Bava Kamma — Daf 40b

אם תם הוה מודינא ומפטרינא

ואפילו למ"ד פלגא נזקא ממונא נימא ליה אי תם הוא הוה מעריקנא ליה לאגמא

אלא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון דאקדים בי דינא ותפסיה

אי הכי בעלים אמאי משלמים חצי נזק נימא ליה אתפסתיה לתוראי בידא מאן דלא מצינא לאשתעויי דינא בהדיה משום דא"ל אי אהדרתיה ניהלך לאו מינך הוו שקלי ליה

ונימא ליה אי אהדרתיה ניהליה הוה מעריקנא ליה לאגמא משום דא"ל סוף סוף לאו מעלייה הוו משתלמי

הניחא היכא דאית ליה נכסי היכא דלית ליה נכסי מאי איכא למימר

משום דא"ל כי היכא דמשתעבדנא לדידך הכי נמי משתעבדנא להאיך מדר' נתן

דתניא רבי נתן אומר מנין לנושה בחבירו מנה וחבירו בחבירו מנין שמוציאין מזה ונותנים לזה ת"ל (במדבר ה, ז) ונתן לאשר אשם לו

הועד בבית שואל והחזירו לבעלים בעלים משלמין חצי נזק ושואל פטור מכלום

סיפא רשות משנה רישא רשות אינה משנה

א"ר יוחנן תברא מי ששנה זו לא שנה זו

רבה אמר מדרישא רשות אינה משנה סיפא נמי רשות אינה משנה וסיפא היינו טעמא משום דא"ל לאו כל כמינך דמייעדת ליה לתוראי

רב פפא אמר מדסיפא רשות משנה רישא נמי רשות משנה ורישא היינו טעמא משום דכל מקום שהולך שם בעליו עליו:

שור האצטדין אינו חייב מיתה [וכו']: איבעיא להו מהו לגבי מזבח

רב אמר כשר ושמואל אמר פסול רב אמר כשר אנוס הוא ושמואל אמר פסול הרי נעבד בו עבירה

מיתיבי (ויקרא א, ב) מן הבהמה להוציא את הרובע ואת הנרבע מן הבקר להוציא את הנעבד מן הצאן להוציא את המוקצה ומן הצאן להוציא את הנוגח

אמר רבי שמעון אם נאמר רובע למה נאמר נוגח ואם נאמר נוגח למה נאמר רובע

מפני שיש ברובע שאין בנוגח ויש בנוגח שאין ברובע

רובע עשה בו אונס כרצון נוגח לא עשה בו אונס כרצון נוגח משלם כופר רובע אינו משלם את הכופר לפיכך הוצרך לומר רובע והוצרך לומר נוגח

קתני מיהת רובע עשה בו אונס כרצון נוגח לא עשה בו אונס כרצון למאי הלכתא לאו לקרבן

לא לקטלא

הכי נמי מסתברא דאי אמרת לקרבן נוגח לא עשה בו אונס כרצון לאו אונס דידיה כתיב ולאו רצון דידיה כתיב אלא לאו לקטלא:

אמר מר נוגח משלם את הכופר רובע אינו משלם את הכופר ה"ד אילימא דרבעה וקטלה מה לי קטלה בקרנא מה לי קטלה ברביעה

