Parallel
עירובין 42:1
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
while R. Nehemiah ruled: If they are in their original place they may be eaten but if they are not in their original place they may not be eaten. Now what [are the circumstances under which they came to be] in their original place? If it be suggested that they were in their original place through some intentional act, surely [it could be retorted] was it not specifically taught: ‘R. Nehemiah and R. Eliezer b. Jacob ruled, [the fruits] are always forbidden unless they are unintentionally returned to their original place’, from which it follows, does it not, that only if they are returned] unintentionally is this law applicable but not [if they are returned] intentionally? Must we not then admit that they [came to be] in their original place through some unintentional act, and that some words are missing, the correct reading being as follows: Fruits that were carried outside the Sabbath limit unwittingly may be eaten, but if they were carried wittingly they may not be eaten. This applies only where they are not in their original place but if they were in their original place they may be eaten even if they were carried intentionally. And in connection with this R. Nehemiah came to lay down that even when they are in their original place the law applies only where they were carried unwittingly but not when it was done wittingly? — No; if they are in their original place through an intentional act no one disputes the ruling that they are forbidden, but the difference of opinion here is [one regarding fruits] that are not in their original place through an unintentional act. The first Tanna is of the opinion that if they are not in their original place through an unintentional act they are permitted while R. Nehemiah maintains that even [if they were carried] unintentionally they are permitted only in their original place but not where they are not in their original place. Since, however, it was stated in the final clause, ‘R. Nehemiah and R. Eliezer b. Jacob ruled, [The fruits] are always forbidden unless they are unintentionally returned to their original place’ [from which it follows that only if they’ are returned [unintentionally is this law applicable but not [if they are returned] intentionally, it may be concluded that the first Tanna is of the opinion that [the fruits] are permitted even [if they are returned] intentionally. This is conclusive. R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel: If a man was walking and did not know where the Sabbath limit ended he may walk a distance of two thousand moderate paces; and this constitutes for him the Sabbath limit. R. Nahman further stated in the name of Samuel: If a man took up his Sabbath abode in a valley around which gentiles put up a fence on the Sabbath, he may only walk a two thousand cubits distance in all directions but may move objects throughout all the valley by throwing them, but R. Huna ruled: He may walk the two thousand cubits but may move objects within four cubits only. But why should he not be allowed to move objects throughout all its area by throwing them? — He might be drawn after his object. Then why should he not be allowed to move objects in the usual way within the two thousand cubits? Because the [area in which he is permitted to walk] is like a partition along the full width of which a breach was made towards a place into which it is forbidden to carry anything from it. Hiyya b. Rab ruled: He may walk the two thousand cubits and may also move objects within these two thousand cubits. In agreement with whose view? Is it neither in agreement with that of Rab nor with that of R. Huna? — Read: He may move objects within four cubits. If so, is not his ruling identical with that of R. Huna? — Read: And so ruled Hiyya b. Rab. Said R. Nahman to R. Huna: Do not dispute the view of Samuel since in a Baraitha it was taught in agreement with his view. For it was taught:
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