עירובין 68

68:1

why then should it not be said: As "sprinkling" on the Sabbath which is a Rabbinical prohibition does not supersede the Sabbath so should not an instruction to a gentile to do work on the Sabbath which is also Rabbinically forbidden supersede the Sabbath?’ — ‘Do you’, the first retorted: ‘draw no distinction between a Rabbinical prohibition that involves a manual cat and one that involves no such act?’ ‘How is it, Rabbah son of R. Hanan) asked Abaye, ‘that in an alley in which two great men like you reside there should be neither ‘erub nor shittuf?’ — ‘What’, the other replied. ‘can we do? For the Master [to collect the tenants’ contribution]. would not be becoming, l am busy with my studies, and the other tenants do not care. And were I to transfer to them the possession of a share of the bread in my basket the shittuf, Since If they had asked me for the bread l could not give it to them, would be invalid; for it was taught: If one of the residents of an alley asked for some of the wine or the oil and they refused to give it to them the shittuf is thereby rendered null and void’. ‘Why then’, the first asked: ‘should not the Master transfer to them the possession of a quarter of a log of vinegar a cask?’ — ‘It was taught: [Commodities kept] in store may not be used for shittuf’. ‘But was It not taught that they may be used for shittuf?’ — This, R. Oshaia replied, is no contradiction, since one view is that of Beth Shammai and the other is that of Beth Hillel. For we learned: If a corpse lay in a house that had many doors all the doorways are unclean. If one of them was opened, that doorway is unclean while all the others are clean. If it was intended to take out the corpse through one of them, or through a window that measured four handbreadths by four, this protects all the doors. Beth Shammai ruled: This applies only where the intention was formed before the person in question was dead, but Beth Hillel ruled: Even if it was formed after he was dead. There was once a certain child whose warm water was spilled out. Said Raba: ‘Let us ask his mother [and] if she requires any, a gentile might warm some for him indirectly through his mother’. ‘His mother’, R. Mesharsheya told Raba, ‘is already eating dates’. ‘It is quite possible’, the other replied, ‘that it was merely a stupor that had seized her’. There was once a child whose warm water was spilled out. ‘Remove my things’, ordered Raba, ‘from the men's quarters to the women's quarters and I will go and sit there so that I may renounce in favour of the tenants of the child's courtyard the right I have in this one’. ‘But’, said Rabina to Raba, ‘did not Samuel lay down: No renunciation of one's right in a courtyard is permitted where two courtyards are involved?’ — ‘I’, the other replied, ‘hold the same view as R. Johanan who laid down: It is permitted to renounce one's right in a courtyard even where two courtyards are involved’. ‘But’, the first asked: ‘if the Master does not hold the same view as Samuel

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68:2

let him remain in his usual quarters and renounce his right in his courtyard in their favour and then let them renounce their right in the Master's favour, for did not Rab rule: Renunciaton may be followed by renunciation?’ — ‘On this point I am of the same opinion as Samuel who ruled: Renunciation may not be followed by renunciation’. ‘But are not both rulings based on the same principle, since why indeed should not renunciation be allowed to follow renunciation? Is it not because a person, as soon as he renounces his right. completely eliminates himself from that place and assumes the status of a tenant of a different courtyard and no renunciation is valid between two courtyards? How then could the Master renounce his right? _ ‘There the reason is this: That a Rabbinical enactment shall not assume the character of a mockery and jest. [To turn to] the main text: Rab ruled: Renunciation may be followed by renunciation, and Samuel ruled: Renunciation may not be followed by renunciation. Must it be assumed that Rab and Samuel differ on the same principle as that on which the Rabbis and R. Eliezer differed, Rab holding the same opinion as the Rabbis while Samuel holds the same opinion as R. Eliezer? Rab can answer you: I may uphold my ruling even in accordance with the view of R. Eliezer; for it was only there that R. Eliezer maintained his ruling that the man who renounces his right to his courtyard renounces ipso facto his right to his house also, because people do not live in a house that has no courtyard, but did he express any opinion as regards complete elimination? Samuel also can answer you: l may uphold my ruling even according to the view of the Rabbis; for it was only there that the Rabbis maintained their ruling, since only that which a man actually renounced can be deemed to have been renounced while that which he did not actually renounce cannot be so regarded, but from that at least which a man does renounce he is eliminated completely. R. Aha b. Hana citing R. Shesheth stated: Their views [differ on the same principles] as those of the following Tannas: If a tenant presented his shares and then he carried out something, whether he acted unwittingly or intentionally, he imposes restrictions; so R. Meir. R. Judah ruled: If he acted with intention he imposes restrictions, but if unwittingly he does not. Now, do they not differ on the following principles: One Master holding that renunciation may be followed by renunciation, while the other Master maintains that renunciation may not be followed by renunciation? — R. Aha b. Tahlifa replied in the name of Raba: No; all hold the view that renunciation may not be followed by renunciation but the point at Issue between them is whether a penalty has been imposed in the case of one who acted unwittingly on account of one who acted intentionally. One Master holds the view that in the case of one who acted unwittingly a penalty has been imposed on account of one who acted with intention, while the other Master holds that in the case of one who acted unwittingly no penalty has been imposed on account of one who may act with intention. R. Ashi said: Rab and Samuel differed on the same point of issue as the one between, R. Eliezer and the Rabbis. R. GAMALIEL RELATED: A SADDUCEE ONCE LIVED WITH US. Who ever spoke of A SADDUCEE? — A clause is missing, and this is the correct reading: A Sadducee has the same status as a gentile, but R. Gamaliel ruled: A Sadducee has not the status of a gentile. AND R. GAMALIEL RELATED: A SADDUCEE ONCE LIVED WITH US IN THE SAME ALLEY IN JERUSALEM. AND FATHER TOLD US: ‘HASTEN AND CARRY OUT ALL THE NECESSARY ARTICLES INTO THE ALLEY BEFORE HE CARRIES OUT HIS AND THEREBY IMPOSES RESTRICTIONS UPON YOU’. And so it was also taught: If a man lives [in the same alley] with a gentile, a Sadducee or a Boethusian, these impose restrictions upon him; and it once happened that a Sadducee lived with R. Gamaliel in the same alley in Jerusalem, and R. Gamaliel said to his sons, ‘Hasten my sons and carry Out what you desire to carry Out or take in what you desire to take in, before this abomination carries out his articles and thereby imposes restrictions upon you, since [at that moment] he renounced his share in your favour’; So R. Meir. R. Judah related, [The instruction was given] in a different form: ‘Hasten and attend to your requirements in the alley before nightfall when he would impose restrictions upon you’. The Master said, ‘Carry out what you desire to carry out or bring in what you desire to bring in, before this abomination imposes restrictions upon you’. This then implies that if they carried out their objects first and then he carried out his he imposes no restrictions upon them’.

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