Parallel
חולין 39
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
whereas R. Eliezer holds that we may draw this inference — outside services from inside services. And R. Jose comes to say that even as regards acts performed inside we do not hold that one man's wrongful intention should affect another's acts. It was reported: If one slaughtered a beast with the intention [expressed during the slaughtering] of sprinkling the blood or burning the fat unto idols, R.Johanan says. The beast is forbidden for all purposes; Resh Lakish says. It is permitted. ‘R. Johanan says it is forbidden’, because he accepts the principle: ‘a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence [even in connection with idolatry]’, for one must draw an analogy between acts performed inside and acts performed outside. ‘Resh Lakish says: it is permitted’, because he does not accept the principle, ‘a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence [in the case of idolatry]’, for one must not draw any analogy between acts performed inside and acts performed outside. Now they are consistent in their views, for it was also reported: If one slaughtered [a sin-offering] under its own name with the intention [expressed at the time of slaughtering] of sprinkling the blood under the name of another sacrifice, R. Johanan says, it is invalid; Resh Lakish says. It is valid. ‘R. Johanan says it is invalid’, because he accepts the principle, ‘a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence’, [even in this case], for we derive it from the case of piggul. ‘Resh Lakish says it is valid’, because he does not accept [in this case] the principle, ‘a wrongful Intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence’ for we may not derive it from the case of piggul. And it was necessary [for both disputes to be reported]. For if this dispute only was reported. I should have said that only here does Resh Lakish maintain his view, because we must not draw an inference as to acts performed outside from acts performed inside, but where each is a service performed inside he would no doubt concur with R. Johanan [that we derive one from the other]. And if the other dispute only was reported, I should have said that only there does R. Johanan maintain his view, but in this case he would no doubt concur with Resh Lakish. It was therefore necessary [that both disputes be reported]. R. Shesheth raised an objection. We have learnt: R. JOSE EXCLAIMED, IS THERE NOT HERE AN A FORTIORI ARGUMENT? FOR IF IN THE CASE OF CONSECRATED ANIMALS, WHERE A WRONGFUL INTENTION CAN RENDER INVALID, IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT EVERYTHING DEPENDS SOLELY UPON THE INTENTION OF HIM WHO PERFORMS THE SERVICE. HOW MUCH MORE IN THE CASE OF UNCONSECRATED ANIMALS, WHERE A WRONGFUL INTENTION CANNOT RENDER INVALID. DOES EVERYTHING DEPEND SOLELY UPON THE INTENTION OF HIM WHO SLAUGHTERS! Now what is meant by the assertion that in the case of unconsecrated animals a wrongful intention will not render invalid? Shall I say it means that in no wise will it render invalid? Then how is it possible for the prohibition of that which has been slaughtered to idols ever to take effect? Obviously it means a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service, and the Mishnah is to be interpreted thus: ‘If in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service renders them invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service does not render them invalid, does everything depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters’! Now the assertion with regard to services performed inside [namely, consecrated animals] contradicts Resh Lakish, and the assertion with regard to services performed outside [namely, unconsecrated animals] contradicts R. Johanan. I grant however, that as far as Resh Lakish is concerned, the assertion with regard to services performed inside presents no real difficulty, for one view he expressed before he learnt [the interpretation of the Mishnah] from [his master]. R. Johanan, and the other after he learnt it from R. Johanan. But [the assertion with regard to] services performed outside clearly contradicts R. Johanan! — After raising this objection he [R. Shesheth] answered it thus: [The Mishnah] refers to the four principal services, and the passage must be read as follows: If in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention expressed in the course of any one of the four principal services renders them invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service,
