Bava Kamma — Daf 40a

אי לר"י דעבד ליה שמירה פחותה ולא עבד ליה שמירה מעולה אי לר"א בן יעקב דלא עביד ליה שמירה כלל

דתניא ר"א בן יעקב אומר אחד תם ואחד מועד ששמרן שמירה פחותה פטורין והא קמ"ל ר' יעקב דמעמידין להן אפוטרופין לתם לגבות מגופו

א"ל הכי קאמר חדא דאית ביה תרתי טעמא

רבינא אמר רשות משנה איכא בינייהו כגון דהוה מועד ונתפקח החרש ונשתפה השוטה והגדיל הקטן ר"י סבר הרי הוא בחזקתו ר' יעקב סבר רשות משנה:

ת"ר אפוטרופסים משלמין מן העלייה ואין משלמין כופר

מאן תנא כופרא כפרה ויתמי לאו בני כפרה נינהו

א"ר חסדא ר' ישמעאל בנו של ר' יוחנן בן ברוקה היא דתניא (שמות כא, ל) ונתן פדיון נפשו דמי ניזק ר' ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר דמי מזיק

מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דרבנן סברי כופרא ממונא הוא ור' ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה סבר כופרא כפרה

א"ר פפא לא דכ"ע כופרא כפרה הוא והכא בהא קמיפלגי רבנן סברי בדניזק שיימינן ורבי ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה סבר בדמזיק שיימינן

מ"ט דרבנן נאמרה שיתה למטה ונאמרה שיתה למעלה מה להלן בדניזק אף כאן בדניזק

ור' ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה סבר ונתן פדיון נפשו כתיב

ורבנן אין פדיון נפשו כתיב מיהו כי שיימינן בדניזק שיימינן

משבח ליה רבא לר"נ בדרב אחא בר יעקב דאדם גדול הוא א"ל לכשיבא לידך הביאהו לידי

כי אתא לגביה א"ל בעי מינאי מילתא בעא מיניה שור של שני שותפין כיצד משלמין כופר

משלם האי כופר והאי כופר כופר אחד אמר רחמנא ולא שני כופרין האי חצי כופר והאי חצי כופר כופר שלם אמר רחמנא ולא חצי כופר

אדיתיב וקא מעיין בה א"ל תנן חייבי ערכין ממשכנין אותן חייבי חטאות ואשמות אין ממשכנין אותן חייבי כופרין מאי

כיון דכפרה הוא כחטאת ואשם דמי מחמר חמיר עילויה ולא בעי משכוניה או דלמא כיון דלחבריה הוא דבעי מיתבא ליה ממונא הוא ולא לגבוה הוא ולא חמיר עליה ובעי משכוניה

אי נמי כיון דהוא לא חטא וממוניה הוא דאזיק לא חמיר מילתא עילויה ובעי משכוניה

א"ל שבקן אסתגר בקמייתא:

ת"ר שאלו בחזקת תם ונמצא מועד בעלים משלמין חצי נזק ושואל משלם חצי נזק

הועד בבית שואל והחזירו לבעלים בעלים משלמין חצי נזק ושואל פטור מכלום

אמר מר שאלו בחזקת תם ונמצא מועד בעלים משלמין חצי נזק ושואל חצי נזק ואמאי לימא ליה תורא שאילי אריא לא שאילי

