Parallel
עירובין 32:1
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
in [respect of a law] of the Scribes there is a legal presumption that an agent carries out his mission. R. Shesheth, however, ruled: In respect of the one as in that of the other there is a legal presumption that an agent carries out his mission. Whence, said R. Shesheth, do I derive this?’ From what we learned: As soon as the omer had been offered the new produce is forthwith permitted; and those who [live] at a distance bare permitted [its use] from mid-day onwards. [Now, the prohibition against the consumption of] new produce is Pentateuchal, and yet it was stated that ‘those who [live] at a distance are permitted [its use] from mid-day onwards’. Is not this due to the legal presumption that an agent carries out his mission? And R. Nahman? — There [the presumption is justified] for the reason stated: Because it is known that Beth din would not shirk their duty. Others there are who read: R. Nahman said: Whence do I derive this? since the reason stated was, ‘Because it is known that Beth din would not shirk their duty’, [it follows that] it is only Beth din who do not shirk their duty but that an ordinary agent might. And R. Shesheth? — He can answer you: Beth din [are presumed to have carried out their duty] by mid-day, while an ordinary agent [is presumed to have done his before] all the day [has passed]. Said R. Shesheth: Whence do I derive this? From what was taught: A woman who is under the obligation [of bringing an offering in connection with] a birth or gonorroea brings [the required sum of] money which she puts into the collecting box, performs ritual immersion and is permitted to eat consecrated: food in the evening. Now what is the reason? Is it not because we hold that it is a legal presumption that an agent carries out his mission? And R. Nahman? — There [the presumption may be justified] in agreement with the view of R. Shemaiah. For R. Shemaiah laid down: There is a legal presumption that no Beth din of priest who would rise from their session before all the money in the collecting box had been spent. R. Shesheth again said: Whence do I derive this? From what was taught: If a man said to another, ‘Go out and gather for yourself some figs from my fig tree’, the latter may make of them an irregular meal or he must tithe them [as produce that is] known [to be untithed]. [If however, the owner said to him,] ‘Fill yourself this basket with figs from my tree’ [the latter] may eat them as an irregular meal or must tithe them as demai. This applies only to [an owner who was] an am ha-arez, but if he was a Fellow [the latter] may eat [the fruit] and need not tithe them; so Rabbi: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, however, ruled: This applies only to [an owner] an am ha-arez, but if he was a Fellow [the latter] must not eat [the figs] before he has tithed them, because Fellows are not suspected of giving terumah from [produce] that is not in close proximity [to the produce for which it is given]. My view, remarked Rabbi, seems [to be more acceptable] than that of my father, since it is preferable that Fellows should be suspected of giving terumah from [produce] that is not in close proximity [with that for which it is given] than that they should give ‘amme ha-arez to eat all sorts of tebel. Now, their dispute extends only so far that while one Master maintains that they are not suspected, but both [agree that there is] legal presumption that an agent carries out his mission. And R. Nahman? — There [the presumption is justified] in agreement [with the principle] of R. Hanina Hoza'ah. For R. Hanina Hoza'ah laid down: It is a legal presumption that a Fellow would not allow any unprepared thing to pass out of his hand. The Master said: ‘This applies only to [an owner who was] an am ha-arez, but if he was a Fellow [the latter] may eat [the fruit] and need not tithe them; so Rabbi’. To whom could this ‘am ha-arez have been speaking? If it be suggested that he was speaking to an ‘am ha-arez like himself [what sense is there in the ruling,] ‘Must tithe them, as demai’? Would he obey it? Consequently it in must be a case where an ‘am ha-arez was speaking to a Fellow. Now, then, read the final clause: ‘My view seems [to be more acceptable] than that of my father, since it is preferable that Fellows should be suspected of giving terumah from [produce] that is not in close proximity [with that for which it is given] than that they should give ‘amme ha-arez to eat all sorts of tebel’; how does the question of ‘amme ha-arez at all arise? — Rabina replied: The first clause deals with an ‘am ha-arez who was speaking to a Fellow, and the final clause deals with a Fellow who was speaking to all am ha-arez while another Fellow was listening to the conversation. Rabbi
—