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how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention renders them invalid only if expressed in the course of any one of two services, does everything depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters! [The following Baraitha] was taught in support of the view of R. Johanan: If a person [an Israelite] slaughtered an animal with the intention [expressed during the slaughtering] of sprinkling the blood or burning the fat unto idols, it is regarded as a sacrifice unto the dead. If he slaughtered it and afterwards expressed his intention — this was an actual case which occurred in Caesarea and the Rabbis expressed no opinion with regard to it, neither forbidding nor permitting it. R. Hisda explained. They did not, forbid it in deference to the view of the Rabbis, and they did not permit it in deference to the view of R. Eliezer. But how do you know this? perhaps the Rabbis maintain their view only there [in our Mishnah] because we did not hear him [sc. the idolater] express any intention at all, but here since we heard him express an intention [after the slaughtering, even the Rabbis will admit that it is invalid, for] his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning. Or you might argue thus: Perhaps R. Eliezer maintains his view only there [in our Mishnah], because it deals with a heathen, and he is of the opinion that the thoughts of a heathen are usually directed towards idolatry, but here since we are dealing with an Israelite it would not be right to say that his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning. — Rather, said R. Shizbi, [explain thus]: They did not permit it in deference to the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel. Which statement of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel is meant? Shall I say it is his statement on the subject of Divorce? For we have learnt: If a person in good health said: ‘Write a bill of divorce to my wife’, it is held that he merely intended to tease her. And there actually happened a case where a person of good health said: ‘Write a bill of divorce to my wife’, and he immediately went up to the roof and fell down from it and was killed, and R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled: If he threw himself down, the divorce is valid, but if the wind pushed him over, the divorce is not valid. And the following argument ensued: Does not the case stated contradict [the given ruling]? — [And the reply was,] There is an omission [in the text] and it should read thus: If his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning, the divorce will be valid. And there actually happened a case where a person in good health said: ‘Write a bill of divorce to my wife’, and he immediately went up to the roof and fell down from it and was killed, and R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled: If he threw himself down, the divorce is valid; but if the wind pushed him over, the divorce is not valid! — Perhaps this case is different for he actually said: ‘Write [the bill of divorce].’ Rather, said Rabina: It was in deference to the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel in the following case. For it was taught: If a person assigned in writing his estate, which included slaves, to another, and the latter said: ‘I do not want them’, they [sc. the slaves] may nevertheless eat terumah, if their second master was a priest. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says. As soon as that person has said: ‘I do not want them’, the heirs at once become the legal owners of them. And the following argument ensued: Would the first Tanna regard the assignee as the legal owner even if he stands and objects? Whereupon Rabbah (others say: R. Johanan) explained. If he objected from the outset, all agree that he has not acquired them; likewise if he remained silent at first, but subsequently objected, all agree that he has acquired them. The dispute arises only where the assignor transferred the estate through a third party to the assignee, and the latter was silent at first but subsequently objected to it. The first Tanna is of the opinion that by his silence he has acquired them, and his subsequent objection merely signifies that he has changed his mind. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel is of the opinion that his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning, and the reason he did not object at the outset was because he, no doubt, said to himself, ‘Why should I object before they came into my possession?’ Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel that the halachah is in accordance with the view of R. Jose. Certain Arabs once came to Zikonia and gave the Jewish butchers some rams to slaughter, saying: ‘The blood and the fat shall be for us, while the hide and the flesh shall be yours’. R. Tobi b. R. Mattena sent this case to R. Joseph and asked. ‘What is the law in such a case as this?’ He sent back saying: ‘Thus has Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: The halachah is in accordance with the view of R. Jose’. R. Aha the son of R. Awia asked R. Ashi: According to the view of R. Eliezer, what would be the law if a heathen gave a zuz to a Jewish butcher? — He replied: We must consider the case; If he [the idolater] is a powerful man whom the Israelite cannot put off [by returning his zuz], then the animal is forbidden; but if he is not [a powerful man], the Israelite would be able to say to him, [Strike] your head against the mountain! MISHNAH. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED [AN ANIMAL] AS A SACRIFICE TO MOUNTAINS. HILLS, SEAS, RIVERS, OR DESERTS, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID.
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