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עירובין 37:2
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
except at the time they are purchased by their owner or when the priest prepares them [for the altar]. Is it then still [maintained that] R. Jose is of the opinion that the rule of bererah is not to be upheld? Was It not in fact taught: If an ‘Am ha-arez said to a haber, ‘Buy for me a bundle of vegetables’ or ‘a loaf’, [the latter] need not tithe it; so R. Jose, but the Sages ruled: He must tithe it? Reverse [the rulings]. Come and hear: If a man said: ‘let the [second] tithe which I have in my house be redeemed with the sela’ that would happen to come from my purse into my hand’ it is, said R. Jose, redeemed? — Reverse [the rulings and] read: ‘R. Jose said: It is not redeemed’. What reason, however, do you see for reversing two statements for the sake of one, [why not] reverse the one for the sake of the two? — The last cited Baraitha was at all events taught in a reversed form; since In its final clause it was stated: R. Jose, however, admits that where a man said: ‘The [second] tithe which I have in my house shall be redeemed with the new sela’ that would happen to come from my purse into my hand’, the tithe is redeemed. Now since he ruled here that it ‘is redeemed’ it follows that in the previous case [his ruling was that] it is not redeemed. What, however, is to be understood [by the case of] the new sela’? If there are two or three [other new sela's in his purse] so that selection is possible then this case is exactly identical with the first one. If, however, there was only one, what [sense is there in the expression,] ‘That would happen to come ? — As in the first clause it was taught: ‘That would happen to come’, it was taught in the final clause also, ‘That would happen to come’. Raba asked R. Nahman: Who is that Tanna who does not uphold the rule of bererah even in the case of a Rabbinical enactment? For It was taught: ‘If a man said to five persons, "Behold I am preparing an ‘erub for one of you whom I may choose [in due course] so that if I wish it he would be allowed to go and if I would not wish it he would not go", the ‘erub is effective if he made up his mind while it was yet day, [but if he did it] after dusk the ‘erub is not effective’? The other remained silent and gave him no answer whatever. But why could he not tell him that the Tanna was one of the school of Ayo? — He did not hear [of. Ayo's ruling]. R. Joseph said: Do you wish to remove Tannas from the world? [The fact is that the question is one] on which Tannas differ. For it was taught: [If a man said,] ‘Behold I am preparing an erub for all the Sabbaths of the years so that whenever I should wish it I would go and whenever I should not wish it I would not go’, his ‘erub is effective if he made up his mind while it was yet day; [but if he decided] after dusk, R. Simeon ruled: His ‘erub is effective while the Sages ruled: His ‘erub is not effective. But surely, we heard of R. Simeon that he does not uphold bererah, so that a contradiction arise between two rulings of R. Simeon? — The fact is [that the views are to be] reversed. But what difficulty [is this]? Is it not possible that R. Simeon does not uphold bererah only in a Pentateuchal law but in respect of a Rabbinical law he may well uphold it? — He is of the opinion that he who upholds bererah does so in all cases making no distinction between a Pentateuchal and a Rabbinical law, while he who does not uphold bererah does not do it In any case irrespective of whether a law is Pentateuchal or Rabbinical. Rabbah replied: There [the case is altogether] different, [the reason being] that it is essential [for the priestly and levitical dues] to be firstfruit, so that whatever remains shall be distinguishable [from it]. Said Abaye to him: Now then, if a man who had before him two pomegranates of tebel said: ‘If rain will fall to-day the one shall be terumah for the other and if no rain will fall to-day the other shall be terumah for the first’, would his assertion here also, whether there was rain that day or not, be will and void? And should you reply [that the law is] so indeed [it can be retorted:] Have we not in fact learnt: ‘[If a man said,] "The terumah of this heap and its tithes shall be in the middle thereof" or "The terumah of this [first] tithe shall be In the middle thereof", R. Simeon ruled: He has thereby given it a valid name?’ — There [the law] is different because [the remainder of the produce]’ is round about the dues. And if you prefer I might reply in accordance with the reason elsewhere indicated: They said to R. Meir, ‘Do you not agree that the skin might burst and the man would thus have been drinking liquids of tebel?’ And he replied: ‘When it will have burst [there would be time for the question to be considered]’. On the previous assumption, however, that it is essential [for the priestly and levitical dues] to be ‘firstfruit’ so that whatever remains shall be distinguishable from it, what could they have meant? It is this that they meant: ‘According to our view [the reason for the prohibition is that] it is essential [for the priestly and levitical dues] to be "firstfruit" so that whatever remains shall be distinguishable [from it], but even according to your view,
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