ואלא דרבעה ולא קטלה האי דלא משלם כופר משום דלא קטלה הוא

אמר אביי לעולם דרבעה ולא קטלה דאתיוה לבי דינא וקטלוה מהו דתימא

'Were the ox to have been Tam I would have admitted [the act of goring] and become exempt from having to pay'?  Moreover even according to the view  that the payment of half-damages [for goring in the case of Tam] is a civil liability,  why should the borrower still not argue: 'Had the ox been Tam I would have caused it to escape to the pasture'?  — We must therefore suppose the case to have been one where the Court of law stepped in first and took possession of the ox. But if so why should the owner pay one half of the damages? Why not plead against the borrower: 'You have allowed my ox to fall into the hands of a party against whom I am powerless to bring any legal action'? — [This could not be pleaded] because the borrower might retort to him: 'Were I even to have returned the ox to you, would the Court of Law not have taken it from you?' But why should the owner still not plead against the borrower: 'Were you to have returned it to me, I would have caused it to escape to the pasture'?  — [This could not be pleaded] because the borrower might argue against him: 'In any case would the damages not have been paid out of the best [of your general estate]?'  This indeed could be effectively argued [by the borrower] where the owner possessed property, but what could be argued in the case where the owner possessed no property? — What therefore the borrower could always argue against the owner is [as follows]: 'Just as I am under a personal obligation to you,  so am I under a personal obligation  to that party [who is your creditor], in virtue of the rule of R. Nathan, as it was taught,  'R. Nathan says: Whence do we conclude that if A claims a maneh  from B, and B [claims a similar sum] from C, the money is collected from C and [directly] handed over to A? From the statement of Scripture:  And give it unto him against whom he hath trespassed. 'If it was declared Mu'ad while in the possession of the borrower, and [after it] was returned to the owner [it gored again], the owner will pay half damages while the borrower is exempt from any liability whatsoever.' Does this concluding clause [not appear to prove that a change in the] control [of the ox]  causes a change [in its status], while the preceding clause [tends to prove that a change in the] control [of the ox]  causes no change [in its status]? — R. Johanan thereupon said: The contradiction [is obvious]; he who taught one clause certainly did not teach the other clause [in the text of the Baraitha]. Rabbah, however, said: Since the opening clause [tends to prove that a change in the] control  does not cause a change [in the status], the concluding clause [may also maintain that a change in the] control does not cause a change [in the status]. For the ruling in the concluding clause could be based on the fact that the owner may argue against the borrower, 'You had no legal right to cause my ox to be declared Mu'ad.'  R. Papa, however, said: Since the concluding clause [proves that a change in the] control  [of the ox] causes a change [in its status], the opening clause [may also maintain that a change in the] control [of the ox] causes a change [in its status]. For the ruling in the opening clause could be based upon the reason that wherever the ox is put, it bears the name of its owner upon it. IN THE CASE OF A STADIUM OX [KILLING A PERSON], THE DEATH PENALTY IS NOT IMPOSED [UPON THE OX] etc. The question was raised: What [would have been the position of such an ox] with reference to [its being sacrificed upon] the altar? — Rab said that it would have been eligible, whereas Samuel maintained that it would have been ineligible. Rab considered it eligible since it committed manslaughter only by compulsion, whereas Samuel considered it ineligible since it had been used as an instrument for the commission of a crime. An objection was raised:  [Ye shall bring your offering] of the cattle  excludes an animal that has copulated with a woman and an animal that has copulated with a man;  even of the herd  excludes an animal that has been used as an instrument of idolatry; of the flock  excludes an animal that has been set apart for idolatrous purposes; and of the flock excludes an animal that has gored [and committed manslaughter]. R. Simeon remarked upon this: If it is laid down that an animal that has copulated with a woman  [is to be excluded] why was it necessary to lay down that an animal goring [and committing manslaughter is also excluded]?  Again, if it is laid down that an animal that gored [and committed manslaughter is to be excluded], why was it necessary to lay down that an animal copulating with a woman [is also excluded]?  [The reason is] because there are features in an animal copulating with a woman which are not present in an animal goring [and committing manslaughter], and again there are features in an animal goring [and committing manslaughter] which are not present in the case of an animal copulating with a woman. In the case of an animal copulating with a human being the law makes no distinction between a compulsory  and a voluntary act [on the part of the animal],  whereas in the case of an animal goring [and committing manslaughter] the law does not place a compulsory act on the same footing as a voluntary one. Again, in the case of an animal goring [and committing manslaughter] there is liability to pay kofer,  whereas in the case of an animal copulating with a woman there is no liability to pay kofer.  It is on account of these differences that it was necessary to specify both an animal copulating with a woman and an animal goring [and committing manslaughter]. Now, it is here taught that in the case of an animal copulating with a human being the law makes no distinction between a compulsory and a voluntary act, whereas in the case of an animal goring [and committing manslaughter the law] does not place a compulsory act on the same footing as a voluntary one. What rule are we to derive from this? Is it not the rule in respect of eligibility for becoming a sacrifice [upon the altar]?  — No; the rule in respect of stoning.  This indeed stands also to reason, for if you maintain that it is with reference to the sacrifice that the law does not place a compulsory act on the same footing as a voluntary one in the case of an animal goring, [I would point out that with reference to its eligibility for the altar] the Scripture says nothing explicitly with regard either to a compulsory act or a voluntary act on its part. Does it therefore not [stand to reason that what we are to derive from this is] the rule in respect of stoning? The Master stated: 'In the case of an animal goring [and committing manslaughter] there is liability to pay kofer, whereas in the case of an animal copulating with a woman there is no liability to pay kofer.' What are the circumstances? It could hardly be that while copulating with a woman it killed her, for what difference could be made between killing by means of a horn and killing by means of copulating? If on the other hand the act of copulating did not result in manslaughter, is the exemption from paying kofer not due to the fact that no killing took place? — Abaye said: We suppose, in fact, that it deals with a case where, by the act of copulating, the animal did not kill the woman, who, however, was brought to the Court of Law and by its orders executed. [In such a case] you might perhaps have thought