חולין 109 — parallel

109:1

(It follows then from this that R. Judah holds that [the entire contents of the pot] are forbidden even though he stirred it straightway [and continued to do so] till the very end, or covered it straightway [and kept it so] till the very end. But why should this be so? The one [piece] has not absorbed any more [than the others]? — Perhaps he did not stir it so well or he did not cover it so well.) The Master [further] stated above: ‘And the words of the Sages in the case where he either stirred it or covered it’. What is meant by ‘either stirred it or covered it’? Should you say it means that he stirred it only later on but not at the beginning, or that he covered it only later on but not at the beginning, — but in this case you have said that the words of R. Judah are acceptable. It must therefore mean that he stirred it straightway and [continued to do so] till the very end, or that he covered it straightway and [kept it so] till the very end; from which it follows that the Sages maintain [that everything in the pot is] permitted even though he stirred it only later on but not at the beginning, or he covered it only later on but not at the beginning. It is evident then that they hold that when the forbidden substance can be considered extracted it becomes permitted. R. Aha of Difti said to Rabina: Why say they differ as to the law where the forbidden substance can be extracted? Perhaps all are of the opinion that even when the forbidden substance can be is extracted it is still forbidden, but they differ [about the neutralization of homogeneous substances: R. Judah maintaining his principle that homogeneous substances cannot neutralize each other, and the Rabbis maintain theirs that homogeneous substances can neutralize each other? — This argument cannot be entertained. If you concede that the Sages in this dispute accept R. Judah’ s view concerning homogeneous substances, but they differ only as to the law in the case where the forbidden substance can be considered extracted, then the meaning of Rabbi is clear when he says. ‘The words of R. Judah are acceptable in this case and the words of the Sages in that’. But if you insist that all agree that even where the forbidden substance can be considered extracted it is still forbidden, but they differ concerning the law of homogeneous substances, then surely [Rabbi] should have said. ‘The words of R. Judah are acceptable in this but not in that’! And there is no more to be said about this. MISHNAH. THE UDDER MUST BE CUT OPEN AND EMPTIED OF ITS MILK; IF HE DID NOT CUT IT OPEN HE HAS NOT TRANSGRESSED THE LAW ON ACCOUNT THEREOF. THE HEART MUST BE CUT OPEN AND EMPTIED OF ITS BLOOD; IF HE DID NOT CUT IT OPEN HE HAS NOT TRANSGRESSED THE LAW ON ACCOUNT THEREOF.12

—

109:2

GEMARA. R. Zera said in the name of Rab: He has [not only] not transgressed the law on account thereof, but it is even permitted. But have we not learnt: HE HAS NOT TRANSGRESSED THE LAW ON ACCOUNT THEREOF, which implies that there is no transgression of the law but that it is forbidden?Strictly it is not forbidden at all, but only because the second clause reads: THE HEART MUST BE CUT OPEN AND EMPTIED OF ITS BLOOD; IF HE DID NOT CUT IT OPEN HE HAS NOT TRANSGRESSED THE LAW ON ACCOUNT THEREOF, in which case it is true that there is no transgression of the law but clearly it is forbidden, the Tanna also stated in the first clause, HE HAS NOT TRANSGRESSED THE LAW ON ACCOUNT THEREOF. Shall we say that the following teaching supports him? It was taught: The udder must be cut open and emptied of its milk; if he did not cut it open he has not transgressed the law on account thereof. The heart must be cut open and emptied of its blood; if he did not cut it open he must cut it open after it had been cooked and it is permitted [to be eaten]. Now it is only the heart that must be cut open [after the cooking], but the udder need not be cut open at all! — Perhaps the inference is: only for the heart does the cutting open [after the cooking] suffice, but for the udder the cutting open [after the cooking] would not be sufficient. Others report the passage thus: R. Zera said in the name of Rab: He has not transgressed the law on account thereof, but it is forbidden [to be eaten]. Shall we say that [our Mishnah] supports him? It reads: HE HAS NOT TRANSGRESSED THE LAW ON ACCOUNT THEREOF, which implies, no doubt, that there Is no transgression of the law but that it is forbidden! — Strictly it is not even forbidden, but only because the second clause reads: THE HEART MUST BE CUT OPEN AND EMPTIED OF ITS BLOOD; IF HE DID NOT CUT IT OPEN HE HAS NOT TRANSGRESSED THE LAW ON ACCOUNT THEREOF, in which case there is no transgression of the law but clearly it is forbidden, the Tanna also stated in the first clause, HE HAS NOT TRANSGRESSED THE LAW ON ACCOUNT THEREOF. Come and hear: The udder must be cut open and emptied of its milk; if he did not cut it open he has not transgressed the law on account thereof. The heart must be cut open and emptied of its blood; if he did not cut it open, he must cut it open after it had been cooked and it is permitted [to be eaten]. Now only the heart must be cut open [after the cooking] but the udder need not be cut open at all! — Perhaps the inference is: only for the heart does the cutting open [after the cooking] suffice, but for the udder the cutting open [after the cooking] would not be sufficient. It was taught in agreement with the first version of Rab's view: If the udder was cooked with its milk it is permitted; if the stomach [of a sucking calf] was cooked with its milk it is forbidden. And wherein lies the distinction between the two? In the one the milk is collected inside, in the other it is not collected inside. How should one cut it open? — Rab Judah replied. One must cut it lengthwise and breadthwise and press it against the wall. R. Eleazar once said to his attendant, ‘Cut it up for me and I will eat it’. What does he teach us? Is it not [a clear statement in] our Mishnah? — He teaches us that it is not necessary to cut it both lengthwise and breadthwise. Or [he teaches us that this would be sufficient even for cooking] in a pot. Yaltha once said to R. Nahman: ‘Observe, for everything that the Divine Law has forbidden us it has permitted us an equivalent: it has forbidden us blood but it has permitted us liver; it has forbidden us intercourse during menstruation but it has permitted us the blood of purification; it has forbidden us the fat of cattle but it has permitted us the fat of wild beasts; it has forbidden us swine's flesh but it has permitted us the brain of the shibbuta; it has forbidden us the girutha but it has permitted us the tongue of fish; it has forbidden us the married woman but it has permitted us the divorcee during the lifetime of her former husband; it has forbidden us the brother's wife but it has permitted us the levirate marriage; it has forbidden us the non-Jewess but it has permitted us the beautiful woman [taken in war]. I wish to eat flesh in milk, [where is its equivalent?]’ Thereupon R. Nahman said to the butchers, ‘Give her roasted Udders’. But have we not learnt, [THE UDDER] MUST BE CUT OPEN? — That is only when [it is to be cooked] in a pot. But does it not state [in the Baraitha above]. ‘If [the udder was] cooked’, which implies that only after the act it is permitted but not in the first instance? — Indeed, it is even permitted in the first instance, but only because [the Tanna of the cited Baraitha] desired to state the second clause viz., If the stomach

—