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חולין 39:2
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention renders them invalid only if expressed in the course of any one of two services, does everything depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters! [The following Baraitha] was taught in support of the view of R. Johanan: If a person [an Israelite] slaughtered an animal with the intention [expressed during the slaughtering] of sprinkling the blood or burning the fat unto idols, it is regarded as a sacrifice unto the dead. If he slaughtered it and afterwards expressed his intention — this was an actual case which occurred in Caesarea and the Rabbis expressed no opinion with regard to it, neither forbidding nor permitting it. R. Hisda explained. They did not, forbid it in deference to the view of the Rabbis, and they did not permit it in deference to the view of R. Eliezer. But how do you know this? perhaps the Rabbis maintain their view only there [in our Mishnah] because we did not hear him [sc. the idolater] express any intention at all, but here since we heard him express an intention [after the slaughtering, even the Rabbis will admit that it is invalid, for] his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning. Or you might argue thus: Perhaps R. Eliezer maintains his view only there [in our Mishnah], because it deals with a heathen, and he is of the opinion that the thoughts of a heathen are usually directed towards idolatry, but here since we are dealing with an Israelite it would not be right to say that his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning. — Rather, said R. Shizbi, [explain thus]: They did not permit it in deference to the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel. Which statement of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel is meant? Shall I say it is his statement on the subject of Divorce? For we have learnt: If a person in good health said: ‘Write a bill of divorce to my wife’, it is held that he merely intended to tease her. And there actually happened a case where a person of good health said: ‘Write a bill of divorce to my wife’, and he immediately went up to the roof and fell down from it and was killed, and R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled: If he threw himself down, the divorce is valid, but if the wind pushed him over, the divorce is not valid. And the following argument ensued: Does not the case stated contradict [the given ruling]? — [And the reply was,] There is an omission [in the text] and it should read thus: If his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning, the divorce will be valid. And there actually happened a case where a person in good health said: ‘Write a bill of divorce to my wife’, and he immediately went up to the roof and fell down from it and was killed, and R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled: If he threw himself down, the divorce is valid; but if the wind pushed him over, the divorce is not valid! — Perhaps this case is different for he actually said: ‘Write [the bill of divorce].’ Rather, said Rabina: It was in deference to the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel in the following case. For it was taught: If a person assigned in writing his estate, which included slaves, to another, and the latter said: ‘I do not want them’, they [sc. the slaves] may nevertheless eat terumah, if their second master was a priest. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says. As soon as that person has said: ‘I do not want them’, the heirs at once become the legal owners of them. And the following argument ensued: Would the first Tanna regard the assignee as the legal owner even if he stands and objects? Whereupon Rabbah (others say: R. Johanan) explained. If he objected from the outset, all agree that he has not acquired them; likewise if he remained silent at first, but subsequently objected, all agree that he has acquired them. The dispute arises only where the assignor transferred the estate through a third party to the assignee, and the latter was silent at first but subsequently objected to it. The first Tanna is of the opinion that by his silence he has acquired them, and his subsequent objection merely signifies that he has changed his mind. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel is of the opinion that his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning, and the reason he did not object at the outset was because he, no doubt, said to himself, ‘Why should I object before they came into my possession?’ Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel that the halachah is in accordance with the view of R. Jose. Certain Arabs once came to Zikonia and gave the Jewish butchers some rams to slaughter, saying: ‘The blood and the fat shall be for us, while the hide and the flesh shall be yours’. R. Tobi b. R. Mattena sent this case to R. Joseph and asked. ‘What is the law in such a case as this?’ He sent back saying: ‘Thus has Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: The halachah is in accordance with the view of R. Jose’. R. Aha the son of R. Awia asked R. Ashi: According to the view of R. Eliezer, what would be the law if a heathen gave a zuz to a Jewish butcher? — He replied: We must consider the case; If he [the idolater] is a powerful man whom the Israelite cannot put off [by returning his zuz], then the animal is forbidden; but if he is not [a powerful man], the Israelite would be able to say to him, [Strike] your head against the mountain! MISHNAH. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED [AN ANIMAL] AS A SACRIFICE TO MOUNTAINS. HILLS, SEAS, RIVERS, OR DESERTS, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID.
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