אמר רב הכא במאי עסקינן שהכיר בו שהוא נגחן

ונימא ליה תם שאילי מועד לא שאילי

משום דא"ל סוף סוף אי תם הוה פלגא נזקא בעית שלומי השתא נמי זיל שלים פלגא נזקא

ונימא ליה אי תם הוה משתלם מגופו

משום דא"ל סוף סוף את לאו תורא בעית שלומי לדידי

ונימא ליה

if he  follows the view of R. Judah,  in a case where the precautions taken to control the ox were of an inferior kind and not really adequate,  or if he  follows the view of R. Eliezer b. Jacob,  where no precautions to control the ox had been taken at all,  as it has been taught: R. Eliezer b. Jacob says: Whether in the case of Tam or in the case of Mu'ad, if precautions of [at least] some inferior sort have been taken to control the ox, there would be no liability. The new point made known to us by R. Jacob would thus have been that guardians should be appointed even in the case of Tam to collect payment out of its body. [Why then did Raba explain the former statement of R. Jacob to refer only to Mu'ad? Why did he not explain it to refer to Tam also?] — [In answer] he  said: Raba made  one statement express two principles [in which R. Jacob is in agreement with R. Judah]. Rabina stated that [the question whether or not a change of] control should cause a change [in the state of the ox] might have been the point at issue between them,  e.g., where after the ox had been declared Mu'ad, the deaf-mute recovered his faculty, or the idiot became sane, or the minor came of age, [in which case] R. Judah would maintain that the ox should remain in its status quo whereas R. Jacob would hold that [a change of] control should cause a change [in the state of the ox]. Our Rabbis taught: In the case of guardians, the payment [for damages] will be out of the best of the general estate, though no kofer  will be paid by them. Who is the Tanna who holds that [the payment of] kofer is but an act of atonement  [which would justify the exemption in this case], as [minor] orphans are not subject to the law of atonement? — R. Hisda said: It is R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka. For it was taught: [The words,] Then he shall give for the ransom of his life  [indicate] the value [of the life] of the person killed. But R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka interprets it to refer to the value [of the life] of the defendant. Now, is this not the point at issue between them,  that the Rabbis consider kofer to constitute a civil liability  whereas R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka holds kofer to be of the nature of propitiation?  — R. Papa said that this was not the case. For we may suppose all to agree that kofer is a kind of propitiation, and the point at issue between them here is merely that the Rabbis hold that this propitiatory payment should be fixed by estimating the value [of the life] of the person killed, whereas R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka maintains that it should be fixed by estimating the value of [the life of] the defendant. What reason have the Rabbis for their view? — The expression 'laying upon' is used in the later context  and the same expression 'laying upon' is used in an earlier context;  just as there it refers to the plaintiff, so does it here also refer to the plaintiff. But R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka argued that it is written, 'Then he shall give for the ransom of his life' [referring of course to the defendant]. And the Rabbis? — [They reply,] Yes, it does say 'The ransom of his life', but the amount must be fixed by valuing [the life of] the person killed. Raba in his conversations with R. Nahman used to praise R. Aha b. Jacob as a great man. He  therefore said to him: 'When you come across him, bring him to me.' When he  later came to see him he  said to him: 'You may put problems to me', whereupon he  asked him: 'If an ox of two partners [kill a person] how is the payment of kofer to be made? Shall this one pay kofer and the other one kofer? But one kofer is mentioned by Divine Law and not two kofers! Shall this one [pay] half of the kofer and the other one half of the kofer? A full kofer is commanded by Divine Law and not half of a kofer!' While he  was still sitting and pondering over this, he  further asked him: We have learnt:  'In the case of debtors for valuations  the Sanctuary treasury may demand a pledge, whereas in the case of those who are liable to sin-offerings or for trespass-offerings  no pledge can be enforced.' Now, what would be the law in the case of those liable to kofer? [Shall it be said that] since kofer is a kind of propitiation it should be subject to the same ruling as sin-offerings and trespass-offerings,  the matter being of serious moment to the defendant so that there is no necessity of enforcing a pledge from him; or [shall it] perhaps [be argued that] since it has to be given to a fellow man it is [considered] a civil liability, and as it does not go to the Temple treasury,  it is consequently not taken too seriously by the defendant, for which [reason there may appear to be some] necessity for requiring a pledge? Or, again, since the defendant did not [in this case] himself commit the wrong, for it was his chattel that did the wrong [and committed manslaughter], the whole matter might be considered by him as of no serious moment, and a pledge should therefore be enforced? — He  said to him: 'Leave me alone; I am still held prisoner by your first problem [that has not yet been answered by me].' Our Rabbis taught: If a man borrowed an ox on the assumption that it is in the state of Tam but is subsequently discovered to have already been declared Mu'ad, [if goring is repeated while still with the borrower] the owner will pay one half of the damages and the borrower will pay [the other] half of the damages. But if it was declared Mu'ad while in the possession of the borrower, and [after it] was returned to the owner [it gored again], the owner will pay half the damages while the borrower is exempt from any liability whatsoever. The Master stated: 'If a man borrowed an ox on the assumption that it is in the state of Tam but was subsequently discovered to have already been declared Mu'ad, [if goring is repeated] the owner will pay one half of the damages and the borrower will pay [the other] half of the damages.' But why should the borrower not plead against the owner, 'I wanted to borrow an ox, I did not want to borrow a lion?' — Rab said: we are dealing here with a case where the borrower knew the ox to be a gorer.  Still why can he not plead against him: 'I wanted to borrow an ox in the state of Tam but I did not want to borrow an ox that had already been declared Mu'ad'? — [This could not be pleaded] because the owner might argue against him: 'In any case, even had the ox been still Tam, would you not have to pay half-damages? Now, also, you have to pay one half of the damages.' But still why can he not plead against him: 'Had the ox been Tam, damages would have been paid out of its body'?  — [This could similarly not be pleaded] because the owner might contend: 'In any case would you not have had to reimburse me [to the full extent of] the value of the ox?'  Why can he still not plead against him: