before nightfall when he would impose restrictions in you".’ From this it is evident that he is regarded as a gentile; but have we not learnt. BEFORE HE CARRIES OUT? — Read: Before the conclusion of the day. And if you prefer I might say: There is really no contradiction since the former might refer to one who is a mumar in respect of desecrating the Sabbath in privacy only, while the latter might deal with one who desecrates the Sabbath in public. Whose view is followed in what was taught: ‘A mumar or a barefaced sinner is not entitled to renounce his share’? — But is a barefaced sinner on a par with a mumar? — Rather read: ‘A barefaced mumar is not entitled to renounce his share’. Now in agreement with whose [view has this been laid down]? — In agreement, of course, with that of R. Judah. A certain man once went out with a jewelled charm but when he observed R. Judah Nesi'ah he covered it up. ‘A person of this type’, [the Master said.] ‘is in accordance with the view of R. Judah entitled to renounce his share’. R. Huna stated: Who is regarded as an Israelite in mumar? He who desecrates the Sabbath in public. Said R. Nahman to him: In agreement with whose view? If [it be suggested that it is] in agreement with that of R. Meir who holds that a person who is suspected of disregarding one matter [of law] is held suspect in regard to all the Torah, the statement should also apply to any of the other prohibitions of the Torah; and if [it is suggested that it is] in agreement with the view of the Rabbis, did they not rule, it may be objected, that one who is suspected of disregarding one law is not held suspected in regard to all the Torah

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69:2

unless he is a mumar in respect of idolatry? — R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: Only in respect of presenting or renouncing his right to his share, this being in agreement with what was taught: An Israelite mumar who observes the Sabbath in public may renounce his share, but one who does not observe the Sabbath in public may not renounce his share, because the Rabbis have laid down: An Israelite may renounce or present his share, whereas with a gentile transfer is possible only through the letting of his share. How is this done? He says to him, ‘My share is acquired by you’ or ‘my share is renounced in your favour’, [and the latter thereby] acquires possession and there is no need for him to perform a formal act of acquisition. R. Ashi replied: To this Tanna the desecration of the Sabbath is an offence as grave as idol worship; as it was taught: Of you implies: But not all of you, thus excluding a mumar; ‘of you’ only among you did I make distinctions but not among the other nations; ‘of the cattle’ includes men who resemble cattle. From here it has been inferred that sacrifices may be accepted from transgressors in Israel, in order that they might return in repentance, all except from a mumar, from one who offers libations of wine to idols and from one who publicly desecrates the Sabbath. Now is not this statement self contradictory: First you said: ‘Of you implies: But not all of you, thus excluding a mumar’, and then you state, ‘Sacrifices may be accepted from transgressors in Israel’? This, however, is no contradiction since the first clause might deal with a person who is a mumar in respect of all the Torah, while the intervening clause might refer to one who is a mumar in respect of one precept only. But [then] read the final clause: ‘Except from a mumar and from one who offers libations of wine to idols’. What, pray, is one to understand by this type of mumar? If he is a mumar in respect of all the Torah he is obviously identical with the one in the first clause; and if he is a mumar in respect of one precept only, does not a contradiction arise from the middle clause? Must it not consequently be conceded that it is this that was meant: Except from one who is a mumar in respect of offering libations of wine to idols or the desecration of the Sabbath in public? It is thus evident that idolatry and the desecration of the Sabbath are offences of equal gravity. This is conclusive. MISHNAH. IF ONE OF THE TENANTS OF A COURTYARD FORGOT TO JOIN IN THE ‘ERUB, HIS HOUSE IS FORBIDDEN BOTH TO HIM AND TO THEM FOR THE TAKING IN OR FOR THE TAKING OUT OF ANY OBJECT. BUT THEIR HOUSES ARE PERMITTED BOTH TO HIM AND TO THEM. IF THEY PRESENTED THEIR SHARES TO HIM, HE IS PERMITTED THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE COURTYARD BUT THEY ARE FORBIDDEN. IF THERE WERE TWO [WHO FORGOT TO JOIN IN THE ‘ERUB], THEY IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS UPON ONE ANOTHER, BECAUSE ONE TENANT MAY PRESENT HIS SHARE AND ALSO ACQUIRE THE SHARES OF OTHERS WHILE TWO TENANTS MAY PRESENT THEIR SHARES BUT MAY NOT ACQUIRE ANY. WHEN MUST ONE'S SHARE BE PRESENTED? BETH SHAMMAI RULED: WHILE IT IS YET DAY, AND BETH HILLEL RULED: AFTER DUSK. IF A TENANT PRESENTED HIS SHARE AND THEN CARRIED OUT ANY OBJECT, WHETHER UNWITTINGly OR INTENTIONAlly, LIE IMPOSES RESTRICTIONS; SO R. MEIR. R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE ACTED WITH INTENTION HE IMPOSES RESTRICTIONS, BUT IF UNWITTINGLY HE IMPOSES NO RESTRICTIONS. GEMARA. Apparently it is only HIS HOUSE that IS FORBIDDEN but his share in the courtyard is permitted; but how is one to understand the circumstances? If he has renounced his rights, why should his house be forbidden? And if he has not renounced his rights why should his courtyard be permitted? Here we are dealing with the case of a tenant who renounced his right to his courtyard but not his right to his house, the Rabbis being of the opinion that a tenant who renounces his right to his courtyard does not ipso facto renounce his right to his house, since a person might well live in a house that has no courtyard. BUT THEIR HOUSES ARE PERMITTED BOTH TO HIM AND TO THEM. What is the reason? — Because he is regarded as their guest. IF THEY PRESENTED THEIR SHARES TO HIM, HE IS PERMITTED THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE COURTYARD BUT THEY ARE FORBIDDEN. Why should not they be regarded as his guests? — One man may be regarded as the guest of five men; five men cannot be regarded as the guests of one. Does this then imply that renunciation may be followed by renunciation? — No; it is this that was meant: IF THEY originally PRESENTED THEIR SHARES TO HIM, HE IS PERMITTED THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE COURTYARD BUT THEY ARE FORBIDDEN. IF THERE WERE TWO WHO FORGOT TO JOIN IN THE ‘ERUB THEY IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS UPON ONE ANOTHER. Is not this obvious? — This ruling was necessary only in a case where one of them has subsequently renounced his share in favour of the other. As it might have been assumed that the latter should be permitted [the full use of the courtyard]. hence we were informed that [this is not so], because the former, at the time he renounced his share, was not himself permitted the unrestricted use of that courtyard. BECAUSE ONE TENANT MAY PRESENT HIS SHARE. What need again was there for this ruling? If that he MAY PRESENT, did we not learn this before? If that he MAY ACQUIRE, did we not already learn this also? — It was necessary on account of the final clause: TWO TENANTS MAY PRESENT THEIR SHARES. Is not this also obvious? — It might have been presumed

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